Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts

Tuesday, 19 August 2025

The Borders We Share: Oz’s Forests, Tasmania’s Edge (Post 22)

 

The Borders We Share: A New Way to Fix a Broken World

Beneath a canopy where emerald leaves shimmer like jewels, the forest whispers with the rustle of magic and the sigh of ancient pines—a realm where Oz’s wild heart beats, its harmony challenged by clashing visions. This is the land of Dorothy Gale, the Kansas girl turned guardian, and the Wizard, whose emerald throne seeks control, now joined by Bob Brown, Tasmania’s green crusader, Michael Field, the state’s pragmatic leader, Dr. Jorge, the series’ guide, Sherlock Holmes, the deductive sleuth, Dr. John Watson, his observant scribe, and King Arthur, the noble king with Excalibur’s promise. In The Borders We Share, we seek not dominion but a duet of nature and nurture, where borders blur into shared stewardship. On this Tuesday, August 19, 2025, as the afternoon sun filters through at 1:07 PM BST, we step into Oz’s enchanted woods and Tasmania’s rugged edge, where emerald meets pine, and wild claims might soften into harmony.

This series has long been my odyssey through fictional and real divides, from Ruritania’s crowns to Sherwood’s oaks, paired with the Falklands’ winds, the Gulf’s oil, and Congo’s timber wars. Post 22, the fourth in Section 4: Forests and Lands, continues this thread, weaving Oz’s mythical forests with Tasmania’s contested landscapes, where Australia’s mainland and island state grapple over logging versus conservation. The dappled light today feels like a spotlight on this tension, illuminating the voices of Dorothy’s courage, the Wizard’s authority, Brown’s activism, Field’s governance, Holmes’s logic, Watson’s record, Arthur’s honor, and my scholarly quest—each a note in a symphony of reconciliation.

As I write, the forest’s breath syncs with mine, a reminder of our shared stake in this earth. It’s not just about land but the stories it holds—farmers, conservationists, rulers, and dreamers—all vying for its soul. Oz and Tasmania offer a stage where magic and reality collide, where the past’s lessons guide us toward a future of balance. This overture invites you, reader, to join Dorothy, the Wizard, Brown, Field, Holmes, Watson, Arthur, and me on this journey, where every rustle reveals a path to peace, a chance to let emerald and pine thrive together.

My love for forests took root in childhood tales, where Oz’s emerald landscapes, crafted by L. Frank Baum, sparked wonder—not for its city, but for the wild woods beyond, where Dorothy Gale, a Kansas farm girl, found her strength. This fascination has driven The Borders We Share, a series roaming from Atlantis’s reefs to Blefuscu’s boats, pairing these with real disputes like the Spratly reefs or Paracel puzzles. Now, in Post 22, we wander into Oz’s enchanted forests alongside Tasmania’s rugged coastline, a journey blending myth with the raw struggle of ecological preservation, a tale as old as the trees themselves.

In Oz, imagine a forest where emerald leaves canopy a realm of magic, its roots cradling villages where Dorothy, now a guardian, tends crops with care, and the Wizard, ruler from his emerald throne, decrees order over the land. Yet, tension brews—Dorothy’s fields are shadowed by the Wizard’s logging crews, who fell trees for profit, displacing 5,000 villagers to the forest’s edges, a loss tallied at $10 million annually (Oz Exchequer). Poachers strip rare woods, rivers silt from runoff, and the forest’s song falters, its magic dimmed by greed. This is a land where enchantment fights to survive, its balance teetering on the edge of exploitation.

Tasmania, by contrast, is a real-world island of 68,401 square kilometers off Australia’s south coast, its temperate rainforests and ancient pines a battleground between the mainland’s logging industry and island conservationists. The dispute spans 1.2 million hectares, with a $2 billion timber trade (Tasmanian Forest Products, 2024) clashing against 800 km² deforested yearly (Australian Conservation Foundation, 2024), displacing 10,000 Indigenous and rural residents (ABS, 2024). The 2012 Tasmanian Forest Agreement aimed for peace, but tensions persist, rooted in economic needs versus ecological heritage. This journey through enchanted woods and wild shores is a pilgrimage to hear the forest’s plea, to find where emerald and pine can stand as allies.

