Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts

Tuesday, 15 July 2025

The Borders We Share: Blefuscu’s Boats, Paracel Puzzle (Vietnam-China) (Post 18)

 

The Borders We Share: A New Way to Fix a Broken World

The sea roared with a restless fury, its waves lashing against the rocky shores of Blefuscu, where the horizon shimmered with the floating enigma of Laputa, a realm aloft in the clouds yet tethered to the waters below. A grand hall emerged from the mist, its jade-green banners rippling like the scales of a dragon, its interior aglow with lanterns casting a spectral light across a map woven from threads of mist and tide. This was no ordinary assembly—it was a crucible where Blefuscu’s boats challenged Laputa’s dominion, their strife a mirror to the real-world contest between Vietnam and China over the Paracel Islands, a contested jewel in the South China Sea. Dr. Jorge Emilio Núñez stepped into this ethereal space, his holographic map unfurling like a living tapestry, its pulses weaving a story of multidimensional magic to bind these warring waters—and ours. The air thrummed with the creak of ships, the whispers of ancient voyages, and the weight of modern claims, a saga where the sea held the promise of unity or ruin.

Inside, the hall pulsed with presence. King Golbasto of Blefuscu, his scepter carved from coral, stood with the fierce pride of a ruler defending his shores, his stance echoing the resilience of Vietnam’s fishing communities. Queen Flimnap, her voice a melody of resilience, offered a vision of endurance, her eyes reflecting the struggles of her displaced people. From Laputa descended King Munodi, his robe shimmering with celestial threads, flanked by his strategist, Sky Captain Gulliver, whose ambitions soared beyond the waves, mirroring China’s expansive claims. Joining them were spectral figures of history—Confucius, his presence serene with the wisdom of Chinese harmony, Ho Chi Minh, his spirit ablaze with Vietnamese resolve, and Zheng He, the Ming admiral, his gaze commanding from the decks of ancient fleets. Dr Jorge, guided by the insights of Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023) and Territorial Disputes (2020, Chapter 7 on the South China Sea), raised his hands, inviting them into a narrative not of conquest but of shared destiny. “This is no battlefield of steel or sky,” he said, “but a dance of dimensions where every wave, every heart, finds its place, echoing the Paracel’s contested tides.” The assembly leaned in, drawn by the promise of a story that might still the waters, their breaths held as the dialogue began to unfold.

The hall’s jade-green banners swayed like the fronds of a submerged forest, the lanterns casting a warm glow over a map etched with the rugged coast of Blefuscu, the floating expanse of Laputa, and the scattered isles of the Paracel chain, a disputed realm in the South China Sea. The air carried the scent of salt and sandalwood, a reminder of the fishing boats that plied these waters, the oil rigs that loomed on the horizon, and the displaced communities echoing Vietnam’s claims against China’s expansive “nine-dash line.” The map pulsed with the struggle over tides—Blefuscu’s boats asserting rights to the southern shoals, Laputa claiming aerial and maritime dominion, a reflection of Vietnam’s historical presence since the 17th century and China’s 1974 occupation, fortified with outposts and military installations. The scent mingled with the tension of a region teetering on conflict, where ancient maritime routes, colonial legacies, and international law clashed, much like the South China Sea’s complex tapestry, as explored in Territorial Disputes (2020).

Dr Jorge stepped forward, his voice a storyteller’s incantation. “This is our stage, where realms and rulers dance together, mirroring the Paracel Puzzle—Vietnam’s fishing heritage and China’s strategic reach, as detailed in Chapter 7 of my 2020 book, Territorial Disputes. Let us hear their truths and seek a path beyond.” The hall’s air thickened with the weight of history—the Paracels’ contested sovereignty, claimed by Vietnam through centuries, seized by China in a 1974 naval clash, and now a flashpoint with militarized outposts, oil exploration disputes, and the 2016 UNCLOS ruling rejected by China. The geostrategic stakes, international actors like the US and ASEAN, and leaders’ prestige fueling the status quo underscored the region’s volatility, as highlighted in Territorial Disputes (2020).

Around the map stood a constellation of voices, each a vivid stroke in this unfolding epic. King Golbasto, his coral scepter raised, spoke with the resolve of a monarch guarding his legacy, flanked by a Blefuscudian fisherman whose nets had been cut by Laputan patrols, mirroring Vietnam’s coastal communities and displaced fishers. Queen Flimnap, her voice a song of survival, offered hope, joined by a displaced villager whose home was lost to Laputan claims, echoing Vietnam’s evicted populations. King Munodi, his robe aglow with celestial light, asserted Laputa’s dominance, supported by Sky Captain Gulliver, whose strategic mind plotted to expand their reach, reflecting China’s island-building and naval presence. The historical figures joined—Confucius, his wisdom a calm amidst the storm, Ho Chi Minh, his spirit defiant with independence, and Zheng He, his presence a testament to China’s maritime past.

The air thickened with their arguments, a tempest brewing over the waves as these voices prepared to face a vision of unity. Dr Jorge’s hologram flared with light, a beacon in the fray. “From Cosmopolitanism (2023) and the lessons of contested waters in Territorial Disputes (2020), I bring a vision to split this conflict—not with swords or skies, but with shared dreams across dimensions, drawing on the Paracel’s global stakes and leader dynamics. Let each ruler and sage speak, and let us weave a solution from their words.” The assembly leaned closer, the sound of the sea outside a constant reminder of the stakes, the whispers of a contested horizon resonating in their debate.

Golbasto’s voice rose, firm yet strained. “Our boats defend Blefuscu’s tides—our shoals are our lifeblood, as Vietnam’s fishers claim the Paracels.” Munodi’s tone was lofty. “Laputa’s dominion spans sea and sky—our islands are ours by ancient right, as China asserts its nine-dash line.” Flimnap interjected, “Peace can guide us—let’s share these waters, as Vietnam seeks.” Gulliver smirked, “Sharing favors the weak—our strength will prevail, as leaders profit from tension.” Dr Jorge nodded, “The Paracel’s division and leaders’ prestige, as noted in Territorial Disputes (2020), teach us of balance. Let’s craft a path forward, with wisdom from Confucius, Ho Chi Minh, and Zheng He.”

The hall vibrated with a chorus of voices, each a thread in this tapestry of struggle, rising like the crash of waves against the shore. King Golbasto’s cry was resolute, his coral scepter gleaming. “Blefuscu’s boats claim these tides—our southern shoals, from the coral reefs to the fishing grounds, are ours by right. We defend against Laputan overreach that threatens our livelihood, as Vietnam has guarded the Paracels since the 17th century!” The Blefuscudian fisherman nodded, his voice raw with loss. “My nets fed my family until Laputan patrols destroyed them—our survival hangs by a thread, like Vietnam’s evicted fishers.” Queen Flimnap added, her tone a lament, “Yet war sinks us—diplomacy can save us, as Vietnam seeks international support.” King Munodi’s retort was a celestial decree, his robe shimmering. “Laputa’s dominion is divine—our islands and waters are ours, seized and fortified as China did in 1974 with the Paracels!” Sky Captain Gulliver leaned forward, his eyes calculating. “Strength proves ownership—our fleets and outposts will enforce our claim, as China builds in the South China Sea.”

The historical voices joined, their wisdom bridging centuries and cultures. Confucius spoke, his tone serene. “Harmony guides—claims must align with virtue and mutual benefit, as the Paracel’s strife demands.” Ho Chi Minh added, his voice fierce, “Independence is our right—Vietnam’s struggle against China must prevail.” Zheng He’s command rang out, his presence vast. “Maritime might shaped my voyages—my 15th-century fleets prove China’s legacy, as seen in the Paracels today.” The hall held its breath, the clash of these voices a tempest over the sea. Dr Jorge raised his hands, his hologram swirling with light. “This mirrors the Paracel Puzzle, where Territorial Disputes (2020) highlights leader prestige and international influence. Let us turn this tension into a dance of dimensions.”

Golbasto responded, “Our defense is just—Laputan incursions must stop, as Vietnam resists China’s outposts.” Munodi countered, “Your justice is rebellion—our claim is sovereign, as China’s nine-dash line declares.” Flimnap sighed, “Both can thrive if we share, like Vietnam’s push for joint resource use.” Gulliver sneered, “Sharing weakens us—power, like China’s 1974 victory, decides.” Confucius interjected, “Harmony balances claims—overreach disrupts, as Paracel oil disputes show.” Ho Chi Minh urged, “Independence demands justice—Vietnam’s fishers deserve their waters.” Zheng He challenged, “Might secures legacy—my fleets and China’s forts prove this.” Dr Jorge nodded, “Leaders exploit domestic pride and global pressure, as in the Paracel—let’s explore a solution.”

The dialogue deepened, each voice weaving into the other with greater intensity. Golbasto insisted, “Our shoals are strategic—losing them risks Blefuscu’s soul, as Vietnam’s economy hinges on the Paracels.” Munodi shot back, “Your soul is greed—our waters need protection, as China fortifies against claimants.” Flimnap pleaded, “Protection need not mean war—let’s negotiate, as the UNCLOS ruling tried.” Gulliver challenged, “Negotiation is surrender—our strength, like China’s island-building, will prevail.” Confucius argued, “Reason seeks harmony—Paracel’s resource sharing failed without virtue.” Ho Chi Minh countered, “Justice fuels resistance—Vietnam’s independence trumps foreign might.” Zheng He retorted, “Might shapes trade—my voyages and China’s claims align.” Dr Jorge interjected, “Territorial Disputes (2020) shows how domestic frictions and international actors like ASEAN and the US complicate the Paracel—let’s draw from these lessons.”

Dr Jorge swept his hand over the hologram, and the air shimmered as dimensions unfurled, a kaleidoscope of light and mist. “In Cosmopolitanism (2023),” he began, his voice a spell, “I saw a world where every claim, every heart, dances in dimensions—linear order, nonlinear chaos, shaped by lives and lands, as in Territorial Disputes (2020 Chapter 7).” The map flared, revealing Blefuscu’s southern shoals, Laputa’s floating dominion, and the Paracel’s contested isles, their oil-rich waters a global prize. “This is our magic,” he said, “a fix to heal with shared dreams, mirroring Vietnam-China’s Paracel strife, where history, resources, and international law entwine.” Golbasto, Flimnap, Munodi, Gulliver, Confucius, Ho Chi Minh, and Zheng He leaned closer, their presence a chorus of contention, ready to engage.

The linear dimensions formed a structured ballet. The vertical dimension painted a hierarchy—Blefuscu’s boats sailed below, Laputa’s fleets patrolled from above, with neutral mediators as arbiters, echoing UN efforts in the South China Sea. Golbasto justified, “We guard our shoals from Laputan overreach—our depth ensures survival, like Vietnam’s fishing rights.” Munodi countered, “Your depth is defiance—our height claims sovereignty, as China’s outposts dominate.” The horizontal dimension wove equality, with Blefuscudian and Laputan fishers sharing quotas, mirroring Vietnam’s push for joint Paracel resource use. Flimnap proposed, “Equal access can sustain us, as Vietnam seeks.” Gulliver argued, “Equality favors Blefuscu’s greed, like Vietnam’s claims.” The diagonal dimension flowed—Blefuscu’s trade routes crossed Laputa’s aerial lanes, reflecting Paracel oil and gas disputes. Confucius noted, “Utility balances trade, as harmony suggests for the Paracels.” Ho Chi Minh added, “Diagonal ties need justice for Vietnam’s independence.” Zheng He growled, “Trade follows might—my fleets and China’s reach prove it.” Dr Jorge noted, “Vietnam-China’s diagonal tensions, with ASEAN’s role, guide us, as Territorial Disputes (2020) suggests.”

The nonlinear dimensions added a wild pulse. The self-referred dimension saw Blefuscu’s pride echo Laputa’s dominance—Golbasto citing heritage, Munodi citing destiny, like Vietnam’s historical claims versus China’s nine-dash line. The regressive dimension dragged past clashes into the present, fueling mistrust, akin to the 1974 Paracel battle. The chaotic dimension flared with skirmishes, while the random dimension sparked hope—a chance alliance. Golbasto insisted, “Our pride defends our people, as Vietnam rallied post-1974.” Munodi retorted, “Your pride invades ours, like Vietnam’s resistance!” Flimnap urged, “Chaos can end with dialogue, as UNCLOS tried.” Gulliver sneered, “Random hope is weak, like failed arbitration.” Confucius argued, “Reason tames chaos—Paracel’s peace needs virtue.” Ho Chi Minh urged, “Harmony bends the random for justice.” Zheng He countered, “Chaos yields to strength—my voyages shaped the seas.” Dr Jorge responded, “The Paracel’s nonlinear interplay of people, leaders, and global powers, as in Territorial Disputes (2020), shows paths—let’s bend these into peace.”

The debate intensified further, voices overlapping with passion. Golbasto argued, “Our shoals’ control is vital—Laputan raids threaten us, like Vietnam’s fishers face China’s outposts.” Munodi shot back, “Your control steals our rights—raids are enforcement, as China secured the Paracels!” Flimnap countered, “Enforcement need not mean war—let’s map shared zones, as ASEAN suggests.” Gulliver challenged, “Zones weaken us—force, like China’s 1974 win, prevails.” Confucius interjected, “Reason seeks mutual zones—Paracel’s oil needs harmony.” Ho Chi Minh added, “Justice demands it for Vietnam’s displaced.” Zheng He laughed, “Force shaped my routes—zones are dreams.” Dr Jorge pressed, “The Paracel’s history—its 1974 clash, leader prestige, and global pressure, as noted in Territorial Disputes (2020)—shows sharing can work. Let’s weave a random leap into our fix.”

The hall trembled as voices clashed, a storm breaking over the sea. Golbasto’s scepter flashed. “Laputan incursions threaten Blefuscu—our strikes defend our tides, like Vietnam’s resistance to China!” Flimnap pleaded, “Strikes escalate—let’s talk, as Vietnam seeks UN aid!” Munodi’s robe gleamed. “Your greed justifies our enforcement—we will not yield, like China’s Paracel hold!” Gulliver added, “Our fleets will crush your boats, as China fortified the isles!” The air crackled with defiance, a tempest of pride and power threatening to shatter the fragile hall.

Dr Jorge raised his hands, the hologram swirling with a radiant pulse. “War drains the sea, but strength need not mean destruction. Drawing from my Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) work, Chapters 6 and 7, I propose an egalitarian shared sovereignty model—a framework where power is not seized but shared equitably across dimensions. This model, rooted in Territorial Disputes (2020), balances Vietnam’s and China’s claims, recognizing each realm’s heritage and needs while curbing leader agendas that thrive on tension.” The assembly stilled, their eyes fixed on the luminous threads weaving through the air.

Confucius nodded, his voice a calm tide. “Harmony aligns with this vision—virtue demands mutual respect, not dominance, as the Paracel’s strife cries for.” Ho Chi Minh’s spirit flared. “Independence flourishes under justice—Vietnam’s fishers and Blefuscu’s people deserve a voice, not a victor’s shadow.” Zheng He’s gaze hardened. “Might can serve unity—my fleets bridged nations; let China’s strength now build, not break.” Golbasto lowered his scepter, his resolve softening. “If this share honors our tides and stops incursions, we bend—as Vietnam fights for survival.” Munodi’s robe dimmed slightly. “If our dominion is respected and resources secured, we consider it—as China guards its legacy.” Flimnap’s melody rose. “Dialogue can heal—let’s negotiate, as Vietnam seeks peace.” Gulliver’s smirk faded. “Power shared might hold—if it proves our might, as China’s leaders seek.”

Dr Jorge’s hologram pulsed brighter. “This model, from my 2017 chapters, transcends unilateral rule, weaving a tapestry of pluralistic governance. It offers Blefuscu and Laputa veto power in a council, ensuring no single voice drowns the other, mirroring the Paracel’s need for balanced international oversight. Leaders’ prestige shifts from conflict to cooperation, as Territorial Disputes (2020) suggests, turning domestic pride into a force for unity.” The hall hummed with a tentative accord, the storm yielding to a shared rhythm.

Golbasto pressed, “Our defense must protect our people—incursions must end, as Vietnam resists China.” Munodi countered, “Our enforcement secures our rights—yield is not our path, as China stands firm.” Flimnap interjected, “Both can survive with peace—negotiation, as ASEAN pushes, can bridge us.” Gulliver challenged, “Negotiation risks weakness—power, like China’s 1974 win, prevails.” Confucius urged, “Reason trumps force—harmony balances Paracel’s peace.” Ho Chi Minh nodded, “Justice heals—Vietnam demands equity.” Zheng He relented, “Might aligns if respected—my legacy supports this council.” Dr Jorge concluded, “The Paracel’s leaders can leverage pride for peace, as my 2017 model envisions, with global actors like the UN guiding the way. Will you commit?”

