Showing posts with label Malaysia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Malaysia. Show all posts

Tuesday, 12 August 2025

The Borders We Share: Gor’s Jungle, Borneo’s Line (Post 21)

 

The Borders We Share: A New Way to Fix a Broken World

Beneath a canopy where sunlight fractures into emerald shards, the jungle hums with a primal symphony—ancient chants drift from hidden groves, vines sway with the weight of forgotten tales, and the air carries the scent of damp earth and wild orchids. This is Gor, a counter-earth realm where the wild heart beats fiercely, its rhythm disrupted by clashing claims that echo like distant thunder, a stage for Tarl Cabot, the Earthman guide seeking balance, and Marlenus, the Ubar of Ar, whose scepter enforces order. In The Borders We Share, I, Dr Jorge, have long sought to transform discord into harmony, joined by Sherlock Holmes, the deductive master from London’s fog, Dr. John Watson, his ever-observant companion, and King Arthur, the legendary ruler wielding Excalibur for justice, alongside Tun Mustapha, Sabah’s wise chief minister, and Tom Harrisson, the anthropologist who united Borneo’s tribes. On this Tuesday, August 12, 2025, as mist clings to the dawn and the world awakens, we step into this tale, where wild claims might yield to a shared song.

The narrative of borders is not new to me; it’s a thread I’ve followed through fictional realms and real-world fractures, each a mirror to the other. From Sherwood’s oaks with Robin Hood to Atlantis’s sunken reefs, I’ve paired these tales with the Congo’s timber wars, Vietnam’s Paracel puzzles, and beyond, seeking a pattern of peace amid strife. This post, the third in Section 4: Forests and Lands, builds on that legacy, weaving Gor’s jungle saga with Borneo’s border dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia, where Tarl’s mediation, Marlenus’s rule, Mustapha’s statesmanship, Harrisson’s insight, Holmes’s logic, Watson’s notes, Arthur’s honor, and my scholarly vision converge to explore a path forward. The mist today feels like a veil lifting, revealing not just land but the cultures, histories, and hopes entwined within it—a call to tame wild claims with understanding rather than force.

As I pen this, the jungle’s pulse resonates with my own heartbeat, a reminder of why this series matters. It’s not just about lines on a map but about the people and spirits they enclose—hunters, planters, tribes, and rulers—all seeking a place in the sun. Gor and Borneo offer a canvas where the wild and the civilized collide, where the past whispers through the trees, urging us to find a way forward. This overture is my invitation to you, dear reader, to join Tarl, Marlenus, Mustapha, Harrisson, Holmes, Watson, Arthur, and me on this path, where every step uncovers a story of resilience and the potential for a harmonious chorus to rise above the clamor.

My fascination with jungles began in childhood, sparked by tales of lost worlds where every rustle hid a narrative waiting to be unraveled. Gor, inspired by John Norman’s Gor series, became a personal obsession—not for its warrior bravado, but for its portrayal of a counter-earth wilderness where Tarl Cabot, an Earthman turned guide, navigates a delicate balance among diverse inhabitants. This love of wild spaces has shaped The Borders We Share, a series that roams from Ruritania’s crowns to Oz’s emeralds, pairing these with real disputes like the Falklands’ winds or the Gulf’s oil. Now, in this post, we venture into Gor’s jungle alongside Borneo’s contested frontier, a journey that promises to blend myth with the gritty reality of cultural survival.

In Gor, the landscape is a living tapestry—kapok trees stretch skyward, their roots cradling thatched villages where Kael, a hunter, tracks game with reverence passed down through generations, and Sira, a planter, tends taro fields with the care of a mother nurturing her child. Marlenus, the Ubar of Ar, rules with a scepter that symbolizes authority, his decrees intended to unify but often dividing as Kael’s hunts encroach on Sira’s crops, and poachers strip rare woods for profit. The rivers silt from overuse, displacing 8,000 villagers to the jungle’s ragged edges, a loss that echoes at $15 million annually (Gor Ledger). This is a land where the wild spirit fights to breathe, its harmony threatened by unchecked ambition and the weight of tradition clashing with progress.

Borneo, by contrast, is a real-world jungle of 743,330 square kilometers, split among Malaysia’s Sabah and Sarawak, Indonesia’s Kalimantan, and Brunei, its borders drawn by the 1891 Anglo-Dutch Treaty with little regard for the Dayak, Iban, or Punan tribes who call it home. The dispute over 1.6 million hectares, fueled by a $10 billion palm oil industry (Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2024) and timber, sees 1,500 km² deforested yearly (World Resources Institute, 2024), displacing 20,000 Indigenous people (UNHCR, 2024). The ICJ’s 2002 ruling on Sipadan and Ligitan favored Malaysia, yet Indonesia’s claims linger, rooted in colonial scars and the cultural bonds that defy artificial lines. This journey through vines and villages is a pilgrimage to hear the land’s voice, to find where wild claims can be tamed by mutual respect.

These disputes transcend mere territorial tugs—they are rich tapestries woven from the threads of identity, history, and the land’s own heartbeat. My Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025, Chapter 7) offers a lens, framing this as a border dispute with deep cultural undertones, where Malaysia and Indonesia wield similar bargaining power, unlike cases dominated by the United States or United Kingdom. In Gor, Kael’s hunts honor ancestral rites, Sira’s fields sustain communal life, and Marlenus asserts a ruler’s claim, each a strand in the cultural fabric. In Borneo, Dayak weavers craft baskets, Iban singers preserve epics, and governments draw lines, their actions a discordant note against Indigenous harmony. Chapter 7’s typology highlights these cultural components, noting how Indigenous rejection of mono-ethnic states mirrors Gor’s tribal ethos and Borneo’s multi-ethnic villages.

The historical roots run deep, a legacy of colonial indifference that still shapes the present. The 1891 Anglo-Dutch Treaty, drawn with scant regard for Borneo’s terrain or tribes, parallels Chapter 7’s observation of imprecise demarcations in the Americas, treating Indigenous lands as terra nullius. Post-independence, Malaysia’s 1963 formation and Indonesia’s Konfrontasi (1963–1966) reflect leaders’ prestige disputes, where national pride overrides tribal unity, much like Marlenus’s rule in Gor. My Sovereignty Conflicts (2017, Chapter 7) uncovers the drivers: Marlenus seeks glory to cement his reign, Malaysia’s leaders push palm oil for 4% GDP growth (IMF, 2024), and cultural erosion fuels resistance from both Gor’s villagers and Borneo’s tribes. These forces weave a complex web, where the past’s shadows lengthen into today’s struggles.

The challenge demands a multidimensional view, as Chapter 7 suggests. The domestic context—pride in Gor’s traditions, Borneo’s tribal resilience—intertwines with regional ties, where Malaysia and Indonesia negotiate under ASEAN’s gaze, and international law, where the ICJ’s 2002 ruling hints at peace. Yet, cultural loss looms large—Dayak dances fade, Iban lore silences—threatening more than land, a loss echoed in Gor’s displaced 8,000. My Cosmopolitanism (2023, Chapter 6) calls for preserving these voices, not just dividing resources, aligning with Chapter 7’s emphasis on Indigenous rights and the potential of external guarantors, like the 1998 Brasilia Agreement, to foster harmony. This tapestry unravels to reveal a path where culture, not conquest, might heal the jungle.

Conquest silences the jungle’s song; preservation lets it rise anew, a melody of life over the din of ownership. In Gor, I envision a cultural covenant where Tarl Cabot maps sacred groves, preserving their spiritual essence as havens for tribal rites, while Kael hunts sustainably, honoring the balance his ancestors knew. Sira plants taro with rituals that bind the community, and Marlenus shifts his scepter’s focus from control to heritage protection, ensuring the jungle’s wild soul endures. Timber trade profits, carefully regulated, fund rewilding projects, bringing 8,000 displaced villagers back to restored homes, saving the $15 million lost to conflict (Gor Ledger) and replanting the land’s memory.

In Borneo, this vision scales to the island’s vast expanse. Dayak elders guide forest stewardship, their wisdom charting paths to protect 1.6 million hectares from further loss, while Iban hunters patrol borders, their songs a shield against encroachment. Governments, inspired by this cultural lead, redirect $10 billion from the palm oil industry (Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2024) to fund cultural centers and reforest 1,500 km² lost yearly (World Resources Institute, 2024), easing the displacement of 20,000 (UNHCR, 2024). My 2017 concept of egalitarian shared sovereignty adapts here—equal cultural voices shape decisions, roles reflect tradition (elders guide, hunters guard), rewards honor stewardship (timber for rewilding), and the strong uplift the weak (governments support tribes). This approach, rooted in Chapter 7’s multidimensional framework, prioritizes preservation over division.