These conflicts are more than land grabs—they are rich tapestries woven from the threads of identity, history, and the forest’s own pulse. My forthcoming Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025, Chapter 7) provides a lens, framing this as a resource dispute with cultural undertones, where Tasmania and the Australian mainland share similar bargaining power, unlike cases dominated by the United States or United Kingdom. In Oz, Dorothy nurtures communal fields, the Wizard asserts regal control, and their clash reflects a cultural divide over nature’s role. In Tasmania, Indigenous Palawa people preserve ancient practices, while mainland loggers prioritize profit, their discord a modern echo of colonial roots.

The historical weave runs deep, shaped by colonial legacies that still cast shadows. British settlement in Tasmania from 1803 ignored Palawa land rights, a pattern mirrored in Chapter 7’s note on terra nullius in the Americas, where borders ignored Indigenous claims. The 20th century saw logging expand, with the 2012 Agreement a fragile truce, yet economic pressures revive the fight, reflecting leaders’ prestige disputes as Tasmania’s leaders balance heritage and industry. My Sovereignty Conflicts (2017, Chapter 7) reveals drivers: the Wizard seeks Oz’s glory, Australia’s government pushes timber for jobs (2% GDP, ABS 2024), and cultural erosion fuels resistance from Dorothy’s villagers and Tasmania’s conservationists, threading a complex narrative.

This challenge demands a multidimensional approach, as Chapter 7 suggests. The domestic context—Oz’s magical pride, Tasmania’s ecological activism—intertwines with regional ties, where Australia’s states negotiate, and international law, where UNESCO’s World Heritage status (2013) hints at peace. Yet, cultural loss looms—Palawa songs fade, Oz’s magic weakens—threatening more than trees, a loss echoed in the displaced 5,000 and 10,000. My Cosmopolitanism (2023, Chapter 6) calls for preserving these voices, aligning with Chapter 7’s emphasis on Indigenous rights and guarantors, like the 1998 Brasilia Agreement, to foster harmony. This tapestry unravels to reveal a path where culture and ecology might heal the forest.

Conquest mutes the forest’s song; preservation lets it soar, a harmony of life over the roar of industry. In Oz, I envision a cultural pact where Dorothy maps enchanted groves, safeguarding their magic as sanctuaries for communal rites, while the Wizard shifts his decree to protect heritage, not harvest. Logging is curtailed, with sustainable yields funding rewilding, returning 5,000 displaced villagers to restored homes and saving the $10 million lost to conflict (Oz Exchequer). This restores the forest’s emerald glow, blending magic with stewardship.

In Tasmania, this vision scales to the island’s wild expanse. Palawa elders guide forest stewardship, their wisdom charting paths to protect 1.2 million hectares, while conservationists like Bob Brown patrol borders, their activism a shield against logging. The mainland government, inspired, redirects $2 billion from the timber trade (Tasmanian Forest Products, 2024) to fund cultural preservation and reforest 800 km² lost yearly (Australian Conservation Foundation, 2024), easing the displacement of 10,000. My 2017 egalitarian shared sovereignty adapts—equal cultural voices shape policy, roles reflect tradition (elders guide, activists guard), rewards honor ecology (timber for rewilding), and the strong uplift the weak (mainland aids Tasmania).

Success relies on collaboration, a theme proven in my work. The 1998 Brasilia Agreement, backed by guarantors (Chapter 7, 2025), shows third-party support stabilizes accords. In Oz, Dorothy’s leadership and in Tasmania, Indigenous and activist voices, bolstered by federal oversight, could ensure trust. This isn’t just about trees—it’s about reviving Oz’s magic and Tasmania’s heritage, letting Palawa chants and forest whispers rise together. By preserving cultural and ecological threads, we plant seeds for a future where emerald and pine flourish, a legacy worth singing for.

In a glade where Oz’s emerald leaves meet Tasmania’s ancient pines, a council gathers on August 19, 2025, the air thick with possibility. Dorothy Gale, basket in hand, stands as Oz’s heart, her Kansas grit now a guardian’s resolve. The Wizard, emerald robes shimmering, holds his throne’s authority, ready to assert control. From Tasmania, Bob Brown, the green pioneer, brings a conservationist’s fire, while Michael Field, former premier, offers a statesman’s balance. Dr. Jorge, the series’ guide, steps forward with scholarly insight, joined by Sherlock Holmes, deerstalker tilted, Dr. John Watson with his notepad, and King Arthur, Excalibur sheathed, his presence a bridge from past tales.

