BOOK PREVIEW [coming May 2017] Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. Chapter One: General Structure

Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics

A Distributive Justice Issue

By Jorge E. Núñez

Previously:

About the Book

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter One: Introduction.

Chapter One

General structure

To evaluate the potential for using principles of distributive

justice to resolve certain kinds of sovereignty conflicts, 

the monograph is divided into three Parts.

The First Part

The First Part—i.e. Chapters One and Two—includes 

discussion on two preliminary potential pitfalls to this project 

that is the use of Rawlsian methodology and the use of the 

concept of ‘sovereignty’. Chapter One, the Introduction, 

presents some simplifying assumptions and the 

basic elements that constitute this study and in 

particular goes through the critical discussion on 

Rawls methodology in order to justify its application.

Chapter Two will address a key task in developing the 

new approach: to examine if the concept of 

‘sovereignty’, which is assumed by many to be absolute, 

can be (and in fact, actually is) limited. This Chapter 

follows two lines of analysis: a) conceptual; and b) historical.

The Second Part

The Second Part—i.e. Chapters Three, Four, and Five—

introduces and explores the current state of affairs in 

international law and politics in terms of conceptual elements 

and potential remedies to sovereignty conflicts.

Chapter Three will focus on assessing the need for a revised 

‘shared sovereignty’ and will review different ways in which 

this concept (in various versions or conceptions) and similar 

ones have been previously applied in legal and political 

scholarly literature.

Chapter Four will examine self-ownership as a way to define 

sovereignty. More precisely, if it can be established that 

sovereignty may in theory be limited and the need of a 

revised ‘shared sovereignty’ the next step will be to evaluate 

how sovereignty can be shared—i.e. how a State can limit 

itself by sharing its rights and obligations and still remain 

sovereign.

Chapter Five highlights the main remedies applied at 

international level to sovereignty conflicts and will explore 

each in order to determine whether any of them could be a 

reasonable solution to the sovereignty conflicts discussed. 

What this Chapter will argue is that there is a need for a 

reasonable solution that the reviewed international remedies 

cannot offer.

The Third Part

The Third Part—i.e. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight—will 

explore the use of Rawlsian methodology in order to put a 

solution to certain sovereign conflicts, and discuss if the 

outcome is a reasonable remedy for them.

Chapter Six will introduce and explore: a) the conditions for 

achieving justice—toleration, peace, etc.; b) why the ‘just 

acquisition’ principle may not work; and c) why the Rawlsian 

method of conceiving of the respective claimants as behind a 

‘veil of ignorance’ just might.

Chapter Seven will test the proposed model by working out 

what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would 

best, realise it. In order to do that this Chapter will make use 

of some sovereign conflicts to show that the model can be 

extended from the general principles to workable institutions 

that realise those principles in: a) population; b) territory; c) 

government and law; and d) all that they imply (e.g. 

defence, natural resources, financial system).

Finally, Chapter Eight will conclude by assessing the model’s 

potential and highlighting any possible limitations and 

implications.

More preview posts coming in January 2017.

Routledge PREORDER

BOOK PREVIEW [coming in 2017] Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. Chapter One: Introduction.

Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics

A Distributive Justice Issue

By Jorge E. Núñez

Chapter One

Sovereignty conflicts as a distributive justice dilemma

Introduction

It is arguably a truism in international law and politics that an ultimate 

sovereign, with a common legal bond or system of norms, will govern 

one territory with population. What would happen if that one territory 

and population had two ultimate and hierarchically equal sovereigns 

(legally speaking) and, at the same time, two valid sets of norms? 

Would it be possible, for instance, that Israel and Palestine had sovereign 

authority at the same time over Jerusalem? Would it be possible that 

Argentina and the United Kingdom were at one time sovereign over the 

territory and population of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands? If the answer 

were positive, what would the consequences be—in terms of territory, 

population, government and law?

About the Book

Routledge PREORDER

Sovereignty over the Falklands: who has the right to claim?

