Today natural
resources and the Falkland/Malvinas islands. It is one of the most
controversial elements in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. It is usually the case the real
reasons behind these TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is different (domestically, for example,
level of popularity of ruling party, corruption, unemployment, security, etc.;
regionally and internationally, geostrategic location, bargaining power, debt,
etc.). However, natural resources are used to justify ongoing disputes (or to
create new ones).
What
are natural resources and who owns them? What do we do with the natural
resources in the Falkland/Malvinas islands? What happens in the zone in which
Argentina and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands overlap? In the case of the
Falkland/Malvinas islands any decision over this point has particular
importance since it could affect in the future the legal and political status
in Antarctica.
Natural
resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic
or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some
States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of
natural resources defines a State. But the distribution of natural resources is
usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even
though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a
feature that always presents controversy.
There
are two key connected issues with natural resources. First and more evident,
who owns them. But, even if we had an answer to that, this does not solve the
controversy either. That is because, even though Argentina, the United Kingdom
and the Falkland/Malvinas islanders agreed to distribute natural resources,
other highly controversial issues remain. This is not only a matter of
distribution because the resources have to be farmed, or mined, or piped, and
someone has to do the work, and someone, whether a private individual or the
State, has to own the farms, mines, pipes, etc.
The EGALITARIAN
SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations, that ownership, public or
private, should be totally in the hands of the territory where the mines, etc.,
are situated, without regard to the needs of the two sovereign States, or that
it should be totally in the hands of the sovereign States. It would also rule
out the idea that existing ownership should automatically continue, or that
everything should be left to the market. In brief, in order to to acknowledge
the controversial features that natural resources present and still apply the
egalitarian shared sovereignty solution and hence distribute them, the
following points have to be addressed: a) just distribution as the aimed
outcome; b) the ownership system of natural resources; c) the exploitation
system; d) the gains and losses of the involved agents; e) the needs and
capabilities of all three parties.
The
differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects
(for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical
location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will
be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens.
However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the
co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the
inhabitants of the islands), and this will involve both rights and obligations.
A
combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared
sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may
exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way
(for example, joint ventures).
Two points
must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of all the
parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle is in
terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the
distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by
bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together
offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a
solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the
participants.
The
egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural
resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and
exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the
parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will
make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of
natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the
inequality.
Consequently,
even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural
resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of
development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still
be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of
exploitation and the way benefits were allocated. Let us think of Argentina’s
volatile financial past and more recently, Brexit posing a strong question for
the United Kingdom’s future.
Next
time how all this could work with the Falklands/Malvinas.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive
Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Media file by Wikimedia Commons
available at
04th
April 2018
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