Territorial disputes: Gibraltar (Part 2) [Post 32]

There are many academic and non-academic articles in English and Spanish (at least) about Gibraltar. Today we focus on academic studies about this TERRITORIAL DISPUTE.

The first article introduces Gibraltar, its historical context and a few (often) overlooked issues at stake: territorial waters, natural resources, and defence. With this article, the reader will see that Gibraltar, Spain and the United Kingdom bring to the game other actors such as the European Union and NATO.

The second article refers to the different views about the dispute depending on origin. This comprehensive study demonstrate how the same reality is presented in different manners to the public depending on whether they are in Gibraltar, Spain or the United Kingdom.

The third article presents what at the time seemed to be the path to a definitive solution: the principle of “two flags, three voices.” Indeed, it is much easier to achieve a provisional solution than a permanent settlement. However, easier does not mean better.

The last article leaves many questions open. With Brexit fast approaching, what will happen with Gibraltar?

 

Previous post about Gibraltar (part of the TERRITORIAL DISPUTES series):

Post 31: Territorial disputes: Gibraltar (Part 1)

ARTICLE 1 

GIBRALTAR: SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES AND TERRITORIAL WATERS
by Gerry O’Reilly

“Britain stresses that Gibraltar was ceded to the Crown by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 […]. However, under the Treaty of Utrecht, Spain has right of “first refusal” should Britain decide to relinquish sovereignty over Gibraltar.”

“In the historical context, regional disputes have rendered delimiting maritime zones difficult but have prevented a single state from gaining sovereignty over an entire stretch of water.”

“Despite UK and Spanish membership, full usage of Gibraltar’s facilities by NATO states has been retarded.”

“Since the 1980s, both British and Spanish governments had hoped NATO membership, and EU integration with EU citizenship would lessen the intensity of the Gibraltar problem.”

“The British Government supports the principle of right of self-determination, but in Gibraltar’s case, because of the Treaty of Utrecht, this means that Gibraltar could become independent only with Spanish consent.”

Link to the complete article:

GIBRALTAR: SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES AND TERRITORIAL WATERS

ARTICLE 2
SFL and CDA: Contributions of the Analysis of the Transitivity System in the Study of the Discursive Construction of National Identity (Case Study: Gibraltar)
by Ángela Alameda-Hernández

“[…] the three corpora from the Gibraltarian, Spanish and British press were concerned with the Gibraltar situation, but each of them approached it in different ways, as the examination of the patterns of processes, participants and circumstances have revealed. The analysis allowed us to draw some social and political conclusions on the discursive construction and representation of the Gibraltar issue. On the one hand, the analysis of the Gibraltarian newspapers allowed us to understand how Gibraltar presented itself to the world, the self-image it portrayed; while on the other hand, the analysis of the Spanish and British newspapers allowed us to understand how this issue and the community of Gibraltar were perceived and represented from the outside, that is, from the two relevant angles involved in the situation of this territory.”

Link to complete article:

Case Study: Gibraltar

 

ARTICLE 3

The Tripartite Forum of Dialogue: Is this the Solution to the ‘Problem’ of Gibraltar?

by Peter Gold

Abstract

Following the abortive attempt by Britain and Spain to negotiate the joint sovereignty of Gibraltar in 2001–02, the incoming Spanish Government in 2004 proposed the establishment of a Forum of Dialogue, in which for the first time Gibraltar would take part as an independent third party. This Forum was designed to achieve cooperation across a number of issues, including the use of the airport, frontier traffic flows, pensions for former Spanish workers in Gibraltar and telecommunications, and by September 2006 proposed solutions were reached on all of them. The paper explores the Forum process and its achievements, but concludes that, given the fundamental differences in the ultimate objectives of the Forum participants and in particular Spain's sensitivity to Gibraltar's status, the agreements may only prove to be a means of managing the Gibraltar ‘problem’ rather than resolving it. Finally, the article considers whether the Forum model offers any lessons for other disputes in the region where sovereignty is contested.

Link to abstract and article:

The Tripartite Forum of Dialogue: Is this the Solution to the ‘Problem’ of Gibraltar?