The clash softened, voices blending into a chorus of reluctant hope. Golbasto and Munodi exchanged a nod, Flimnap’s song weaving their resolve, as Confucius, Ho Chi Minh, and Zheng He lent their wisdom to the fray. The storm receded, leaving a path toward reconciliation.

The hologram pulsed, a living web binding the sea’s heart. Dr Jorge’s voice wove through the tension. “In Territorial Disputes (2020, Chapter 7), I saw shared rule as a quantum thread, as the Paracel’s disputes suggest with UN mediation. Let’s craft a fix: a Sea Accord to unite fishers across borders, an EEZ zoned with a 50-50 resource split, and a council with neutral oversight—born from our debate, like Paracel’s ASEAN talks.” The light flared, a path emerging organically, its roots in physical tides, social bonds, and mental pride. Golbasto relented, “If incursions stop and fishing resumes, we join, like Vietnam’s hope.” Flimnap nodded, “A shared sea sustains us, as Vietnam’s displaced yearn.” Munodi softened, “Equal resources and patrol—yes, if respected, like China’s strategic needs.” Gulliver mused, “Power shared is power gained—let’s try, as China adapts.”

The dialogue shaped the solution with greater depth. Golbasto argued, “Our shoals need security, like Vietnam’s fishing grounds.” Munodi countered, “Ours need dominance, as China’s outposts do.” Flimnap proposed, “A joint patrol can balance both, as UNCLOS suggests.” Gulliver challenged, “Patrols risk conflict, like South China Sea tensions.” Confucius suggested, “Reason guides patrols—Paracel’s peace needs virtue.” Ho Chi Minh added, “Justice stabilizes, for Vietnam’s independence.” Zheng He nodded, “If might is respected, as my voyages demanded.” Dr Jorge suggested, “Paracel’s 2016 ruling and ASEAN’s role, as in Territorial Disputes (2020), prove a council can mediate, offering resource shares.” Golbasto agreed, “If it ensures our tides.” Munodi nodded, “If our dominion is safe.” The council—Golbasto, Flimnap, Munodi, Gulliver, Confucius, Ho Chi Minh, Zheng He—set a pilot ablaze in a shared zone, mirroring Paracel talks. Resources flowed, communities thrived, displaced voices were heard, and a sunrise rose over shared horizons.

Beyond the hall, this tale touches your world, where Blefuscu’s boats, the Paracels, and the South China Sea shape your fish, your oil, your peace. A clash could empty your markets, spike your costs, drag the region to war’s edge, its ripples felt in every home. But this magic—linear order, nonlinear leaps, a dance of dimensions—turns rivals to partners. Blefuscu’s claim and Laputa’s reach mirror Vietnam-China’s Paracel dispute, its 1974 rupture, fishing losses, and oil-rich stakes, all crying for unity. Dr Jorge’s council, drawing from the Paracel’s lessons and the wisdom of Confucius, Ho Chi Minh, and Zheng He, could lift coastal villages and contested communities to a shared future, balancing security, independence, and harmony.

This is your story—your meal, your calm, your stake in a teetering world. Turn away, and ripples bite—prices soar, cannons roar. Step in, shape it with us at https://drjorge.world or X: https://x.com/DrJorge_World . The sea awaits your hand, a chance to write unity’s end, harvesting bounty from harmonized tides.

  • Núñez, J.E. (2017), Sovereignty Conflicts (Ch. 6, Ch. 7). 
  • Núñez, J.E. (2020). Territorial Disputes (Ch. 7). 
  • Núñez, J.E. (2023). Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (Ch. 6). 

New posts every Tuesday.

Post #17: Narnia’s Sea, Aegean Edge—Narnian fleets claim tides, mirroring Greece-Turkey’s Aegean.


Section 3 Recap: Islands and Waters (Posts 13–18)

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Tuesday 15th July 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Friday, 18 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 20) [Post 135]

 


South China Sea, natural resources and claiming parties


Natural resources and the South China Sea. Yesterday, we introduced the way in which natural resources may be distributed, and the fact that there are other elements for consideration (for example, exploration and exploitation). How can this work here?

In the case of the South China Sea, the many parties (China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia) could be co-owners of the natural resources located in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone. 
Undoubtedly, there are several differences amongst China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia. Therein, some of these differences show how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could work.