Once again the Falkland Islands on the news. And once again because of a conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom. There are, like in previous occasions, many terms from legal and political theory that are being used without much accuracy: sovereignty, self-determination, colonialism, implanted population and so on. It is a fact, the confusion and misuse is evident for someone that is used to dealing with legal theory or international relations as well as the real intentions behind such a use.

Leaving aside anecdotic discussions about the governmental interests of both Argentina and the United Kingdom, it is sill undefined who has the right to claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The arguments from one side and the other focus on short and medium term impact but even the islanders seem to be forgotten.

It is the time for a more egalitarian approach in international relations. To be equal does not mean that we are not different. Being equal means that every being has the same “weight”, that his opinion has equal worth. Moreover, an equal moral status implies more than simply respect to mutual claims. Therefore, even though we have competing claims in a case like the Falklands, the main issue is that the parties involved appear to have an unequal right to participate.

Assuming that both claiming parties finally decided to leave behind egoistical interests and were looking for a real, definitive and peaceful solution for the conflict, before going into any negotiations, they would need to agree on who would be able to participate. Indeed, this is a key question to solve, particularly important to all the claiming parties because not only do Argentina and the United Kingdom opposed to each other but also they –to a different extent- neglect the direct participation of the Falkland Islanders (Argentina simply rejects them in any negotiation; the United Kingdom speaks on their behalf, differently from what they do in the case of Gibraltar for which they apply the principle “two flags, three voices”).

Any claiming party in any sovereignty conflict should have what I call a ‘colourable claim’. In other words, they must have a valid reason to claim sovereignty over the Falklands—e.g. effective occupation, consent by the other agent in the dispute, consent by other States, and/or consent by the international community. That reason should be ‘colourable’ enough to prove that their intended rights are at least plausible to be acknowledged, and they can be based on any reasonable circumstances—e.g. political, historical, legal, geographical arguments to name a few. For example, in the case of the Falkland Islands it would be unreasonable for Russia to participate in the negotiations in relation to their sovereignty since they do not have any colourable claim over that territory.

Some questions may arise, in particular, in relation to the participation of the Falkland Islanders in the negotiations: would it be fair for them to negotiate the sovereignty of the territory they are inhabitants of? On the other hand, do we need some minimum criteria here to help us determine when the residents of the disputed territory get a vote?—e.g. what if these residents were brought there by one of the competing parties? And that is the main obstacle Argentina always introduces.

Indeed, it may seem unfair for someone to negotiate what is supposed to be his own. However, the reality is that the sovereignty over the Falkland Island is the centre of the whole dispute. These inhabitants do live there, but their right to do so is under discussion. Nevertheless, that does not mean that they can be left outside the negotiations. It must be made clear that they are rational beings and human beings and hence they have human rights, even though sovereignty disputes are not an issue of human rights only. Therefore, it would be simply unfair to ask them to leave or not to take their claimed rights into consideration. In the hypothetical scenario there were negotiations and the islanders did not participate, two sovereign States would be deciding the future of a whole population (and for the next generations) with various consequences at different levels—e.g. territory, exploitation of natural resources, law, taxes, etc., and that seems completely unfair.

If we pursue a solution both possible and fair, to ask the Falkland Islanders to go into negotiations is fair, provided that their right participate is welcomed by all the claiming parties—i.e. they have a colourable claim.

Soberanía sobre Malvinas: ¿quién tiene derecho a reclamar?

Una vez más, las Islas Malvinas en las noticias. Y una vez más debido a un conflicto entre Argentina y el Reino Unido. Hay, como en ocasiones anteriores, muchos términos de la teoría jurídica y política que se están utilizando sin mucha precisión: soberanía, autodeterminación, colonialismo, población implantada, sólo por nombrar algunos. Es un hecho, la confusión y el mal uso es evidente para alguien que está acostumbrado a tratar con la teoría del derecho o relaciones internacionales, así como las intenciones reales detrás de este uso.

