South
China Sea and Japan
On the South China Sea issue, although
Japan is not a claimant country, it fears that China’s attempts to assert
sovereignty over the South China Sea will embolden Beijing in its dispute with
Japan over the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands). Tokyo hopes to strengthen ASEAN unity
on its policy with China over the South China Sea. After the judgment of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) regarding the South China Sea dispute in
July 2016, Cambodia became a major supporter for Beijing by blocking mention of
the international tribunal ruling within the consensus-based ASEAN. Japan tried
to change Cambodia’s position through infrastructure support commitments.
Tokyo’s own security interests and
geopolitical considerations for its position within the Asian security order—in
particular, its competition with a rising China—drive its approach toward the
South China Sea. Furthermore, Japan’s perspective toward the South China Sea,
through which $5 trillion in maritime trade traverses annually, is informed by
the overall importance of the region for global commerce. In particular, as a
net importer of energy, Japan’s energy security is highly dependent on
commercial sea lanes crossing the South China Sea. Keeping sea lanes open to
free navigation and overflight is thus central to Japan’s grand strategic
thinking about the South China Sea. Following China, Japan is the world’s
largest net importer of fossil fuels. Notably, 83 percent of Japan’s energy
imports originate in the Middle East and pass through the strategically pivotal
Malacca Strait before making their way through the South China Sea to access
the waters of the western Pacific, between the First and Second Island Chains,
on their way to Japanese ports.
The Government of Japan believes that the
South China Sea issue is directly related to peace and stability of the region.
More importantly, however, Japan recognizes the possibility of conflict in the
region as a threat to the integrity of the international maritime order as a
whole.
Japan’s policy towards the South China
Sea is likely to have a considerable bearing on the future shape of the
regional order in this region although ultimately US-China competition and the
reaction of the other countries around the SCS will have a more decisive
bearing.
Important economic interests are
related to Japan’s involvement in the off-shore (as well as onshore) prospection
and extraction of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea region in order
to pursue the goal of diversification of supply of hydrocarbon as well as the
marketing of Japan’s high technology services in the energy sector.
But not only economic interests but
also geostrategic concerns have made the stability of the ASEAN member states
of central importance to Japan. Next to Japan’s dependence on the freedom of
navigation through the South China Sea , it is the nexus of its security
alliance with the US and the interdependence of the security in the East China
Sea and the South China Sea. Standing up to Chinese assertiveness in the South
China Sea and supporting in some way the other littoral states of the SCS is
perceived as necessary to maintain US support against Chinese policies in the East
China Sea.
Until recently, Japan mostly
contributed to stability of the region through economic means. The Japanese government
has started helping the more vocal SCS littoral states with their coast guard
and military capacity. The increased Japanese involvement in the security of the
SCS has been very much promoted by the US through various new bilateral defence
policy agreements.
In contrast to its reticence and
hesitant attitude in the 1990s, Japan’s current approach to the South China Sea
has been much more active and multi-dimensional. The Japanese government has
been eager to actively participate in ASEAN-centered security dialogues. The
basic strategy Tokyo has employed in multilateral arenas is to include the
concept of maritime security on the agenda, emphasizing the importance of
resolving territorial disputes in a peaceful manner and securing freedom of
navigation.
Chinese and Japanese infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia:
from rivalry to cooperation?
Japan’s Grand Strategy in the South China Sea
Japan’s Policy towards the South China Sea
Link to document
Link to document
The South China Sea: A View from Japan
Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter:
@London1701
19th September 2018
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