Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 30) [Post 190]

 

The Persian Gulf: Partial Conclusions

The longstanding and still unresolved TERRITORIAL DISPUTES in the Persian Gulf have several dimensions. The current nomenclature in legal and political sciences used the term TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. Yet, the disputes in the Persian Gulf are a clear example of an ongoing differences that have to do with territory as well as population, government and law domestically, regionally and internationally.

This blog series TERRITORIAL DISPUTES originally aimed only to briefly introduce conceptual elements (first ten posts of the series) and thereafter present a succinct overview of relevant and current examples.

Before we covered the differences in the Persian Gulf, we had addressed Kashmir, the Malvinas/Falkland islands, Gibraltar, the Israel-Palestine case, and many others. The plan was to write and publish only ten posts (like with the rest of the case studies) for the Persian Gulf region. Thanks to the comments made by one of our readers, I decided to extend the assessment of this particular case study.

Because of the nature of this series and its platform (a blog), I have covered the basis in relation to the differences in the Persian Gulf and the application of the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY to evaluate a solution. However, there are questions that are more complex and more serious problems to address. 

I am addressing these questions with future dedicated research. To give an answer to these points deserve a more in-depth analysis that will have to include technicalities in terms of statistical information, methodology and content based on the disciplines of reference. In addition to this, I do my best to keep this blog series as accessible as possible for anybody (at least, most people) to be able to get a grasp and participate in the discussion.

Having said that, the last 29 posts have enabled us to:

• Be familiar with a brief historical chronology.
• Distinguish historical facts from religious account.
• Understand some key domestic, regional and international reasons behind this difference.
• Introduce the concept of “colourable claim” and explore three different grounds: historical entitlement, legal basis and moral standing. Its main outcome is that both Israelis and Palestinians ought to be part of any negotiation concerning the sovereignty (de jure and de facto) over the disputes territories.
• Introduce the solutions presented in recent years by the United States, United Nations and Arab League.
• Learn that all the aforementioned solutions suggest explicitly or implicitly partition and/or the interference of non-regional parties.
• Evaluate by means of an abstract experiment how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may solve the difference and could materialize.

With all this in mind, three main partial conclusions leave the door open for future reflection and analysis:

1. Sovereignty of the disputed territories should not be totally in the hands of only one of the claiming parties either Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates.
2. If existing conditions in terms of sovereignty continue, they will only perpetuate a status quo and therefore, a legal and political limbo securing only one result: a volatile area in many ways.
3. United Nations or any other party alien to the dispute (for example, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Arab League) should not interfere.

There is nothing completely unresolvable if we look together for a solution. Indeed, if we choose not to solve the difference and we do not look for ways to move forward we are not going to find it. 

It is usually the case in this kind of differences that victory for one party means the other party has to suffer. 

When we shift the focus, and understand we are all human beings and we are all fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters doing our best to let our future generations live in a better world we may have a chance. It is not only up to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates. It is up to all of us.

For an interactive map of TERRITORIAL DISPUTES see

Link to the complete publication

For current information about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES see CIA’s The World Factbook at:

Link to the complete publication

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

Final recap.

Friday 12th February 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 29) [Post 189]

 

The Persian Gulf and controversial borders

Borders are volatile (to say the least) in the already tense Persian Gulf region. With communities presenting very different living standards and the myriad of checkpoints the situation deteriorates on an ongoing basis. Recent events are self-evident.

A general approach previously used in the region (and in many others around the world by former colonial powers imposing them to former colonies) has to do with partition solutions. 

They work under the assumption that the hostilities between opposing ethnic groups makes it impossible for them to live peacefully together in a single state (Haklai and Loizides, ed., 2015). 

There are many reasons to disagree with the partition solution. For an academic reference see for example Laitin (2004), Sambanis (2000), Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009), and others.

The EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations such as:

• Sovereignty of the disputed territories to be totally in the hands of only one of the claiming parties.

• Existing sovereignty should automatically continue, or that everything should remain in a status quo.

• The intervention of the United Nations or any other party alien to the dispute. Several problems immediately arise.

United Nations (UN): although UN aims to grant sovereign equality amongst the States its own system reveals a contradiction: veto power in the Security Council is only granted to certain sovereign States.

This may be translated (in the perception of at least one of claiming parties) as an unbalanced and unfair starting point to have negotiations, and with a predictable result.

Not only does the Security Council present these problems but also other UN organizations. Even the UN General Assembly, at first glance a fair environment for sovereign States to participate in, has been regarded as ineffective or irredeemably biased because of the different bargaining powers of its members.

Finally, in cases of contested sovereignty over populated territories, stateless people are not UN members.

Other parties: in terms of other parties alien to the dispute (for example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China) history is self-evident in demonstrating their policies in the region have been far from successful, have taken little care about the local population and their needs, and have been more (only) centered on their geostrategic domestic policies rather than taking Israel and Palestine into consideration.

In brief, in order to acknowledge the controversial features the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY advises to remove the borders and any checkpoints in the disputed territories. 

As we discussed when assessing population in the context of the Israel-Palestine difference a while ago in this blog series, by applying the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY, the inhabitants of the disputed territories would be citizens of both bordering sovereign states, they would have a common passport valid in the disputed territories. 

In terms of religion, as the second pre-requisite recognizes basic non-political liberties, freedom of movement and residence would be adopted at a constitutional level. The lexically prior prerequisite of non-political liberties controls this.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf: Partial Conclusions

Thursday 11th February 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 28) [Post 188]

 

The Persian Gulf, territorial disputes and the historical entitlement

In reviewing TERRITORIAL DISPUTES in the Persian Gulf, we centered the attention yesterday on historical entitlement arguments. It is often the case Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates base their claims on historical, legal, political, cultural and geographical evidence.

The just acquisition principle has been previously related to territorial sovereignty since it has been maintained that amongst the objects to which this principle is meant to be capable of applying are portions of the Earth’s surface, that is, areas of land. 

The main problem with this idea applied to TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is that the information required to apply this principle is not epistemically accessible in sovereignty conflicts—e.g. how far back would the agents need to investigate so as to determine who the first inhabitants of the Persian Gulf were? What would happen in the case of extinct civilisations? What about cultures that were in Ancient Times nomadic?

The principle of just acquisition may work for individuals. For States, it may solve one problem, what one has to do, i.e. mix one’s labour. But leaves several other issues unresolved—e.g. a) who did it first? b) how much each does individual own? (new problem, e.g. if someone digs, can he claim that plot, the field or the whole island?), and c) who inherits the property—the inhabitants or their ‘mother community’?

Any version of just acquisition will have the same problems: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates will never agree on the relevant facts and the relevant test, and therefore all this principle would do is guarantee endless conflict. So, reasonable people would reject it if they wanted to achieve a peaceful and permanent solution.

Whether they have access to historical records or not is irrelevant since they would only result in endless discussion concerning historical entitlement that in most—if not all cases—is highly difficult to be demonstrated. Governments and their representatives are aware of this issue. 

More precisely, as we have seen in previous posts referred to the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, non-regional states maintain the very convenient status quo to their interest by using the historical argument since they know it will not bring any changes to the current situation.

The advice here would be not to agree to rely on a principle that guarantees endless conflict, and therefore, to reject it as the principle to resolve these disputes. 

At the same time, by rejecting the historical entitlement argument, it leaves all (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) with an equal footing to continue the negotiations since none of them can argue a better or more robust right over the claimed territories.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf and controversial borders

Wednesday 10th February 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 27) [Post 187]

 

Natural resources and the Persian Gulf and the historical account

Many of the TERRITORIAL DISPUTES in the Persian Gulf have to do with non-regional states that had long ago presence in the continent by means of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism or neo-imperialism.

In relation to the agreement on the historical account each sovereign state taking part in a sovereignty conflict is certain that it has ultimate and highest right over the disputed territory, and the use and ownership of the third territory is due to them. As a consequence, sovereignty disputes do not move from a zero-sum game.

That is because, in order to determine the initial acquisition, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates have to go back and resolve old historical claims only resulting in a practical matter: the competing agents are never going to agree on the ‘correct’ historical version of the events—i.e. the historical account is fundamentally controversial.

