Wednesday, 26 March 2025

Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Conflicts in Africa: The Situation in 2025

 

Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Conflicts in Africa: The Situation in 2025

Africa’s territorial disputes and sovereignty conflicts remain a crucible of historical legacies, legal ambiguities, political rivalries, and sociocultural tensions as of March 2025. Rooted in colonial border-drawing and exacerbated by post-independence struggles, these disputes—spanning over 100 active cases—persist as volatile clashes over land, identity, and power. My research, distilled in 25 posts from October to November 2020 (e.g., Territorial Disputes: Africa, Parts 1-25), predicted their endurance absent radical rethinking—a forecast borne out by recent escalations. Through Sovereignty Conflicts (2017), Territorial Disputes (2020), and Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023), I probe justice, complexity, and pluralism, while my forthcoming Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025) informs broader resolution proposals.

Latest Developments: Escalating Violence and Fragile Stalemates

In March 2025, tensions flared anew across the continent. On March 13, posts on X reported Ethiopia and Eritrea mobilizing forces near their border, with Tigray officials warning of imminent war amid internal power struggles—a legacy of the 1998-2000 war and the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict (Africa Part 8). Reuters noted Sudan’s ongoing civil war, with over 10 million displaced since 2023, as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) vie for Khartoum (Africa Part 15). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, seized Goma in January 2025 (ACLED), displacing thousands and reigniting the Rwanda-DRC proxy war (Africa Part 12). Meanwhile, the Sahel’s jihadist expansion—Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—saw fatalities in Niger surge 60% in 2024 (Africa Center), threatening Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s sovereignty (Africa Part 19).

My 2020 posts (Parts 1-5) traced Africa’s disputes to colonial partitions—e.g., the 1884 Berlin Conference—imposing arbitrary borders that ignored ethnic realities. Part 6 foresaw escalation without equitable resource division, now evident in Sudan’s 10 million displaced and DRC’s 2025 Goma crisis. Parts 10-15 critiqued international inertia, mirrored today in stalled UN-AU mediation efforts.

Historical Context: Colonial Roots and Post-Independence Strife

Africa’s sovereignty conflicts stem from a colonial past that carved 54 states from diverse ethnic tapestries (Africa Part 2). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 upheld these borders to avert chaos, yet this froze tensions—e.g., Somalia-Somaliland’s unresolved split (Africa Part 14). The 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea war, sparked by the Badme dispute, killed 70,000 over a barren strip, reflecting colonial cartography’s enduring scars (Africa Part 8). In Western Sahara, Morocco’s 1975 annexation defied Spain’s exit, leaving the Polisario Front’s independence bid unresolved (Africa Part 11). Parts 1-5 argued these historical fault lines—Ottoman, British, French legacies—set precedents for today’s violence.

Legal and Political Context: Fragile Frameworks

Legally, the UN Charter and AU Constitutive Act affirm territorial integrity, yet enforcement falters. The 2000 Algiers Agreement ending Ethiopia-Eritrea’s war awarded Badme to Eritrea, but Ethiopia’s non-compliance persists (Africa Part 9). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on Nigeria-Cameroon’s Bakassi Peninsula in 2002, yet local resistance lingers (Africa Part 13). In Sudan, neither SAF nor RSF faces ICC accountability for 2023-2025 atrocities, despite Geneva Convention breaches (Africa Part 20). Parts 16-20 argued legal frameworks collapse without enforcement—Ethiopia’s border defiance and Sudan’s impunity prove this.

Politically, domestic fragility fuels disputes. Sudan’s 2023 coup dissolved a transitional government, splitting power between SAF and RSF (Africa Part 15). DRC’s weak state enables M23’s resurgence, with Rwanda’s backing reflecting regional power plays (Africa Part 12). The Sahel’s juntas— Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger—exit from ECOWAS in January 2025 (FRS) signals sovereignty assertions against regional norms (Africa Part 19). Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) frames this as distributive injustice—land and rights skew toward stronger actors—while Territorial Disputes (2020) notes empirical deadlock (10 million displaced in Sudan) and value clashes (security vs. self-determination).

Sociological and Cultural Dimensions: Identity and Resources

Sociologically, Africa’s 3,000+ ethnic groups clash over land tied to identity (Africa Part 3). The Bawku chieftaincy dispute in Ghana, pitting Mamprusi against Kusasi, escalated in 2024, spilling into North East region (ACLED) (Africa Part 17). In Nigeria’s Niger Delta, oil wealth stokes Ijaw-Itsekiri tensions, predating but intensified by extraction (Africa Part 22). Culturally, pastoralist-farmer conflicts—e.g., Fulani vs. Anti-balaka in Central African Republic (CAR)—blend livelihood disputes with ethnic divides (Africa Part 18). Parts 6-9 warned of narrative wars—2025’s “ethnic cleansing” claims in DRC lack evidence but inflame tensions.

Religiously, disputes intertwine with faith. Somalia’s Al-Shabaab insurgency leverages Islam to challenge Mogadishu’s sovereignty (Africa Part 14), while CAR’s Christian-Muslim clashes reflect colonial-era divides (Africa Part 18). Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023) sees this as a multi-agent tangle—state, rebels, faiths—distorting truth.

Domestic, Regional and International Dynamics

Domestically, weak governance breeds conflict. Sudan’s 48% internally displaced population (Africa Center) reflects state failure (Africa Part 15). Regionally, the Horn of Africa’s Ethiopia-Eritrea-Somalia triangle destabilizes borders, with Eritrea’s March 2025 mobilization echoing 1998 (Africa Part 8). The Great Lakes’ DRC-Rwanda rift, with Angola’s failed December 2024 mediation (ACLED), shows regional peace’s limits (Africa Part 12). Internationally, foreign powers exploit vacuums—Russia and UAE back Sudan’s RSF, while China eyes DRC minerals (Africa Center) (Africa Part 23). Parts 10-15 flagged UN-AU weakness—2025’s vetoed Sudan resolutions (UN) affirm this.

Published Research and Open Data

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) records 39,787 deaths in Sudan by July 2024, civilians outnumbering fighters (Africa Part 21). In DRC, M23’s January 2025 Goma takeover followed 2024’s 25% violence spike (ACLED). The UN’s March 13, 2025, Sudan report alleges “genocidal acts” but lacks raw data, risking bias (Africa Part 24). Parts 21-25 predicted civilian tolls from advanced warfare—Sahel’s 11,000 deaths in 2024 (Africa Center) bear this out.

UN and International Response: Feeble Efforts

The UN-AU partnership, vital per October 2024 Security Council briefings, falters. Sudan’s crisis—world’s largest displacement—sees no ceasefire (Africa Part 15). DRC’s July 2024 ceasefire collapsed by December (ACLED), with Rwanda rejecting Kinshasa talks (Africa Part 12). The AU’s Mediation Support Unit (2016) and ECOWAS’s decline (FRS) underscore institutional limits (Africa Part 23). