SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 21 OF 21)

By applying equality strictly, the agents would all receive equal benefits and contribute equally towards the burdens. How would Borduria fulfil its duty to defend Khemed? How would Khemedians defend themselves? The same could be said about natural resources because although Khemedians, Syldavians and Bordurians would receive the same share in terms of ownership, Khemedians and Bordurians would not have the means to exploit them. Several other implications could be drawn but the point is clear. It is both unreasonable and unfair to expect three parties with different comparative situations in many different areas to contribute in an equal manner or to receive an equal return.

Nevertheless, to apply the difference principle in the same form may have similar consequences. Syldavia is the least advantaged in terms of natural resources, so they will receive a larger share. Khemed is less advantaged than Syldavia in terms of defence, so the latter will provide the means to defend the third territory. But Borduria is the least advantaged in terms of wealth, the natural resources in its territory are not part of the agreement so they are not under discussion, and they do not have any means to defend the third territory (Bordurians cannot even defend themselves). Would they have to receive a larger share of the benefits resultant from the exploitation of natural resources in Khemed with means provided by Syldavia? Indeed, this seems unacceptable.

 

To recapitulate, there are two sovereign States Syldavia and Borduria claiming sovereignty over Khemed, a third populated insular territory. The three populations through their representatives agreed on sharing sovereignty over Khemed. They understand that they are dealing with many issues—i.e. activities or goods, and these many issues imply both benefits and burdens. So, to ask all of them to contribute equally and receive an equal return is not the solution. Neither is it for the better off in any given activity to contribute more and the least advantaged in any other activity to receive a larger benefit. They may either lead to domination or to continuous assistance. And because they do also know that they will maintain the agreement under the three pre-requisites, they keep their reciprocal non-interference and consider themselves reciprocally equals. In addition to this, they know it is a targeted agreement only referring to the third territory—i.e. this is not an agreement based on humanitarian reasons, domestic or global justice.

Thereby, the representatives of Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria have decided:

Khemedians, Syldavians and Bordurians have all the same right to participate in every aspect of the sovereignty over Khemed. That is to say, they all have the opportunity to present and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty over Khemed (egalitarian consensus principle). Khemed shares in equal portions natural resources with Syldavians and Bordurians. Syldavia shares in equal portions the means for their exploitation with Khemed and Borduria. And Borduria, because of their geographical location, will grant special privileges for both Khemedian and Syldavian enterprises only related to the exploitation of natural resources in Khemed (or any other activity but it must be related to Khemed).

 
Indeed, either Khemed or Borduria may have issues in exploiting at the same level of efficiency as Syldavia their shares of natural resources. Hence, Syldavia must make sure that both the other agents reach the same level of exploitation or divide the benefits resultant amongst the three parties equally in the meantime—i.e. it is a targeted shared model.

The principle can be seen in a larger picture across the board with different activities. At first, the smaller and the larger the contribution, the smaller and the larger the return respectively. But as the agreement aims to avoid domination (secure non-interference) and has a target, it is to be expected a more evenly shared contribution-return relationship amongst the parties will emerge in the long term. That is to say in the example, at first Khemed would be defended by Syldavia, and the latter would as well contribute to the exploitation of the natural resources in the island (principle of efficiency). In principle, Syldavians would receive a larger share of the resultant benefits—i.e. the larger the contribution, the larger the return since Syldavia is contributing towards both defence and exploitation of natural resources in a larger manner than the other two agents (input-to-output ratio principle). This covers the burdens-benefits part.

But, because of the targeted agreement, Syldavia must make sure both Khemed and Borduria reach relatively the same level for the defence of the third territory and the exploitation of natural resources (equilibrium proviso). It is then when the contributions amongst the three will be more even as well as the returns.

Meanwhile, and in order to lessen the gap between contributions and benefits, Bordurians could use the difference they have in their favour—i.e. geographically proximity means a more accessible bilateral commerce with Khemed, faster and possibly more effective response in case of international threat or attack, etc., things that Syldavia cannot offer.