Dejando a un lado las discusiones anecdóticas acerca de los intereses gubernamentales de Argentina y el Reino Unido, se encuentra aun indefinido quién tiene el derecho de reclamar soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas. Los argumentos de un lado y el otro se focalizan en el impacto a corto y mediano plazo, pero incluso los isleños parecen ser olvidados.

Es el momento de adoptar un enfoque más egalitario en las relaciones internacionales. Ser iguales no significa que no seamos diferentes. Ser iguales tiene que ver con el "peso" que tiene cada ser, con que su opinión tenga el mismo valor que la de otro. Asimismo, un status moral igual implica más que simplemente respetar los reclamos mutuos. Por lo tanto, a pesar de que existen reclamos recíprocos en un caso como el de las Malvinas, el problema principal es que las partes involucradas parecen tener un derecho desigual a participar.

Suponiendo que ambas partes reclamantes finalmente decidieran dejar atrás los intereses egoístas y buscaran una solución real, definitiva y pacífica para el conflicto, antes de entrar en cualquier negociación, tendrían que ponerse de acuerdo sobre quién sería capaz de participar. De hecho, esta es una cuestión clave a resolver, particularmente importante para todas las partes que reclaman porque no sólo Argentina y el Reino Unido se han opuesto recíprocamente, sino que también existe un diferente grado de desidia respecto de la participación directa de los isleños de Malvinas (Argentina simplemente los rechaza en cualquier negociación; el Reino Unido habla en su nombre, a diferencia de lo que hacen en el caso de Gibraltar, para el que aplican el principio de "dos banderas, tres voces").

Cualquier parte que reclama soberanía en todo conflicto debe tener lo que llamo un "reclamo verosímil”. En otras palabras, deben tener una razón válida para reclamar la soberanía sobre Malvinas-por ejemplo, ocupación efectiva, el consentimiento del otro agente en la disputa, el consentimiento de otros Estados, y/o el consentimiento de la comunidad internacional. Esta razón debería ser suficientemente verosímil como para probar que los derechos que reclaman son por lo menos plausible de ser reconocidos, y pueden basarse en cualquier circunstancia razonable, por ejemplo, elementos políticos, históricos, argumentos legales, razones geográficas, por nombrar algunos. A título ilustrativo, en el caso de las Islas Malvinas no sería razonable que Rusia participe en las negociaciones en relación a su soberanía, ya que no tendría ningún reclamo verosímil sobre ese territorio.

Algunas preguntas que pueden surgir, en particular, en relación a la participación de los isleños en las negociaciones: ¿sería justo para ellos negociar la soberanía del territorio del que son habitantes? Por otro lado, ¿necesitamos criterios mínimos aquí para ayudarnos a determinar cuando los residentes del territorio en disputa tienen voto? Y el principal obstáculo esgrimido por Argentina: ¿qué sucede si estos residentes fueron llevados allí por una de las partes reclamantes?

De un lado, puede parecer injusto que alguien deba negociar respecto a algo que supone suyo. Sin embargo, la realidad es que la soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas es el centro de toda la disputa. Estos habitantes viven allí, pero su derecho a hacerlo está en discusión. De todas maneras, eso no significa que puedan ser dejados fuera de las negociaciones. Debe quedar en claro que son seres racionales y seres humanos y por lo tanto tienen derechos humanos, a pesar que las disputas de soberanía no son una cuestión de derechos humanos solamente. Por lo tanto, sería simplemente injusto pedirles que se retiren o no considerar los derechos que invocan. En el hipotético caso que existieran negociaciones y los isleños no participaran, dos Estados soberanos estarían decidiendo el futuro de toda una población (y el de las próximas generaciones), con consecuencias diversas en diferentes niveles (por nombrar algunas, territorio, explotación de los recursos naturales, derecho, impuestos, etc,) y esta situación resulta a todas luces completamente injusta.

Si buscamos una solución posible y razonable, proponer a los isleños negociaciones respecto de la soberanía sobre Malvinas es justo, si y solo si su derecho a participar es bienvenido por todas las partes reclamantes-es decir, tienen un reclamo verosímil.