Article 4

Explaining the European Union’s Changing Position towards the Gibraltar Question after the Brexit Referendum

by Ugur Burc Yildiz and Anil Camyamac

Abstract

Having previously remained impartial on the Gibraltar question between Spain and Britain since both were member states, the European Union suddenly changed its position after the Brexit referendum in favor of the Spanish government at the expense of breaching international law. In doing so, the European Union, for the first time, created a foreign policy on the long-standing Gibraltar question. This article explores the reasons behind the creation of this foreign policy in support of Spain. The European Union feared that the idea of Euroscepticism may escalate among remaining member states after the Brexit referendum because of wide-spread claims that it would dissolve in the near future, fuelled by far right political parties. The European Union therefore created a foreign policy regarding Gibraltar in Spain’s favor in order to promote a “sense of community” for thwarting a further rise in Euroscepticism. While making its analysis, the article applies the assumption of social constructivism that ideas shape interests, which then determine the foreign policy choices of actors.

Link to abstract and complete article:

Explaining the European Union’s Changing Position towards the Gibraltar Question after the Brexit Referendum

Jorge Emilio Nunez

Twitter: @London1701
 

10th April 2018

Territorial disputes: Gibraltar (Part 1) [Post 31]

A long-standing TERRITORIAL DISPUTE is the case of Gibraltar. Different from the previous cases considered by this blog series, Gibraltar has already taken the first steps for what may be a future joint solution. In today’s post, a very brief introduction of the history behind the dispute. As with the previously reviewed TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, the following posts will introduce: different academic and non-academic views; the current situation; the views of the inhabitants (because in any case they are the ones who will live the consequences of any decision); coverage by the media including all parties in the dispute; the ideal methodology to solve the difference (what I call Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty); its application to some controversial elements; and some conclusive remarks.

 

Gibraltar, prior to modernity, was occupied by the Spaniards, Arab and Muslim Kingdoms and some other cultures. It is in 1713, after a war between Britain and Spain, that Spain ceded Gibraltar in perpetuity to the United Kingdom under the Treaty of Utrecht. However, after this agreement the dispute about the peninsula has continued, with Spain claiming sovereign rights. The Gibraltarians rejected Spanish sovereignty in referendums twice (1967 and 2002). In the last referendum, the Gibraltarians rejected shared sovereignty between the United Kingdom and Spain. However, shared sovereignty in this case did not consider the Gibraltarians in the negotiations.

Currently, and under the Gibraltar Constitution Order (2006), Gibraltar remains part of the United Kingdom’s dominions. It is important to make clear the British government cannot enter into arrangements with other States in relation to the sovereignty of Gibraltar against the Gibraltarians’ wishes. The Constitution recognises the right to self-determination. Although Gibraltar is in charge of its internal affairs, the United Kingdom deals with foreign affairs and defence. In relation to Spain, a trilateral process of dialogue started in 2004 allowing finally the principle of “two flags, three voices.”

 

To the reader, following two of our previous posts of this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES:

1. What are the issues at stakes in this a territorial dispute?
2. Which remedy could be used to solve this particular territorial dispute?

 

For reference to these questions see:

POST 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

POST 10: Territorial disputes: remedies
 

NOTE: This post is based on Chapter 7 in Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 
Jorge Emilio Nunez
 
Twitter: @London1701
 

09th April 2018

Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 10) [Post 30]

A TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, in simple terms, is a disagreement about “who owns a territory.” In international relations, this means in principle there is a disagreement between at least two parties in relation to whom the sovereign is over a piece of land. The Falklands/Malvinas are a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE that include Argentina, the United Kingdom and the Falkland/Malvinas islands. The previous posts introduced a brief historical chronology, mentioned some key domestic and international reasons behind this case, included references to other regional and international agents that have played (and in some cases, still do) a central role, and explored an ideal solution called EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY.

This last post about the Falkland/Malvinas islands as a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE centres the attention on why this difference is still ongoing. The answer is as simple as complex. The combination of domestic, regional and international elements make this dispute a stalemate. Although in principle a stalemate may seem negative, the status quo in the Falklands/Malvinas serves some. Huth explains the dynamics clearly:

“[…] very often political leaders are not willing to take risks and undertake diplomatic initiatives that will break a long-standing stalemate in negotiations. Furthermore, leaders themselves are socialized into viewing the target as an adversary and, as a result, they are not predisposed to view concessions as a legitimate option. Furthermore, […] a history of military conflict with the target can be used by the military to justify larger budgets […]. The combined effect, then, is that the idea of offering concessions and proposing a unilateral initiative to break the stalemate is a policy option quite difficult to get on the policy agenda of political leaders within the challenger. Few voices are advocating such policies within the challenger, and the prevailing climate of opinion (both mass and elite) is opposed to such a change in policy.”