Moreover, as the first pre-requisite prohibits interferences of any kind, and the second pre-requisite specifically protects non-political liberties, different religious beliefs between Khemedians and Bordurians could not be used for the advantage or disadvantage of any of the populations. That is because they are in a certain order of priority. In other words, the principle and the pre-requisites are lexically ordered. Therein, no transgression of: a) the non-interference or non-domination principle; b) the basic non-political liberties; and c) the principles recognised by the law of peoples, is allowed under any excuse or reason even if that means not fulfilling the ‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ principle.

  
NOTE: Post based on Chapter 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 

Jorge Emilio Núñez

9^th February 2018

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 20 OF 21)

The representative of each party (Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed) they are deprived of knowledge in regard to which party they represent. So, it is reasonable for them and likely to agree that each party has a right to participate in each aspect of sovereignty, regardless of their particular circumstances (i.e. their development or ability) because no one would want to be left out. In other words, they would agree that ideally they would have “equal” shares of sovereignty over Khemed, which means that the three claimants would have equal standing or status. Therein, all three parties (Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed) would have a right to participate and the decision making process in each case would be subject to egalitarian consensus. That is to say, all the three parties should be granted an equal input into the decision making process. They all have the opportunity to present, and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty of Khemed.

 

A second point has to do with factual circumstances. The representatives would acknowledge that once the negotiations were over all the three parties would have very different situations (e.g. economic development, defence system, means for exploitation of natural resources, law, and so on). So it is reasonable to think that the representatives would agree that the degree of each party’s participation would vary according to each party’s ability to contribute. It is also reasonable to suppose that each party would as well have an interest in each aspect of sovereignty. Therefore, and bearing in mind these two circumstances (i.e. equal right to participate and different ability to contribute) it is reasonable to maintain that each party would have an interest in each aspect of sovereignty being handled in the most efficient manner.

 

A third point would be to determine the level of input and output of each party with regard to each objective/area/activity related to the sovereignty over the third territory. In principle, the representatives may think of distributing what benefits or rights each party would enjoy depending on the level of contribution that the party makes. Indeed, they acknowledge that some parties will be able to make a bigger or larger input than others. However, an immediate problem arises. The representatives would realise that by making the output dependant on the level of each party’s input this could result in a subterfuge for domination. That is to say, the better off party contributing more towards one or more areas and therefore securing a larger stake while the other two parties were unable to make the same level of contribution that would be translated in an ad eternum share of benefits.

 

But if the representatives added a proviso in order to make sure that the party with greater ability—and therefore greater initial participation rights—would have the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium, the proposal becomes reasonable. That is because it ensures the most efficient current distribution of rights and obligations but also ensures the party that currently benefits most has an obligation to bring the other two parties up to a position where they can contribute equally—i.e. it has the burden to assist the other two parties to acquire the ability to contribute equally to that particular objective/area/activity of sovereignty over Khemed. Therein, the party with the greater ability in whatever area would agree to this because there is no other way of having the cooperation of the other two, and the other two parties would agree because this arrangement requires they receive something immediately and will eventually gain the ability to have an equal share, and they would otherwise get nothing.

 

In brief, it means:

 

1. Equal right to participate (egalitarian consensus principle)

 

2. Nature and degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency)

  
3. Each party receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party contributes with (input-to-output ratio principle).

 

PROVISO:

4. But the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium proviso)

 

NOTE: Post based on Chapter 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 

Jorge Emilio Núñez

2^nd February 2018

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 19 OF 21)

About to finish…

The question at issue now is to decide, by respecting these three pre-requisites, how to share sovereignty over Khemed.