It is common to observe in sovereignty differences that the involved agents usually support their claims through historical, legal, political, cultural or geographical arguments—even a combination of many of them. In other words, not only will be the dispute over what the facts are but also what the relative moral significance of those facts is.

For example, one party will claim that whoever was the first one in the third territory is its owner and hence, its sovereign, and they were there first. But the opposite party disputes this, supporting their case with historical, legal, political, cultural and geographical evidence, and arguing either a) that they were there first, or b) that being first is not what makes acquisition just, but, e.g., being first to exploit its resources, or establish a community. 

Because all the parties argue they were the first to do what gave them a right to the third territory, an approach based on a historical account is futile for providing a solution to sovereignty disputes and the conflicts continue endlessly—e.g. arguments about the rightful sovereign of Jerusalem and surrounding areas have been present for generations. 

See for example Genesis 14: 18-20 in which Jerusalem (or Salem) has already enemies. Since Biblical times the region has been centre of disputes in relation to the rightful settlement of different populations. Should these agents go back to Biblical times in order to prove the current legitimate occupancy of the territory?

Faced with the idea of applying any kind of principle based on a historical entitlement will confront the representatives with two main problems.

First, they would need to agree upon a historical account—i.e. what actually happened, who was the first one to discover the territory, or to have a population there, etc.

Second, they would need to decide what type of act makes their claimed rights just—i.e. the first one setting foot on the territory, the first one to have a permanent settlement, etc. Besides, if there were conflicts in the past it would need to be decided whether they were just or not and whether the just side won.

The posts will continue this analysis tomorrow.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf, territorial disputes and the historical entitlement

Tuesday 09th February 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 26) [Post 186]

 

Natural resources and the Persian Gulf

The previous post introduced the way in which natural resources may be distributed, and the fact that there are other elements for consideration (for example, exploration and exploitation). How can this work here?

In the case of the Persian Gulf, the many parties (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates) could be co-owners of the natural resources located in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone.

Undoubtedly, there are several differences amongst Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates. Therein, some of these differences show how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could work.

The first difference is given by the fact the inhabitants possess the total of natural resources at stake (100%). By applying the egalitarian shared sovereignty, each party receives the rights to the same ideal portion (an equal percentage of the ownership of natural resources, minus original ownership of the inhabitants of the islands in question). 

It would be either over simplistic or naïve to imagine Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates be able to explore and exploit to the same level their shares of natural resources (second difference). However, each of them individually have some elements that put them in a better position in relation to the rest, for example local work force, geographical proximity (third difference).

With all these differences in mind, the party most developed technically and economically could explore and exploit natural resources (as they are in the best position to do it), and both the inhabitants adjacent to areas rich in natural resources could offer the work force for the joint venture and grant privileges in terms of location to companies that take the exploration and exploitation. Thus, less advantaged parties in terms of means for exploration and exploitation could also offer the most advantaged party certain exclusive rights in the sea-zone that overlaps with their jurisdictions.

Continuous assistance from, for example, Saudi Arabia or Iran, to other parties might become a permanent feature (it may lead to domination or an unbalanced relationship).  To avoid this, in the example, Saudi Arabia or Iran, respectively, would have to help the others in developing their means of exploration and exploitation to relatively the same level they have.

At the beginning of the agreement Saudi Arabia or Iran would be contributing more towards the exploration and exploitation and hence have a larger return. However, these uneven distributions of burdens and benefits amongst the parties would only be in the short term. Natural resources and all that they imply in terms of rights and obligations are part of a wider agreement that has a target: the Persian Gulf.

Finally, the way in which each party redistributes the benefits of this shared model within each population is entirely a matter of national or local distribution and hence may have various forms. That is to say, the egalitarian shared sovereignty gives the basic structure of the solution; the details are subject to actual rather than hypothetical negotiation. As an example, the resultant revenues of some or all the joint activities could be destined to a distribution fund benefiting all the inhabitants.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

Natural resources and the Persian Gulf and the historical account

Monday 25th January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 25) [Post 185]

 

The Persian Gulf, natural resources and the egalitarian shared sovereignty

Yesterday, the post introduced the issue of natural resources and their distribution (ownership, exploration, exploitation, gains and losses) in the context of a particular region with several TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: the Persian Gulf.

The differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects (for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the inhabitants), and this will involve both rights and obligations.

A combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way (for example, joint ventures).

Two points must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of all the parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle is in terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the participants.

The egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the inequality. 

Consequently, even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of exploitation and the way benefits were allocated.

Next time how all this could work with the Persian Gulf and all the claiming parties.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

Natural resources and the Persian Gulf

Friday 22nd January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 24) [Post 184]

 

The Persian Gulf and the distribution of natural resources

Today’s post is about natural resources and the Persian Gulf. It is one of the most controversial elements in any TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. It is usually the case the real reasons behind these TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is different (domestically, for example, level of popularity of ruling party, corruption, unemployment, security, etc.; regionally and internationally, geostrategic location, bargaining power, debt, etc.). 

Often, natural resources are used to justify ongoing disputes (or to create new ones). Furthermore, whilst many of the TERRITORIAL DISPUTES have to do with local and regional interests to start and to remain unresolved, most of them are beneficial to external powers (as we have seen with the previous posts, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China are amongst these).

Questions in terms of the distribution of natural resources

• What are natural resources and who owns them? 
• What do we do with the natural resources in the Persian Gulf? 
• What happens in the zone in which jurisdictions and interests overlap? 

Any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the inhabitants of those areas that are populated or where migration is high. Let us remember there are several claiming parties and different realities in terms of law, politics, economy, religion, etc.: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates.

To recapitulate, natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. 

Some states are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a state. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

There are two key connected issues with natural resources. 

First and more evident, who owns them. 

But, even if Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates agreed to distribute natural resources, other highly controversial issues remain. This is not only a matter of distribution because the resources have to be explored, exploited, or piped, and someone has to do the work, and someone, whether a private individual or the state, has to own the means for their exploration and exploitation.

The EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations:

• ownership, public or private, should be totally in the hands of the territory where the mines, etc., are situated, without regard to the needs of the sovereign states; or 
• it should be totally in the hands of the one of the sovereign states; or
• existing ownership should automatically continue; or 
• everything should be left to the market. 

In brief, in order to acknowledge the controversial features that natural resources present and still apply the egalitarian shared sovereignty solution and hence distribute them, the following points have to be addressed: 

a) just distribution as the aimed outcome; 

b) the ownership system of natural resources; 

c) the exploitation system; 

d) the gains and losses of the involved agents; 

e) the needs and capabilities of all parties.

Tomorrow, some key issues to take into consideration before we assess how all this could work with the Persian Gulf and all the claiming parties.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf, natural resources and the egalitarian shared sovereignty

Thursday 21st January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 23) [Post 183]

 

The Persian Gulf and the Military Balance

The latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centered the attention on the Persian Gulf. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to this particular issue.

Today’s post will cover defense:

What would happen if another party with no part in the original conflicts decided to invade or exploit natural resources in the Persian Gulf? 

In the hypothetical scenario that an alien party to the area decided to invade the region or exploit natural resources, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows: 

a) the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the new agent would take over the islands, exploit natural resources in land and the continental shelf; 

b) one of the sovereign states may respond to the invasion and defend the area; 

c) some or all the neighbors may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently area.

At the same time, states have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defense is fair and just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should be defending the territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a common interest for all the involved parties: the areas under dispute.

In addition to the way in which the parties would defend the area,  there are two other crucial elements that need to be agreed, even if joint defense was the case: 

a) the extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their forces against the other two parties); 

b) and the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it. 

Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend. However, how would Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates share the defense?

The egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in order to have shared defense: 

a) Resources; 

b) Training and opportunities; 

c) Safety of all the parties (how to avoid misuse of power). 

What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the case of defense are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location; economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these differences work together in an efficient form.

The Persian Gulf presents a case with very different levels of defense power and development in terms of their respective defense systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways: 

a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in the area, the geostrategic location, and the equipment, resources and any means best adapted to defending it; 

b) the agent with the better comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso).

It is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are able to defend the area (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign states). 

Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth status and defense development among the involved participants, the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to produce the most efficient result.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf and the distribution of natural resources

Wednesday 20th January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world