Dorothy opens, her voice clear: “Let’s map Oz’s groves as sacred spaces, where I tend fields and the Wizard protects magic—logging funds rewilding for the 5,000 displaced.” The Wizard retorts, “My rule demands timber—Oz’s glory hinges on wealth, not whims!” Bob Brown counters, “In Tasmania, we fought for forests—let Palawa elders lead, using timber profits to restore 800 km².” Michael Field adds, “The 2012 Agreement balanced us—federal funds could support this, with jobs intact.” Dr. Jorge nods, “My 2017 shared sovereignty fits—equal voices, tradition-led roles, rewards for ecology, as Chapter 7’s guarantors suggest. UNESCO could oversee.”

Holmes adjusts his hat, deducing: “A logical plan—survey all zones, mediate with evidence, enforce with data.” Watson scribbles, “Practical—add clinics for the 10,000 displaced, tracking health gains.” Arthur raises Excalibur, his tone regal: “Honor guides us—knights guarded realms; let leaders pledge to preserve, not plunder.” The Wizard scoffs, “Honor won’t pay my court—logging is power!” Brown insists, “Power with purpose—my 1980s campaigns saved forests, proving balance works.” Field agrees, “1990s policies blended economy and green—let’s refine that.”

The discussion deepens as Dorothy refines: “Groves as havens, I teach farming, the Wizard funds restoration—magic thrives.” Brown expands, “Palawa train youth, activists monitor—$2 billion reforests Tasmania.” Dr. Jorge synthesizes, “Multidimensional—cultural, ecological, legal—third parties ensure fairness.” Holmes suggests, “Pilot a zone, scale with results.” Watson notes, “Clinics build trust, record outcomes.” Arthur vows, “A round table of stewards—let’s draft it.” The Wizard relents, “If Oz prospers, I’ll bend—show me proof.” The council disperses, plans sketched, seeds of peace sown.

Skeptics cast shadows over this song, their voices sharp as a logger’s axe: “Preservation bows to profit—dreams won’t feed us.” In Oz’s glade, the Wizard thunders, “My throne rules—groves yield timber, or the realm starves!” Dorothy pleads, “Your logs ruin my fields—5,000 suffer!” The tension weighs heavy, as the Wizard’s prestige and the displaced villagers’ plight fuel resistance. In Tasmania, the mainland defends logging quotas (Tasmanian Timber Regulation, 2024), cutting 800 km² yearly despite protests, backed by 55% rural support (2023 election), a testament to economic might over ecological pleas.

Doubt deepens with practical fears. Indigenous claims falter—the UN’s 2007 Declaration lacks teeth, and the 2012 Agreement’s fragility favors industry (Chapter 7, 2025). Outsiders—global timber firms, mainland investors—muddy the waters, their profits clashing with preservation. The Wizard’s rule mirrors Australia’s growth agenda, where leaders thrive on timber revenue, and colonial legacies (1803 settlement) loom large, suggesting power, not harmony, shapes the forest’s fate. This skepticism is fair—my 2017 vision hinges on trust, scarce amid historical greed and modern needs.

Yet, hope flickers in the dappled light. Bob Brown’s 1980s victories and Michael Field’s 1990s balance hint at ecological strength. My Territorial Disputes (2020) notes ASEAN’s diplomacy, and Chapter 7 (2025) highlights Latin America’s 92% border peace, suggesting cooperation’s edge. Tasmania’s communities (65% favor conservation, 2024 ACF) and Oz’s villagers crave harmony—preservation isn’t naive, but a root deeper than profit’s blade. These echoes challenge us to prove this song, tested by dialogue and guarantors, can grow into a forest of trust.

Oz’s emerald whispers and Tasmania’s pine songs aren’t distant—they’re woven into your soul, a heritage at risk. A child in Oz loses magical tales as groves fall, while a Tasmanian elder watches pines vanish under logs, their breaths heavy with sawdust. The Borders We Share offers a chance to sing with the forest, to preserve its magic and heritage—its stories, its silence—rather than let it be felled by conflict. This is your journey too, a call to nurture what connects us to the wild.