 

Previous post about the pre-requisites

 

So, the issue is what would constitute a reasonable allocation of sovereignty over Khemed amongst Syldavians, Bordurians and Khemedians as equal claimants, whose equality of claim is in no way affected by whatever other situation they already have; and that allocation has a target: Khemed and all that it implies in terms of rights and obligations. When the representatives applied the difference principle to the issue constructed in that way, the question is whether there could be a division of Khemed amongst Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed that would be accepted by the three parties. Therein, in the disputed sovereignty case, the difference principle would seem to demand straightforward equality. However, equality sensu stricto presented the representatives several problems too.

 

Instead of the difference principle and the principle of equality, what about working out the solution with all what the representatives have learnt so far? By acknowledging the circumstances in sovereignty conflicts—that is, different agents and an ample concept such as sovereignty—and the way in which the negotiations have been conducted, a revised principle may offer comparable advantages that may make it a reasonable option.

 

Brief account of the conflict’s background and the negotiations so far (post 17)

 

The next post will discuss what kind of arrangement Syldavians, Bordurians and Khemedians would accept considering that:

1. They all are rational beings who are free;

 

2. They all have equal standing in relation to the claimed object;

3. They all recognise their many differences;

4. They all recognise and accept to comply with the three pre-requisites.

 

Jorge Emilio Núñez

26th January 2018

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 18 OF 21)

Preliminary requirements for a fair distribution of the sovereignty over Khemed

 

Bearing in mind the previous discussions (see previous posts), it is reasonable for the representatives of Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed to agree on three basic points in order to share sovereignty before deciding how to do it:

 
First, it is prohibited to interfere with the internal or external affairs of any of the other agents.

Secondly, each agent will respect the liberties of the three populations; so no agreement reached can be interpreted in a way that curtails the basic non-political liberties of any of these populations.

Thirdly, the agents will conduct their mutual relations in light of the principles recognised by the law of peoples.

 

This first pre-requisite, that is non-domination or non-interference principle, applies in particular to agents that are least advantaged in any area by preventing the most advantaged parties to impose their law, policies, values, or ideals. Hence, although the third pre-requisite here will refer to principles recognised by the law of peoples, and therefore include the principles of non-interference and non-intervention as per international law, the one mentioned at this point as first pre-requisite is to be understood with a broader meaning—i.e. it applies to all aspects of society. Therein, not only does it include law and politics but also culture, tradition, values, ideals, and customs. Syldavians, Bordurians and Khemedians are reasonable and intellectually developed enough to understand clearly the difference between accepting and imposing. That is to say, they accept each other mutually as they are (three different populations in many senses). Hence, they will not impose their views on the other populations. Because inclusion in these pages mean to accept each party as they are (and not to accept the other parties if and only if they behave, act or are as its counter-part).
 
The second pre-requisite. For a further analysis of basic liberties and its characterisation see John Rawls (1999) A Theory of Justice, p. 53. For Rawls the basic liberties of citizens are “[…] political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure […].” Although this section is defined in Rawlsian terms, The reference to basic non-political liberties rather than basic liberties is intentional. To leave aside political liberty has to do with the nature of this project, as sovereignty is indeed a political liberty. That is because, if political liberties were included amongst the basic liberties in this pre-requisite, it would not be possible to construct the model proposed here. It is true that some scholars may see freedom of speech as a political liberty. But Rawls specifically separates political liberty (referred to vote and run for office) from freedom of speech and other civil liberties. Thereby, the basic non-political liberties mentioned here include all civil liberties, even freedom of speech.

The third pre-requisite. Rawls’ The Law of Peoples and the understanding of “familiar and traditional principles of justice among free and democratic peoples.” Some of the principles are State equality, right to self-defence, duty of non-intervention, etc. For a more thorough account of the principles of the John Rawls (1999) Law of Peoples, p. 37.

 

With these three pre-requisites agreed in this hypothetical situation, once the negotiations are over the representatives secure that the agreement is not a subterfuge for domination of any kind, that the individuals of each population safeguard their basic non-political liberties, and that the three agents are free and autonomous from each other.