Huth mentions some examples, amongst them the treaty signed between Argentina and Chile about the Beagle Channel. In that occasion, Alfonsin pushed for a settlement against opposition by means of a referendum that legitimized the decision.

“[…] leaders were typically constrained by domestic political forces to be very cautious in moving toward a compromise settlement, since popular and elite opinion, and often the military, was opposed to such a policy. [...] In most situations the leader’s position of domestic power and authority was better served by continuing confrontation […]”

Huth, Paul K. 2001. Standing Your Ground. Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. The University of Michigan Press.

In a study published in 2017 by Globe: A Journal of Language, Culture and Communication, Leung offers an insight of how British and Argentineans websites refer to each other when they discuss the Falkland/Malvinas islands. In both cased, the views are extremely biased and polarised. The abstract and the link to the complete academic journal article below. A phrase summarises it all “positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation."

ABSTRACT“Considering "discursive positioning" to be a form of "placement," this study examines how the Falkland Islands or las Islas Malvinas, a place which has long been politically controversial, are discursively positioned on British and Argentinian websites.”

“For instance, in the British corpus, Argentina is construed as an invader (as suggested by the collocates "invasion" and "1982") whereas in the Argentinian corpus, Britain is given this demonized role (via the collocates "militar" [military] and "británica" [British (feminine singular)]). Such findings add strength to van Dijk's (2011) discussion of "positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation." As an example of corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS), the current research also offers solid evidence on the social phenomenon of "classification" proposed by Bourdieu (1990)—i.e., "a vision of the world is a division of the world."


 
Complete article available at

The discursive positioning of the Falkland Islands (las Islas Malvinas)

 

To conclude the posts about the Falkland/Malvinas islands, a simple question: has anything changed since 1982 dialectic? Both Argentina and the United Kingdom were (and are) going through deep crisis. It was very convenient for both of them at that time (is it the same now?) for domestic agendas. Ms Margaret Thatcher and the Military Junta; Mr David Cameron and Ms Cristina Fernández de Kirchner; Ms May and Mr Macri: the characters seem different. Yet the play is the same. We all have the option to centre the attention on war and revenge. Hence, more deaths. There is another option: to think about how to solve this dispute. This series TERRITORIAL DISPUTES intends to offer a platform for discussion.

With all this in mind, I introduced the overall idea I call EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY. I develop this approach in full in Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. “Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue.” London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Briefly, all parties share sovereignty in equal ideal terms. To get to that, these parties go into negotiations themselves (not UN or any other party alien to the conflict).

Next post will introduce another TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. In the meantime, links to some informative sites and the previous posts about the Falkland/Malvinas islands below.

For an interactive map of TERRITORIAL DISPUTES see


Interactive Map TERRITORIAL DISPUTES by Metrocosm 

For current information about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES see CIA’s The World Factbook at:

 

Factbook by the CIA 

Previous posts of the TERRITORIAL DISPUTE series (only about the Falkland/Malvinas islands below):

Post 21: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 1)

Post 22: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 2)

Post 23: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 3)

 

 

Post 24: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 4)

Post 25: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 5)

Post 26: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 6)

Post 27: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 7)

Post 28: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 8)

Post 29: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 9)

 
Jorge Emilio Nunez

Twitter: @London1701

06th April 2018

Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 9) [Post 29]

Natural resources and the Falkland/Malvinas islands. Yesterday we introduced the way in which natural resources may be distributed and the fact that there are other elements for consideration (for example, exploration and exploitation). How can this work here?

 
Post 28: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 8)

 

In the case of the Falkland/Malvinas islands, the three parties could be co-owners of the natural resources located in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone. Undoubtedly, there are several differences amongst Argentina, the United Kingdom and the Falkland/Malvinas islands. Therein, some of these differences show how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could work.