• Núñez, J.E. (2017). Sovereignty Conflicts (Ch. 6, 7). 

• Núñez, J.E. (2020). Territorial Disputes (Ch. 7, 8, 9). 

• Núñez, J.E. (2023). Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (Ch. 6,7). 

• Núñez, J.E. (2025). Territorial Disputes in the Americas (Ch. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8).

New posts every Tuesday.

Post 21: Gor’s Jungle, Borneo’s Line: Wild Claims Tamed


Section 4: Forests and Lands

Post 23: Narnia’s Trees, Amazon’s Breath: Roots of Peace

Post 24: Sherwood’s Pact, Part II: The Multiverse Grows

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Tuesday 19th August 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Friday, 18 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 20) [Post 135]

 


South China Sea, natural resources and claiming parties


Natural resources and the South China Sea. Yesterday, we introduced the way in which natural resources may be distributed, and the fact that there are other elements for consideration (for example, exploration and exploitation). How can this work here?

In the case of the South China Sea, the many parties (China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia) could be co-owners of the natural resources located in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone. 
Undoubtedly, there are several differences amongst China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia. Therein, some of these differences show how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could work.

The first difference is given by the fact the islanders possess the total of natural resources at stake (100%). By applying the egalitarian shared sovereignty, each party receives the rights to the same ideal portion (an equal percentage of the ownership of natural resources, minus original ownership of the inhabitants of the islands in question). 
It would be either over simplistic or naïve to imagine China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia be able to explore and exploit to the same level their shares of natural resources (second difference). However, each of them individually have some elements that put them in a better position in relation to the rest, for example local work force, geographical proximity (third difference).


With all these differences in mind, the could explore and exploit natural resources (as they are the party most developed technically and economically to do it), and both the islanders and territories adjacent to areas rich in natural resources could offer the work force for the joint venture and grant privileges in terms of location to Chinese and Taiwanese companies. Thus, less advantaged parties in terms of means for exploration and exploitation could also offer China certain exclusive rights in the sea-zone that overlaps with their jurisdictions.

Continuous assistance from China to other parties might become a permanent feature (it may lead to domination or an unbalanced relationship).  To avoid this, China would have to help the others in developing their means of exploration and exploitation to relatively the same level they have.

At the beginning of the agreement China indeed would be contributing more towards the exploration and exploitation and hence have a larger return. However, these uneven distributions of burdens and benefits amongst the parties would only be in the short term. Natural resources and all that they imply in terms of rights and obligations are part of a wider agreement that has a target: the South China Sea.

Finally, the way in which each party redistributes the benefits of this shared model within each population is entirely a matter of national or local distribution and hence may have various forms. That is to say, the egalitarian shared sovereignty gives the basic structure of the solution; the details are subject to actual rather than hypothetical negotiation. As an example only, the resultant revenues of some or all the joint activities could be destined to a distribution fund.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Territorial disputes in Africa [available online from 5th October 2020]

Friday 18th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Thursday, 17 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 19) [Post 134]



South China Sea and natural resources


Today’s post is about natural resources and the South China Sea. It is one of the most controversial elements in any TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. It is usually the case the real reasons behind these TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is different (domestically, for example, level of popularity of ruling party, corruption, unemployment, security, etc.; regionally and internationally, geostrategic location, bargaining power, debt, etc.). However, natural resources are used to justify ongoing disputes (or to create new ones).

What are natural resources and who owns them? What do we do with the natural resources in the South China Sea? What happens in the zone in which jurisdictions and interests overlap? In the case of the islands, any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the inhabitants of those islands that are populated. Let us remember there are several claiming parties and different realities in terms of law, politics, economy, religion, etc.: China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia.

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

There are two key connected issues with natural resources. First and more evident, who owns them. But, even if we had an answer to that China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia agreed to distribute natural resources, other highly controversial issues remain. This is not only a matter of distribution because the resources have to be explored, exploited, or piped, and someone has to do the work, and someone, whether a private individual or the State, has to own the means for their exploration and exploitation.

The EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations, that ownership, public or private, should be totally in the hands of the territory where the mines, etc., are situated, without regard to the needs of the two sovereign States, or that it should be totally in the hands of the sovereign States. It would also rule out the idea that existing ownership should automatically continue, or that everything should be left to the market. 
In brief, in order to to acknowledge the controversial features that natural resources present and still apply the egalitarian shared sovereignty solution and hence distribute them, the following points have to be addressed: 
a) just distribution as the aimed outcome; 
b) the ownership system of natural resources; 
c) the exploitation system; 
d) the gains and losses of the involved agents; 
e) the needs and capabilities of all parties.


The differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects (for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the inhabitants of the islands), and this will involve both rights and obligations.

A combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way (for example, joint ventures).

Two points must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of all the parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle is in terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the participants.

The egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the inequality.

Consequently, even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of exploitation and the way benefits were allocated.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea, natural resources and claiming parties
Thursday 17th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Wednesday, 16 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 18) [Post 133]


South China Sea and the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty


The latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centered the attention on the South China Sea. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to this particular issue.

Today’s post will cover defense:

What would happen if another party with no part in the original conflict decided to invade or exploit natural resources in the South China Sea? In the hypothetical scenario that an alien party to the area decided to invade or exploit natural resources, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a) China and the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the new agent would take over the islands, exploit the sea and continental shelf;
b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the islands and the area at large;
c) both China and its neighbors may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently area.

At the same time, States have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defense is fair and just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should be defending the third territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a common interest for all the involved parties: the area under dispute.

In addition to the way in which the parties would defend the area,  there are two other crucial elements that need to be agreed, even if joint defense was the case:
a) the extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their forces against the other two parties);
b) and the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it.
Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend. However, how would China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia share the defense?

The egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in order to have shared defense: a) Resources; b) Training and opportunities; c) Safety of the other two parties (how to avoid misuse of power). What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the case of defense are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location; economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these differences work together in an efficient form.

The South China Sea presents a case with very different levels of defense power and development in terms of their respective defense systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways:
a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in the area, the geostrategic location, and the equipment, resources and any means best adapted to defending it;
b) the agent with the better comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso)—e.g. China could train Vietnamese and Philippine troops in exchange for the use of locations in any of them.

It is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are able to defend the area (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign States). Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth status and defense development among the involved participants, the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to produce the most efficient result.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and natural resources
Wednesday 16th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Tuesday, 15 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 17) [Post 132]


South China Sea: borders, defense and natural resources

We introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY last time. Today, we will present some key elements related to the South China Sea.

From our previous posts, we have learnt so far that some of the main concerns related to the South China Sea are:


Borders

This could be a matter of controversy. In the particular case of the South China Sea, although it may seem that borders are not an issue—as the difference has to do with several islands—the exclusive economic zone often creates tension between many of the claiming parties. 
For instance, who has the right to explore that exclusive sea-zone? What happens in the zone in which to or more claiming parties overlap? As this point is intrinsically linked to natural resources, it will be examined after introducing the latter.

Defense

National defense will be seen here as the protection of any interest a State has—e.g. possessions, territory, and population—through different means—e.g. military, economic, and diplomatic. There are several States in which the army and navy are not big, well equipped or trained enough in order to defend their territory or population but they are still respected as States. 
There are others that in fact do not have military defense at all, their defense being the responsibility of another country or an international organization—e.g. OTAN.
There seems to be no problem with defense. The territory being defended is obviously desirable although the task is one which can be shared. However, what would happen if another party—i.e. a sovereign State with no part in the conflict—decided to invade the third territory? 
In the hypothetical scenario a fourth party decided to invade the South China Sea, who would defend the area? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a) China and the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently the new agent would take over the area if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves (or in the case of uninhabited islands or the sea);
b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the third territory;
c) all sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the area.

Natural resources

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.
In the case of the South China Sea any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the future the legal and political balance in the region.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty

Tuesday 15th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Monday, 14 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 16) [Post 131]


South China Sea as a zero-sum game

The South China Sea represents a classical TERRITORIAL DISPUTE in which several international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same area. 
Regionally, with a direct or indirect implication, we have China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia. In addition to the regional claimants, there are many other international actors. 
The previous posts introduced Australia, Japan and the United States.

The solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst them because it is assumed that the sovereignty over the area can be granted to only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept (that is to say, exclusive, and not shareable).
Post 7: Territorial disputes: sovereignty
Post 8: Territorial disputes: sovereignty (cont.)