The next post will discuss what kind of arrangement the representatives of Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed would reach under these circumstances and bearing in mind the previous discussions.

 

NOTE: Post based on Chapter 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

  
Jorge Emilio Núñez

19th January 2018

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 17 OF 21)

SO FAR…

We have three populations (Khemed, Syldavia, and Borduria) part of a sovereignty conflict or dispute. For whatever reason, each party claims exclusive sovereignty over Khemed. Since their world might perish soon they have all decided to go into negotiations in relation to the sovereignty over Khemed. That is mainly because Khemed’s territory is rich in a very rare metal that happened to be necessary for the construction of inter-stellar flying objects. All three parties think of using these inter-stellar flying objects in the event the world came to an end and needed to evacuate.

Post introducing Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria

Each of the parties has chosen a representative. The representatives of the three populations will go into the negotiations without knowing whom they represent but with access to any other information about the three parties, their claims, and anything and everything related to Khemed and its sovereignty. By acting in this way, they ensure that none of the parties is more or less advantaged or disadvantaged when choosing how sovereignty will be allocated.

Post about the representatives and their limitations

We have assumed that the representatives do not know whom they represent and they have to accept that they might be representing any of the three populations. So, the representatives are driven by the rule of maximin. The issue then was to determine the nature and size of each particular share of sovereignty.

Previous post on decision theory

The representatives reviewed and rejected a series of possible options in order to make a decision about how to share the sovereignty over Khemed.

To recapitulate, the representatives rejected just acquisition, the best interest of only one of the parties, the difference principle, and equal shares.

Previous post on historical entitlement

Previous post on benefits to only one

Previous post on different shares of sovereignty (1)

Previous post on different shares of sovereignty (2)

Previous post on equal shares of sovereignty (1)

Previous post on equal shares of sovereignty (2)

Sovereignty implies many aspects of many different levels. Not only is this translated in benefits but also burdens. The previous section showed that a cautious choice would acknowledge both that sovereignty indeed is complex and that it implies benefits as well as burdens in different areas. So, to choose any of the aforementioned ideas would be an over simplistic decision that may result in grave consequences for the represented populations.

The solution reached must be one that, apart from being intuitively appealing in the negotiations for all the representatives and those whom they represent, and can be applied when negotiations are over in such a way that the three populations want to respect the agreement reached. Then, the solution must be somehow beneficial to the three Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria, must recognise (to an extent) their claims and the result is not detrimental to any of them.

It is usually the case to think and assume that the population in the third territory is the least advantaged or in a more precarious situation in comparison to that of the two sovereign States. But that is not necessarily true in all cases. In our history, although Khemed may be at disadvantage in some areas in comparison to  Syldavia and Borduria, it is a fact the rare metal they all need is in Khemed. Then, it is not easy to point out the least advantaged party.

In order to succeed in choosing a principle to be applied for the allocation of sovereignty the representatives must bear in mind some circumstances:

a) when they finish the negotiations the claiming parties will be in very different situations in many areas;

b) that the least advantaged party may be but does not need to be Khemed;

c) that sovereignty conflicts and sovereignty itself are complex—i.e. they imply both benefits and burdens in many different areas.

In order to address the issue of complexity the representatives must first make clear how the parties will not use any agreement reached for their benefit only. That is to say, the agreement must not be a subterfuge for any form of domination from one or more claiming parties in relation to the other(s). That is because by application of the maximin rule it is plausible to think the representatives will have a cautious view in relation to the final result.