The success of this song hinges on collaboration, a theme tested across my work. The 1998 Brasilia Agreement between Ecuador and Peru, backed by guarantors (Chapter 7), shows how third-party support can stabilize cultural accords. In Gor, Tarl’s mediation and in Borneo, Indigenous leadership, bolstered by regional bodies like ASEAN, could ensure trust. This isn’t just about land—it’s about reviving the jungle’s voice, letting Dayak chants and Iban epics rise alongside Gor’s tribal hymns. By preserving cultural heritage, we plant seeds for a future where the wild claims of today become the harmonious roots of tomorrow, a legacy worth singing for.

In a clearing where Gor’s vines part and Borneo’s rainforest meets the imagination, a council assembles under a canopy of ancient trees, their leaves filtering the morning light of August 12, 2025. Tarl Cabot, spear-staff in hand, stands as mediator, his gaze steady from years navigating Gor’s wilds. Beside him, Marlenus, Ubar of Ar, grips his scepter, his presence commanding yet tinged with pride. From Borneo, Tun Mustapha, Sabah’s first chief minister, brings a statesman’s calm, his experience shaping Malaysia’s 1963 unity, while Tom Harrisson, the anthropologist who rallied Dayak tribes in 1945, offers a scholar’s depth. Dr. Jorge, the series’ guide, steps forward with a scholar’s vision, notebook in hand, joined by Sherlock Holmes, deerstalker tilted, Dr. John Watson scribbling notes, and King Arthur, Excalibur sheathed, his regal aura bridging past and present.

Tarl opens with a proposal, his voice resonant: “Let’s map Gor’s sacred groves as neutral zones, where Kael hunts sustainably, Sira plants with rites, and timber funds rewilding for the 8,000 displaced.” Marlenus interrupts, his tone firm: “My law must hold—timber strengthens Ar, and I’ll not yield to chaos!” Mustapha counters with a regional vision: “In 1963, we balanced tribes and state—let Malaysia and Indonesia form a Borneo Council, funding cultural hubs with palm oil profits.” Harrisson nods, adding, “1945 taught me Dayak unity—train elders as stewards, preserving their songs and forests.” Dr. Jorge interjects, “My 2017 shared sovereignty fits—equal cultural voices, tradition-led roles, rewards for stewardship, as Chapter 7’s guarantors suggest. ASEAN could oversee.”

Holmes adjusts his deerstalker, his mind racing: “A deductive approach—map all disputed zones with precision, mediate with evidence, and establish a compliance mechanism.” Watson, pen poised, suggests, “Practical—add health clinics for the displaced 20,000 in Borneo, monitoring their well-being.” Arthur raises Excalibur slightly, his voice steady: “Honor binds us—knights guarded lands; let leaders protect culture, not conquer it. A round table of tribes and states could pledge this.” Marlenus scoffs, “Honor fades under might—Konfrontasi proved strength, not tables!” Mustapha replies, “Strength with unity—1963 worked because we listened to the land.”

The debate deepens as Tarl refines his idea: “Groves as sanctuaries, hunters and planters sharing rites—timber trades fund restoration, not ruin.” Harrisson expands, “Elders training youth could revive Dayak dances, Iban epics—culture as a shield.” Dr. Jorge synthesizes, “Multidimensional—cultural preservation, ecological recovery, legal enforcement—third parties like the ICJ could ensure fairness.” Holmes deduces, “Test it in a pilot zone, scale with data—disputes solved case by case.” Watson notes, “Clinics could track health, build trust.” Arthur concludes, “A pact sealed by honor—let’s draft it, with guarantors to hold us true.” Marlenus relents, “If glory shines through peace, I’ll bend—show me the plan.”

The council lingers, voices blending like the jungle’s chorus. Tarl sketches a map, Mustapha outlines a council structure, Harrisson lists cultural priorities, Dr. Jorge cites Chapter 7’s success with guarantors, Holmes plots a strategy, Watson records details, and Arthur blesses the effort with a knight’s vow. The air thickens with possibility—Gor’s groves and Borneo’s trails could heal, not divide. Marlenus, softening, adds, “If my people thrive, I’ll support this—prove it works.” The council disperses, seeds of peace sown, ready to grow from this dialogue into a living accord.

Skeptics cast shadows over this song, their voices sharp as a hunter’s arrow: “Culture bends to power—preservation is a dreamer’s tale.” In Gor’s grove, Marlenus thunders, “My scepter rules—sacred sites bow to order, or chaos reigns!” Kael retorts, “Your rule kills my hunt—trust died with your decrees!” Sira sighs, “Your hunts ruin my fields—harmony’s a lost echo!” The weight of doubt presses, as Marlenus’s prestige and the displaced 8,000’s plight fuel resistance. In Borneo, Malaysia defends logging leases (Sabah Land Ordinance, 2024), clearing 1,500 km² despite protests, backed by 60% rural support (2023 election), a testament to state might over cultural pleas.

The skepticism deepens with practical fears. Indigenous claims falter—the UN’s 2007 Declaration lacks binding force, and the ICJ’s 2002 ruling leaned toward Malaysia, sidelining tribal voices (Chapter 7). Outsiders—British colonial firms, Chinese investors—muddy the waters, their economic pull clashing with cultural preservation. Marlenus’s rule mirrors Malaysia’s growth agenda, where leaders thrive on strife, and the 1891 Treaty’s colonial legacy looms large, suggesting power, not harmony, dictates the jungle’s fate. This doubt is fair—my 2017 vision of shared sovereignty hinges on trust, a rare commodity amid historical grudges and modern greed.

Yet, hope flickers in the mist. Tom Harrisson’s 1945 unity of Dayak tribes and Tun Mustapha’s 1963 balance in Sabah hint at cultural strength. My Territorial Disputes (2020) recalls ASEAN’s South China Sea diplomacy, and Chapter 7 notes Latin America’s 92% border peace, suggesting cooperation’s edge. Borneo’s tribes (68% favor rights, 2024 IPA) and Gor’s villagers crave harmony—preservation isn’t naive, but a root deeper than power’s blade. The echoes of doubt challenge us to prove this song, tested by dialogue and guarantors, can grow into a forest of trust.

Gor’s jungle chants and Borneo’s epic songs aren’t distant echoes—they’re woven into your spirit, a heritage under threat. A child in Gor loses tribal tales to silence as groves fall, while a Dayak elder in Borneo watches his forest vanish under palm oil’s shadow, their breaths heavy with smoke. *The Borders We Share* offers a chance to sing with the land, to preserve its voice—its dances, its stories—rather than let it be drowned by the fight for control. This is your journey too, a call to nurture what binds us to the wild.

Next Tuesday, Post 22 will venture into new frontiers, continuing this exploration. I’m Dr. Jorge, crafting these tales into a book you’ll hold, a testament to our shared world. Visit https://drjorge.world or X (https://x.com/DrJorge_World )—join me, from Gor’s groves to Borneo’s lines, to plant seeds where borders honor culture and jungles thrive for all. Together, we can turn wild claims into a symphony of life, echoing through generations.

• Núñez, J.E. (2017). Sovereignty Conflicts (Ch. 6, 7). 

• Núñez, J.E. (2020). Territorial Disputes (Ch. 9). 

• Núñez, J.E. (2023). Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (Ch. 6). 

• Núñez, J.E. (2025). Territorial Disputes in the Americas (Ch. 7).

New posts every Tuesday.

Post 20: Utopia’s Woods, Guyana’s Gold: Dreams vs. Dirt


Section 4: Forests and Lands

Post 22: Oz’s Forests, Tasmania’s Edge: Emerald Meets Pine

Post 23: Narnia’s Trees, Amazon’s Breath: Roots of Peace

Post 24: Sherwood’s Pact, Part II: The Multiverse Grows

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Tuesday 12th August 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Friday, 18 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 20) [Post 135]

 


South China Sea, natural resources and claiming parties


Natural resources and the South China Sea. Yesterday, we introduced the way in which natural resources may be distributed, and the fact that there are other elements for consideration (for example, exploration and exploitation). How can this work here?

In the case of the South China Sea, the many parties (China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia) could be co-owners of the natural resources located in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone. 
Undoubtedly, there are several differences amongst China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia. Therein, some of these differences show how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could work.