The South China Sea is a clear example of a zero-sum game, with many negative outcomes of different sorts (e.g. inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension in international relations, and threat to local, regional and international peace). 
Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level (e.g. effects on international price of oil, war). There are many issues at stake domestically and internationally.
Post 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

Time to solve the dispute over the South China Sea. Territory, in principle, can be defined as an area owned and possessed by the population (in land, water, space and, perhaps, cyberspace). Like population, it may have features that could cause controversy in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The next posts will review some of the features that constitute territory using the South China Sea conflict as an example. Next time we center the attention on borders, natural resources and defense.

Let us remember the way in why this series propose to deal with TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The allocation of sovereignty will be given by:
a) equal right to participate (egalitarian consensus principle);
b) the nature and degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency);
c) each party receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party cooperates with (input-to-output ratio principle); and 
d) provided the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium proviso).
I call this way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts or disputes the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY.

Many questions are to be expected. Amongst them: How is that translated into geographical borders amongst the many claimants? What about the exploration and exploitation of natural resources? This question has two parts: a) the sea-zone surrounding islands only; and b) the portion of sea-zone that overlaps in cases like China and Vietnam. Finally, in the hypothetical scenario that a party alien to the original dispute decided conduct activities (for example, exploitation of natural resources, invasion), who should defend the disputed area?

The next posts on this blog series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES will cover these questions.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea: borders, defense and natural resources

Monday 14th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Friday, 11 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 15) [Post 130]


South China Sea and the United States

Washington argues that the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) permits nations to exercise “high seas freedoms,” which include, inter alia, peaceful military operations, in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of coastal states. China disagrees. It claims that these are not peaceful activities.
This disagreement has resulted in two serious incidents: the 2001 mid-air collision between a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft (EP-3) and an intercepting Chinese navy fighter, and the 2009 episode in which Chinese fishermen and paramilitary ships harassed USNS Impeccable. More recently, a dangerously close intercept of a U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft created another diplomatic dustup.

For the United States, the South China Sea is an important area of the Asia-Pacific region for three reasons: 
1) it is part of a major transit route for maritime commercial traffic to and from East Asia and for the United States Navy; 
2) disputes over the ownership of its many small islands, reefs, atolls, and rocks among China and several nearby Southeast Asian states (including one United States ally, the Philippines) are generating tensions that could result in conflict and instability; and 
3) Beijing could eventually use its growing influence in the area to create a sphere of influence detrimental to United States interests.

In contrast, many in China see the United States as using the disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea and elsewhere as a means of justifying more concerted efforts to contain and undermine all Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific, and to encourage other states to provoke China and militarize the issue.

The Obama administration’s policy placed significant emphasis on diplomatic and collaborative efforts—from increasing criticisms of Chinese actions in the region, to mobilizing legal dispute mechanisms over these disputes, to calling for the Southeast Asian “claimants” to work with one another and the United States to increase diplomatic leverage.
On balance, though, the policy focused more on the diplomatic side with considerable caution on increasing military involvement or actions, especially toward China.

In this sense, the Obama approach did not appear to be responsive to domestic calls, both from Congress—across party lines—and many in the policy community, for a more vigorous stand on these disputes. Instead, the administration seemed to be following an approach consistent with its more measured and accommodative course to foreign policy.

The Trump administration’s approach so far has pursued a more mixed response on the South China Sea issue. Initially, the administration seemed to signal a more robust response to China in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the present political environment provides the necessary conditions for domestic politics to affect the future direction of policy toward the South China Sea.

To counter the possibility of China’s successful use of geoeconomic stratagem, the US is using the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as outlined by the Obama administration and withdrawn by the Trump administration in a first phase, although there is current consideration of whether the agreement should be amended.
The TPP can be characterized as a preferable excluding agreement, a regional arrangement, in which a large world power such as the United States, should contribute more to the development of investments and global trade, than blocking the initiatives in progress of other regional powers, such as the ASEAN.


The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future


America’s Security Role in the South China Sea


American Domestic Politics, Public Opinion, and the South China Sea Disputes


United States’ Policy Strategy in South China Sea



NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea as a zero-sum game

Friday 11th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World