Natural
resources and the Falkland/Malvinas islands. Yesterday we introduced the way in
which natural resources may be distributed and the fact that there are other
elements for consideration (for example, exploration and exploitation). How can
this work here?
Post 28: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 8)
In the
case of the Falkland/Malvinas islands, the three parties could be co-owners of
the natural resources located in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic
zone. Undoubtedly, there are several differences amongst Argentina, the United
Kingdom and the Falkland/Malvinas islands. Therein, some of these differences
show how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could work.
The
first difference is given by the fact the islanders possess the total of
natural resources at stake (100%). By applying the egalitarian shared
sovereignty, each party receives the rights to the same ideal portion (33% of
the ownership of natural resources, minus original ownership of the inhabitants
of the third territory). It would be either over simplistic or naïve to imagine
Argentineans or Falkland/Malvinas islanders to be able to explore and exploit
to the same level their shares of natural resources in comparison to the United
Kingdom (second difference). However, both Argentineans and Falkland/Malvinas islanders
have some elements that put them in a better position in relation to that of
the United Kingdom, for example local work force, geographical proximity (third
difference).
With
all these differences in mind, the could explore and exploit natural resources
(as they are the party most developed technically and economically to do it),
and both the islanders and Argentina could offer the work force for the joint
venture and grant privileges in terms of location to British companies. Thus,
Argentina could also offer the United Kingdom certain exclusive rights in the
sea-zone that overlaps with the Falkland/Malvinas.
Continuous
assistance from the United Kingdom to Argentina and the Falkland/Malvinas islands
might become a permanent feature (it may lead to domination or an unbalanced
relationship). To avoid this, the United
Kingdom would have to help Argentina and the Falkland islands in developing
their means of exploration and exploitation to relatively the same level they
have.
At the
beginning of the agreement the United Kingdom indeed would be contributing more
towards the exploration and exploitation and hence have a larger return.
However, these uneven distributions of burdens and benefits amongst the parties
would only be in the short term. Natural resources and all that they imply in
terms of rights and obligations are part of a wider agreement that has a
target: the third territory as a whole.
Finally, the way in which each party redistributes the benefits of this shared model within each population is entirely a matter of national or local distribution and hence may have various forms. That is to say, the egalitarian shared sovereignty gives the basic structure of the solution; the details are subject to actual rather than hypothetical negotiation. As an example only, the resultant revenues of some or all the joint activities could be destined to a distribution fund.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive
Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Media file by Wikimedia Commons available at
Road in Stanley05th April 2018
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