The first difference is given by the fact the islanders possess the total of natural resources at stake (100%). By applying the egalitarian shared sovereignty, each party receives the rights to the same ideal portion (an equal percentage of the ownership of natural resources, minus original ownership of the inhabitants of the islands in question). 
It would be either over simplistic or naïve to imagine China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia be able to explore and exploit to the same level their shares of natural resources (second difference). However, each of them individually have some elements that put them in a better position in relation to the rest, for example local work force, geographical proximity (third difference).


With all these differences in mind, the could explore and exploit natural resources (as they are the party most developed technically and economically to do it), and both the islanders and territories adjacent to areas rich in natural resources could offer the work force for the joint venture and grant privileges in terms of location to Chinese and Taiwanese companies. Thus, less advantaged parties in terms of means for exploration and exploitation could also offer China certain exclusive rights in the sea-zone that overlaps with their jurisdictions.

Continuous assistance from China to other parties might become a permanent feature (it may lead to domination or an unbalanced relationship).  To avoid this, China would have to help the others in developing their means of exploration and exploitation to relatively the same level they have.

At the beginning of the agreement China indeed would be contributing more towards the exploration and exploitation and hence have a larger return. However, these uneven distributions of burdens and benefits amongst the parties would only be in the short term. Natural resources and all that they imply in terms of rights and obligations are part of a wider agreement that has a target: the South China Sea.

Finally, the way in which each party redistributes the benefits of this shared model within each population is entirely a matter of national or local distribution and hence may have various forms. That is to say, the egalitarian shared sovereignty gives the basic structure of the solution; the details are subject to actual rather than hypothetical negotiation. As an example only, the resultant revenues of some or all the joint activities could be destined to a distribution fund.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Territorial disputes in Africa [available online from 5th October 2020]

Friday 18th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Thursday, 17 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 19) [Post 134]



South China Sea and natural resources


Today’s post is about natural resources and the South China Sea. It is one of the most controversial elements in any TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. It is usually the case the real reasons behind these TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is different (domestically, for example, level of popularity of ruling party, corruption, unemployment, security, etc.; regionally and internationally, geostrategic location, bargaining power, debt, etc.). However, natural resources are used to justify ongoing disputes (or to create new ones).

What are natural resources and who owns them? What do we do with the natural resources in the South China Sea? What happens in the zone in which jurisdictions and interests overlap? In the case of the islands, any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the inhabitants of those islands that are populated. Let us remember there are several claiming parties and different realities in terms of law, politics, economy, religion, etc.: China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia.

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

There are two key connected issues with natural resources. First and more evident, who owns them. But, even if we had an answer to that China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia agreed to distribute natural resources, other highly controversial issues remain. This is not only a matter of distribution because the resources have to be explored, exploited, or piped, and someone has to do the work, and someone, whether a private individual or the State, has to own the means for their exploration and exploitation.

The EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations, that ownership, public or private, should be totally in the hands of the territory where the mines, etc., are situated, without regard to the needs of the two sovereign States, or that it should be totally in the hands of the sovereign States. It would also rule out the idea that existing ownership should automatically continue, or that everything should be left to the market. 
In brief, in order to to acknowledge the controversial features that natural resources present and still apply the egalitarian shared sovereignty solution and hence distribute them, the following points have to be addressed: 
a) just distribution as the aimed outcome; 
b) the ownership system of natural resources; 
c) the exploitation system; 
d) the gains and losses of the involved agents; 
e) the needs and capabilities of all parties.


The differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects (for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the inhabitants of the islands), and this will involve both rights and obligations.

A combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way (for example, joint ventures).

Two points must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of all the parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle is in terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the participants.

The egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the inequality.

Consequently, even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of exploitation and the way benefits were allocated.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea, natural resources and claiming parties
Thursday 17th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Wednesday, 16 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 18) [Post 133]


South China Sea and the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty


The latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centered the attention on the South China Sea. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to this particular issue.

Today’s post will cover defense:

What would happen if another party with no part in the original conflict decided to invade or exploit natural resources in the South China Sea? In the hypothetical scenario that an alien party to the area decided to invade or exploit natural resources, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a) China and the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the new agent would take over the islands, exploit the sea and continental shelf;
b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the islands and the area at large;
c) both China and its neighbors may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently area.

At the same time, States have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defense is fair and just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should be defending the third territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a common interest for all the involved parties: the area under dispute.

In addition to the way in which the parties would defend the area,  there are two other crucial elements that need to be agreed, even if joint defense was the case:
a) the extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their forces against the other two parties);
b) and the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it.
Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend. However, how would China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia share the defense?

The egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in order to have shared defense: a) Resources; b) Training and opportunities; c) Safety of the other two parties (how to avoid misuse of power). What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the case of defense are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location; economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these differences work together in an efficient form.

The South China Sea presents a case with very different levels of defense power and development in terms of their respective defense systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways:
a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in the area, the geostrategic location, and the equipment, resources and any means best adapted to defending it;
b) the agent with the better comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso)—e.g. China could train Vietnamese and Philippine troops in exchange for the use of locations in any of them.

It is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are able to defend the area (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign States). Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth status and defense development among the involved participants, the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to produce the most efficient result.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and natural resources
Wednesday 16th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Tuesday, 15 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 17) [Post 132]


South China Sea: borders, defense and natural resources

We introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY last time. Today, we will present some key elements related to the South China Sea.

From our previous posts, we have learnt so far that some of the main concerns related to the South China Sea are:


Borders

This could be a matter of controversy. In the particular case of the South China Sea, although it may seem that borders are not an issue—as the difference has to do with several islands—the exclusive economic zone often creates tension between many of the claiming parties. 
For instance, who has the right to explore that exclusive sea-zone? What happens in the zone in which to or more claiming parties overlap? As this point is intrinsically linked to natural resources, it will be examined after introducing the latter.

Defense

National defense will be seen here as the protection of any interest a State has—e.g. possessions, territory, and population—through different means—e.g. military, economic, and diplomatic. There are several States in which the army and navy are not big, well equipped or trained enough in order to defend their territory or population but they are still respected as States. 
There are others that in fact do not have military defense at all, their defense being the responsibility of another country or an international organization—e.g. OTAN.
There seems to be no problem with defense. The territory being defended is obviously desirable although the task is one which can be shared. However, what would happen if another party—i.e. a sovereign State with no part in the conflict—decided to invade the third territory? 
In the hypothetical scenario a fourth party decided to invade the South China Sea, who would defend the area? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a) China and the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently the new agent would take over the area if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves (or in the case of uninhabited islands or the sea);
b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the third territory;
c) all sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the area.

Natural resources

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.
In the case of the South China Sea any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the future the legal and political balance in the region.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty

Tuesday 15th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Monday, 14 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 16) [Post 131]


South China Sea as a zero-sum game

The South China Sea represents a classical TERRITORIAL DISPUTE in which several international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same area. 
Regionally, with a direct or indirect implication, we have China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia. In addition to the regional claimants, there are many other international actors. 
The previous posts introduced Australia, Japan and the United States.

The solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst them because it is assumed that the sovereignty over the area can be granted to only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept (that is to say, exclusive, and not shareable).
Post 7: Territorial disputes: sovereignty
Post 8: Territorial disputes: sovereignty (cont.)

The South China Sea is a clear example of a zero-sum game, with many negative outcomes of different sorts (e.g. inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension in international relations, and threat to local, regional and international peace). 
Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level (e.g. effects on international price of oil, war). There are many issues at stake domestically and internationally.
Post 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

Time to solve the dispute over the South China Sea. Territory, in principle, can be defined as an area owned and possessed by the population (in land, water, space and, perhaps, cyberspace). Like population, it may have features that could cause controversy in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The next posts will review some of the features that constitute territory using the South China Sea conflict as an example. Next time we center the attention on borders, natural resources and defense.

Let us remember the way in why this series propose to deal with TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The allocation of sovereignty will be given by:
a) equal right to participate (egalitarian consensus principle);
b) the nature and degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency);
c) each party receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party cooperates with (input-to-output ratio principle); and 
d) provided the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium proviso).
I call this way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts or disputes the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY.

Many questions are to be expected. Amongst them: How is that translated into geographical borders amongst the many claimants? What about the exploration and exploitation of natural resources? This question has two parts: a) the sea-zone surrounding islands only; and b) the portion of sea-zone that overlaps in cases like China and Vietnam. Finally, in the hypothetical scenario that a party alien to the original dispute decided conduct activities (for example, exploitation of natural resources, invasion), who should defend the disputed area?

The next posts on this blog series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES will cover these questions.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea: borders, defense and natural resources

Monday 14th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World