The
latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centred the attention on
the Falkland/Malvinas islands. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN
SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to the Falklands/Malvinas
respectively.
Today’s
post will cover defence:
What
would happen if another party with no part in the original conflict decided to
invade the Falkland/Malvinas islands? In the hypothetical scenario that a
fourth party decided to invade the Falkland/Malvinas islands, who would defend
them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows: a) both
Argentina and the United Kingdom may remain neutral; consequently the new agent
would take over the islands if the inhabitants were unable to defend
themselves; b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and
defend the islands; c) both Argentina and the United Kindgodm may respond to
the invasion and defend jointly or independently the islands.
At the
same time, States have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests
and their population. Consequently, any act of defence is fair and just as long
as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a
TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should
be defending the third territory in the event of an attack on what appears to
be a common interest for all the involved parties: the third territory.
In
addition to the way in which the parties would defend the third territory, there are two other crucial elements that
need to be agreed, even if joint defence was the case: a) the extent to which
the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate
resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their
forces against the other two parties); b) and the extent to which one considers
what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both
the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best
adapted to defending it. Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on
the obligation to defend. However, how would Argentina, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
and the United Kingdom share the defence?
The
egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be
crucial in order to have shared defence: a) Resources; b) Training and
opportunities; c) Safety of the other two parties (how to avoid misuse of
power). What does it mean if the agents have different level of development?
The differences in the case of defence are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location;
economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities;
number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these
differences work together in an efficient form.
In the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands’ case, it will be highly probable that the parties
have a different level of development in terms of their respective defence
systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty
can be fulfilled in two ways: a) following the most efficient combination in
terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local
knowledge of the people in the territory (Falkland/Malvinas Islands), the
geostrategic location (Argentina), and the equipment, resources and any means
best adapted to defending it (the United Kingdom); b) the agent with the better
comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other
parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso)—e.g. the
United Kingdom could train Argentinean and Falkland/Malvinas troops in exchange
for the use of locations in any of them.
It is
clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same
level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are
able to defend the third territory (not the territory that is already part of
the sovereign States). Thus, even if there were variations in the future in
terms of wealth status and defence development among the involved participants,
the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to
combine to produce the most efficient result. Brexit poses a strong question in
the United Kingdom’s future.
For
further information about defence and the Falkland/Malvinas islands see a
previous post on this blog (2013) in which I reviewed a report from The House
of Commons. Available at:
Next time: natural resources and the
Falkland/Malvinas islands.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive
Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Twitter: @London1701
03rd
April 2018
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