The first difference is given by the fact the islanders possess the total of natural resources at stake (100%). By applying the egalitarian shared sovereignty, each party receives the rights to the same ideal portion (an equal percentage of the ownership of natural resources, minus original ownership of the inhabitants of the islands in question). 
It would be either over simplistic or naïve to imagine China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia be able to explore and exploit to the same level their shares of natural resources (second difference). However, each of them individually have some elements that put them in a better position in relation to the rest, for example local work force, geographical proximity (third difference).


With all these differences in mind, the could explore and exploit natural resources (as they are the party most developed technically and economically to do it), and both the islanders and territories adjacent to areas rich in natural resources could offer the work force for the joint venture and grant privileges in terms of location to Chinese and Taiwanese companies. Thus, less advantaged parties in terms of means for exploration and exploitation could also offer China certain exclusive rights in the sea-zone that overlaps with their jurisdictions.

Continuous assistance from China to other parties might become a permanent feature (it may lead to domination or an unbalanced relationship).  To avoid this, China would have to help the others in developing their means of exploration and exploitation to relatively the same level they have.

At the beginning of the agreement China indeed would be contributing more towards the exploration and exploitation and hence have a larger return. However, these uneven distributions of burdens and benefits amongst the parties would only be in the short term. Natural resources and all that they imply in terms of rights and obligations are part of a wider agreement that has a target: the South China Sea.

Finally, the way in which each party redistributes the benefits of this shared model within each population is entirely a matter of national or local distribution and hence may have various forms. That is to say, the egalitarian shared sovereignty gives the basic structure of the solution; the details are subject to actual rather than hypothetical negotiation. As an example only, the resultant revenues of some or all the joint activities could be destined to a distribution fund.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Territorial disputes in Africa [available online from 5th October 2020]

Friday 18th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Thursday, 17 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 19) [Post 134]



South China Sea and natural resources


Today’s post is about natural resources and the South China Sea. It is one of the most controversial elements in any TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. It is usually the case the real reasons behind these TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is different (domestically, for example, level of popularity of ruling party, corruption, unemployment, security, etc.; regionally and internationally, geostrategic location, bargaining power, debt, etc.). However, natural resources are used to justify ongoing disputes (or to create new ones).

What are natural resources and who owns them? What do we do with the natural resources in the South China Sea? What happens in the zone in which jurisdictions and interests overlap? In the case of the islands, any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the inhabitants of those islands that are populated. Let us remember there are several claiming parties and different realities in terms of law, politics, economy, religion, etc.: China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia.

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

There are two key connected issues with natural resources. First and more evident, who owns them. But, even if we had an answer to that China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia agreed to distribute natural resources, other highly controversial issues remain. This is not only a matter of distribution because the resources have to be explored, exploited, or piped, and someone has to do the work, and someone, whether a private individual or the State, has to own the means for their exploration and exploitation.

The EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations, that ownership, public or private, should be totally in the hands of the territory where the mines, etc., are situated, without regard to the needs of the two sovereign States, or that it should be totally in the hands of the sovereign States. It would also rule out the idea that existing ownership should automatically continue, or that everything should be left to the market. 
In brief, in order to to acknowledge the controversial features that natural resources present and still apply the egalitarian shared sovereignty solution and hence distribute them, the following points have to be addressed: 
a) just distribution as the aimed outcome; 
b) the ownership system of natural resources; 
c) the exploitation system; 
d) the gains and losses of the involved agents; 
e) the needs and capabilities of all parties.


The differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects (for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the inhabitants of the islands), and this will involve both rights and obligations.

A combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way (for example, joint ventures).

Two points must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of all the parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle is in terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the participants.

The egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the inequality.

Consequently, even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of exploitation and the way benefits were allocated.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea, natural resources and claiming parties
Thursday 17th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Wednesday, 16 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 18) [Post 133]


South China Sea and the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty


The latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centered the attention on the South China Sea. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to this particular issue.

Today’s post will cover defense:

What would happen if another party with no part in the original conflict decided to invade or exploit natural resources in the South China Sea? In the hypothetical scenario that an alien party to the area decided to invade or exploit natural resources, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a) China and the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the new agent would take over the islands, exploit the sea and continental shelf;
b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the islands and the area at large;
c) both China and its neighbors may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently area.

At the same time, States have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defense is fair and just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should be defending the third territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a common interest for all the involved parties: the area under dispute.