Jorge Emilio Núñez

20th November 2017

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 16 OF 21)

Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria are having negotiations about the sovereignty over Khemed. Their world is about to perish and they must come to an agreement. Each of these parties sent representatives to the negotiations. By application of maximin the representatives decided to share the sovereignty. However simple it may sound, they face another problem: how are they going to share sovereignty? That is to say, how can sovereignty be divided? They have already reviewed several options and rejected them all. First, the historical entitlement. To benefit only one of the parties was the second option. The third choice reviewed was to divide sovereignty in different portions. Right now, they are considering whether sovereignty could be divided into equal parts. In brief, to divide sovereignty equally means to grant unequal parties at many levels and in many ways equal portions of sovereignty over Khemed. With this in mind, it is highly likely any reasonable representative would see at least three main problems:

a) How are the rights and benefits going to be distributed?

b) How are the obligations going to be distributed?

c) What are they going to do with the areas of sovereignty that in principle cannot be divided?

Thinking as the representatives would, let us consider these three problems one at a time.

First, sovereignty over any land will imply rights and obligations. Khemed, like any other territory, will imply both rights and obligations in terms of its sovereignty. Focused on rights only, if Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria were to receive an equal portion of sovereignty that would at first glance sound fair. Or not? The problem is not the theoretical equal division, but its application to reality. After signing such an agreement, Khemed and Borduria would find themselves with 33% of the rights in relation to, for example, the exploration and exploitation of the rare natural resource that could save them all. As we know, only Syldavia has the technology and means to explore and exploit the resource. This means that what in principle appears to be a fair distribution of sovereignty because the shares were equal, in reality will result in the disadvantage of most of the parties and to the advantage of only one of them.

Similar to the point before, the representatives would think of the equal division of obligations. To that extent, consider the same example, that is the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Would only Syldavia have the obligation to do these? What about the obligation Khemed and Borduria cannot comply with because they do not have either the technology or the means? Consider another important example, how would the three parties protect or defend the rare natural resource? The three peoples, Khemedians, Syldavians and Bordurians depend on the rare metal in order to survive a natural catastrophe. If they divide the sovereignty amongst the three parties in equal portions, each will be obliged to protect the same rare resource. How will Khemed and Borduria fulfil their obligation when they do not have the means to do it?

Considering the two issues we addressed before in a separate manner proves to be a problem if the representatives want to divide sovereignty equally. Would this view change if we considered equal division of rights and obligations together? The short answer: it would not. Why? If Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria accepted to divide equally the rights and obligations in relation to the sovereignty over Khemed, in the case of, for example, the exploration and exploitation of natural resources it would be still Syldavia the only one able to do it. Also, in the case of the protection of the territory and the resources, Syldavia would be once more the only party with the ability to do it. In brief, Syldavia would be the only party able to exercise its rights in relation to the sovereignty over Khemed (at least in the examples we examined) and the only party able to comply with its obligations. Would that give Syldavians the exclusive use and ownership of the rare natural resource? Or, for whatever reason, would they have to share the result of their efforts while Khemedians and Bordurians did very little?

The third and final problem we will consider: what about areas that cannot be divided? Similarly, what about areas that in principle might be divided but they could not be divided equally? Leaving aside for now the considerations we have just made, the sovereignty over Khemed will indeed imply natural resources (including the rare metal), its exploration and exploitation, protection, and may other areas that in principle could be divided. But there will be many other areas that will prove to be difficult to divide. For example, how are they going to share the making and application of the law? For a specific example, what about criminal law in the case one of the parties still had death penalty as capital punishment and the other two parties did not? What about human rights in the event one or more of the parties were under regimes different from a democracy? On the social side, what about migrations, issues related to ethnicity, language, culture and religion? Should the wishes of the majority prevail? Or should they reach a new agreement? And these are but a few examples. Let us remember sovereignty has to do with many areas and many levels.

There could be other problems with equal division of the sovereignty over Khemed. In any case, the representatives would acknowledge at least the three considered above. It is highly unlikely any reasonable representative would opt for this option and even if one of them did, it is extremely hard to see how the three of them would come to such an agreement.

The next posts will introduce some other considerations. This time the representatives will have to be more creative and come up with another option since the ones already available seems to only grant endless disputes. And, as we know, with the end of their world fast coming, time is something they cannot take for granted.

Jorge Emilio Núñez

13th November 2017