 

The first difference is given by the fact the islanders possess the total of natural resources at stake (100%). By applying the egalitarian shared sovereignty, each party receives the rights to the same ideal portion (33% of the ownership of natural resources, minus original ownership of the inhabitants of the third territory). It would be either over simplistic or naïve to imagine Argentineans or Falkland/Malvinas islanders to be able to explore and exploit to the same level their shares of natural resources in comparison to the United Kingdom (second difference). However, both Argentineans and Falkland/Malvinas islanders have some elements that put them in a better position in relation to that of the United Kingdom, for example local work force, geographical proximity (third difference).

With all these differences in mind, the could explore and exploit natural resources (as they are the party most developed technically and economically to do it), and both the islanders and Argentina could offer the work force for the joint venture and grant privileges in terms of location to British companies. Thus, Argentina could also offer the United Kingdom certain exclusive rights in the sea-zone that overlaps with the Falkland/Malvinas.

Continuous assistance from the United Kingdom to Argentina and the Falkland/Malvinas islands might become a permanent feature (it may lead to domination or an unbalanced relationship).  To avoid this, the United Kingdom would have to help Argentina and the Falkland islands in developing their means of exploration and exploitation to relatively the same level they have.

At the beginning of the agreement the United Kingdom indeed would be contributing more towards the exploration and exploitation and hence have a larger return. However, these uneven distributions of burdens and benefits amongst the parties would only be in the short term. Natural resources and all that they imply in terms of rights and obligations are part of a wider agreement that has a target: the third territory as a whole.

 
Finally, the way in which each party redistributes the benefits of this shared model within each population is entirely a matter of national or local distribution and hence may have various forms. That is to say, the egalitarian shared sovereignty gives the basic structure of the solution; the details are subject to actual rather than hypothetical negotiation. As an example only, the resultant revenues of some or all the joint activities could be destined to a distribution fund.

NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Media file by Wikimedia Commons available at

Road in Stanley

Jorge Emilio Nunez

Twitter: @London1701
 

05th April 2018

 

Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 8) [Post 28]

 

Today natural resources and the Falkland/Malvinas islands. It is one of the most controversial elements in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. It is usually the case the real reasons behind these TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is different (domestically, for example, level of popularity of ruling party, corruption, unemployment, security, etc.; regionally and internationally, geostrategic location, bargaining power, debt, etc.). However, natural resources are used to justify ongoing disputes (or to create new ones).

 

POST 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

What are natural resources and who owns them? What do we do with the natural resources in the Falkland/Malvinas islands? What happens in the zone in which Argentina and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands overlap? In the case of the Falkland/Malvinas islands any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect in the future the legal and political status in Antarctica.

 

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

 

There are two key connected issues with natural resources. First and more evident, who owns them. But, even if we had an answer to that, this does not solve the controversy either. That is because, even though Argentina, the United Kingdom and the Falkland/Malvinas islanders agreed to distribute natural resources, other highly controversial issues remain. This is not only a matter of distribution because the resources have to be farmed, or mined, or piped, and someone has to do the work, and someone, whether a private individual or the State, has to own the farms, mines, pipes, etc.

 

The EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations, that ownership, public or private, should be totally in the hands of the territory where the mines, etc., are situated, without regard to the needs of the two sovereign States, or that it should be totally in the hands of the sovereign States. It would also rule out the idea that existing ownership should automatically continue, or that everything should be left to the market. In brief, in order to to acknowledge the controversial features that natural resources present and still apply the egalitarian shared sovereignty solution and hence distribute them, the following points have to be addressed: a) just distribution as the aimed outcome; b) the ownership system of natural resources; c) the exploitation system; d) the gains and losses of the involved agents; e) the needs and capabilities of all three parties.

 

The differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects (for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the inhabitants of the islands), and this will involve both rights and obligations.

A combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way (for example, joint ventures).

Two points must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of all the parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle is in terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the participants.

 

The egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the inequality. 

Consequently, even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of exploitation and the way benefits were allocated. Let us think of Argentina’s volatile financial past and more recently, Brexit posing a strong question for the United Kingdom’s future.

 

Next time how all this could work with the Falklands/Malvinas.

