Yesterday, the post introduced another TERRITORIAL
DISPUTE: the South China Sea. Today, we present a research paper that refers to
this situation.
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A
MARITIME GEOGRAPHY OF LATENT CONFLICTUALITY
Marianne PÉRON-DOISE
ABSTRACT
This Research Paper aims to
identify the strategic objectives pursued by Beijing in the South China Sea.
The hypothesis explored is that the South China Sea constitutes a strategic
layer within a global securitisation design. Other than the protection of “near
seas” and the Hainan naval bases, there is an imperative to protect the “far
seas”, i.e. maritime communication channels. The control of the South
China Sea is thus one of the objectives of Xi Jinping’s China, a market power,
as a means to conquer naval power. To do this, China uses a modus operandi pertaining
to that of a “hybrid war”: historic narratives and revisited policies are put
forward, while a preferential use of paramilitary actors such as coastguards,
fishing fleets and maritime militias can be observed. Faced with this
assertiveness, the growing strategic differential and economic interdependence
between Beijing and the South-East Asian states leaves little space for a fairly
negotiated solution that could result in constructive cooperations.
“The rise of the Chinese navy will surely create serious
difficulties for foreign navies, not only limited to the US Navy but also the
ASEAN navies bordering the South China Sea. In the Spratly Islands, the
formation of artificial islands and enclaves provides the Navy, as well as the
Chinese Coastguard, an opportunity to station more units (including aircrafts),
as well as an opportunity to intensify patrols if the developments of the Sanya
and Longpo naval bases on the island of Hainan are taken into account.
Underwater unit patrols are expected to become a standard for Chinese
operations in the South China Sea and to complicate the deployment of other
submarine fleets. Given the dynamism of submarine acquisition in South-East
Asia, the risk of a naval incident at depths is as great as incidents on the
surface. Indeed, in January 2017, Vietnam received the sixth and last
Kilo-class submarine built in Russia, under a $2 billion contract signed in
2009. Indonesia plans to modernize its aging submarine fleet, while Thailand is
discussing the purchase of three Yuan-class Chinese units. Australia is
engaged in an ambitious construction program of twelve Barracuda units.
Malaysia, for its part, has two recent Scorpène-class units. Submarines,
discreet and enduring, are particularly suited to the defence of coasts and
maritime roads, and clearly pertain to “anti-access” strategies designed to
hamper or even prevent the access of opposing forces to a theatre of
operations.
In addition, collaboration between the Navy and the Chinese
Coastguard will continue to blur the lines between military and non-military
operations. Coastguard units are becoming increasingly robust and heavily
armed, as their American or Japanese competitors. The protection of maritime
claims in the South China Sea and the East Sea remain the most obvious
objective in the coordination of these two components. By combining the capabilities
of the two forces, which now include a paramilitary fleet, China should
intensify its harassment of neighbouring nations that seek to defend their
rights in disputed territories5.
These disputed maritime areas will
increase the potentiality of conflict and become subjects of tense confrontations,
especially if the new US administration continues, as it has been doing so
since the beginning of 2017, US Navy deployments in support of freedom of
navigation (Freedom of Navigation Operations, FONOPS). This perspective, and
therefore the possibility of a serious crisis, is all the more worrying as the
Chinese Navy does not possess a developed culture of confidence-building
measures, despite its participation in various fora. For the time being, the
implementation of confidence-building measures or specific provisions to avoid
incidents at sea (such as the INCSEA-type agreement) remains uncertain.”
Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter:
@London1701
04th September 2018
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