Time
to solve Gibraltar. The last four posts introduced very briefly the background
situation of this TERRITORIAL DISPUTE.
This series introduces TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES and attempts to solve them as a matter of ideal theory. That means we
conduct a theoretical experiment to evaluate what reasonable people would
decide given some facts. When we addressed Kashmir, we centred the attention on
population (religion, ethnicity, etc.). When it was the time to deal with the
Falkland/Malvinas islands, we focused on territory (borders, natural resources,
etc.). With Gibraltar, the analysis will be about government and law. That is
because of two main reasons: a) Gibraltar has already taken the first steps
towards a solution; b) by considering government and law, we complete the
assessment of our current understanding in legal and political sciences of a
“sovereign state.”
Government
can be defined as a person, group of people or body that create and apply the
law for the population in a given territory. Together with population and
territory, it completes the necessary elements that constitute a minimal
political and societal organisation. Government offers some controversial features
in any TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. The following posts will review some of these features
using the case of Gibraltar to show their implications.
The
focus will be first on the financial system and later on specificities about
power share. The main reason to proceed this way is because power sharing has many
different implications, and amongst other sub-elements law. Thereby, and in
order to have a clear picture it is advisable to deal with one issue at a time,
review it, see how EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could be best realised.
REMINDER:
The
allocation of sovereignty will be given by: a) equal right to participate
(egalitarian consensus principle); b) the nature and degree of participation
depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity
at issue (principle of efficiency); c) each party receives a benefit (in terms
of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party cooperates with
(input-to-output ratio principle); and d) provided the party with greater
ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the obligation
to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium proviso). I
call this way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts or disputes the EGALITARIAN
SHARED SOVEREIGNTY.
Many
questions are to be expected. Amongst them: How is that translated into
Gibraltarian autarchy and financial system first?; b) how may it be possible to
share power?
The
next posts on this blog series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES will cover these
questions.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive
Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Jorge Emilio Nunez
13th
April 2018
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