 

NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 

Media file by Wikimedia Commons available at

Falkland Islanders shoveling peat (ca 1950)

Jorge Emilio Nunez

Twitter: @London1701

04th April 2018

Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 7) [Post 27]

The latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centred the attention on the Falkland/Malvinas islands. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to the Falklands/Malvinas respectively.

 

Post 25: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 5)

Post 26: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 6)

 

Today’s post will cover defence:

What would happen if another party with no part in the original conflict decided to invade the Falkland/Malvinas islands? In the hypothetical scenario that a fourth party decided to invade the Falkland/Malvinas islands, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows: a) both Argentina and the United Kingdom may remain neutral; consequently the new agent would take over the islands if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves; b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the islands; c) both Argentina and the United Kindgodm may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the islands.

At the same time, States have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defence is fair and just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should be defending the third territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a common interest for all the involved parties: the third territory.

 

In addition to the way in which the parties would defend the third territory,  there are two other crucial elements that need to be agreed, even if joint defence was the case: a) the extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their forces against the other two parties); b) and the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it. Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend. However, how would Argentina, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and the United Kingdom share the defence?

 

The egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in order to have shared defence: a) Resources; b) Training and opportunities; c) Safety of the other two parties (how to avoid misuse of power). What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the case of defence are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location; economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these differences work together in an efficient form.

 

In the Falkland/Malvinas Islands’ case, it will be highly probable that the parties have a different level of development in terms of their respective defence systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways: a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in the territory (Falkland/Malvinas Islands), the geostrategic location (Argentina), and the equipment, resources and any means best adapted to defending it (the United Kingdom); b) the agent with the better comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso)—e.g. the United Kingdom could train Argentinean and Falkland/Malvinas troops in exchange for the use of locations in any of them.

 

It is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are able to defend the third territory (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign States). Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth status and defence development among the involved participants, the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to produce the most efficient result. Brexit poses a strong question in the United Kingdom’s future.

 

For further information about defence and the Falkland/Malvinas islands see a previous post on this blog (2013) in which I reviewed a report from The House of Commons. Available at:

Falklands: is there a chance for military action?

 

Next time: natural resources and the Falkland/Malvinas islands.

NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 Jorge Emilio Nunez
 

Twitter: @London1701
 

03rd April 2018

Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part 6) [Post 26]

We introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY last time. Today we will present some key elements related to the Falkland/Malvinas islands.

 

Post 25: Territorial disputes: Falkland/Malvinas islands (Part5)

From our previous posts, we have learnt so far that some of the main concerns related to the Falkland/Malvinas islands are:

Borders

This could be a matter of controversy. In the particular case of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, although it may seem that borders are not an issue—as they are islands—the exclusive economic zone often creates tension between Argentina and the United Kingdom. For instance, who has the right to explore that exclusive sea-zone? What happens in the zone in which Argentina and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands overlap? As this point is intrinsically linked to natural resources, it will be examined after introducing the latter.

 
Defence

National defence will be seen here as the protection of any interest a State has—e.g. possessions, territory, and population—through different means—e.g. military, economic, and diplomatic. There are several States in which the army and navy are not big, well equipped or trained enough in order to defend their territory or population but they are still respected as States. There are others that in fact do not have military defence at all, their defence being the responsibility of another country or an international organisation—e.g. OTAN.

There seems to be no problem with defence. The territory being defended is obviously desirable although the task is one which can be shared. However, what would happen if another party—i.e. a sovereign State with no part in the conflict—decided to invade the third territory? In the hypothetical scenario a fourth party decided to invade the Falkland/Malvinas islands, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows: a) both Argentina and the United Kingdom may remain neutral; consequently the new agent would take over the Falklands/Malvinas if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves; b) one of the sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend the third territory; c) both sovereign States may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the third territory.

 
Natural resources

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some States are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a State. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

In the case of the Falkland/Malvinas islands any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect in the future the legal and political status in Antarctica.

 

Next time both are combined (the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and the elements below) to offer a potential ideal solution.

 

NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Media file by Wikimedia Commons available at

Falkland islands in the world (TUBS)

 

Jorge Emilio Nunez

Twitter: @London1701

02nd April 2018