In addition to the way in which the parties would defend the area,  there are two other crucial elements that need to be agreed, even if joint defense was the case:
a) the extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their forces against the other two parties);
b) and the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it.
Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend. However, how would China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia share the defense?

The egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in order to have shared defense: a) Resources; b) Training and opportunities; c) Safety of the other two parties (how to avoid misuse of power). What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the case of defense are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location; economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these differences work together in an efficient form.

The South China Sea presents a case with very different levels of defense power and development in terms of their respective defense systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways:
a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in the area, the geostrategic location, and the equipment, resources and any means best adapted to defending it;
b) the agent with the better comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso)—e.g. China could train Vietnamese and Philippine troops in exchange for the use of locations in any of them.

It is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are able to defend the area (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign States). Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth status and defense development among the involved participants, the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to produce the most efficient result.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and natural resources
Wednesday 16th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Tuesday, 15 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 17) [Post 132]


South China Sea: borders, defense and natural resources

We introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY last time. Today, we will present some key elements related to the South China Sea.

From our previous posts, we have learnt so far that some of the main concerns related to the South China Sea are:


Borders

This could be a matter of controversy. In the particular case of the South China Sea, although it may seem that borders are not an issue—as the difference has to do with several islands—the exclusive economic zone often creates tension between many of the claiming parties. 
For instance, who has the right to explore that exclusive sea-zone? What happens in the zone in which to or more claiming parties overlap? As this point is intrinsically linked to natural resources, it will be examined after introducing the latter.

Defense

National defense will be seen here as the protection of any interest a State has—e.g. possessions, territory, and population—through different means—e.g. military, economic, and diplomatic. There are several States in which the army and navy are not big, well equipped or trained enough in order to defend their territory or population but they are still respected as States. 
There are others that in fact do not have military defense at all, their defense being the responsibility of another country or an international organization—e.g. OTAN.
There seems to be no problem with defense. The territory being defended is obviously desirable although the task is one which can be shared. However, what would happen if another party—i.e. a sovereign State with no part in the conflict—decided to invade the third territory? 
In the hypothetical scenario a fourth party decided to invade the South China Sea, who would defend the area? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:
a) China and the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently the new agent would take over the area if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves (or in the case of uninhabited islands or the sea);
b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the third territory;
c) all sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the area.

Natural resources

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.
In the case of the South China Sea any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the future the legal and political balance in the region.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty

Tuesday 15th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World

Monday, 14 September 2020

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 16) [Post 131]


South China Sea as a zero-sum game

The South China Sea represents a classical TERRITORIAL DISPUTE in which several international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same area. 
Regionally, with a direct or indirect implication, we have China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia. In addition to the regional claimants, there are many other international actors. 
The previous posts introduced Australia, Japan and the United States.

The solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst them because it is assumed that the sovereignty over the area can be granted to only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept (that is to say, exclusive, and not shareable).
Post 7: Territorial disputes: sovereignty
Post 8: Territorial disputes: sovereignty (cont.)

The South China Sea is a clear example of a zero-sum game, with many negative outcomes of different sorts (e.g. inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension in international relations, and threat to local, regional and international peace). 
Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level (e.g. effects on international price of oil, war). There are many issues at stake domestically and internationally.
Post 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

Time to solve the dispute over the South China Sea. Territory, in principle, can be defined as an area owned and possessed by the population (in land, water, space and, perhaps, cyberspace). Like population, it may have features that could cause controversy in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The next posts will review some of the features that constitute territory using the South China Sea conflict as an example. Next time we center the attention on borders, natural resources and defense.

Let us remember the way in why this series propose to deal with TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The allocation of sovereignty will be given by:
a) equal right to participate (egalitarian consensus principle);
b) the nature and degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency);
c) each party receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party cooperates with (input-to-output ratio principle); and 
d) provided the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium proviso).
I call this way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts or disputes the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY.

Many questions are to be expected. Amongst them: How is that translated into geographical borders amongst the many claimants? What about the exploration and exploitation of natural resources? This question has two parts: a) the sea-zone surrounding islands only; and b) the portion of sea-zone that overlaps in cases like China and Vietnam. Finally, in the hypothetical scenario that a party alien to the original dispute decided conduct activities (for example, exploitation of natural resources, invasion), who should defend the disputed area?

The next posts on this blog series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES will cover these questions.


NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea: borders, defense and natural resources

Monday 14th September 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World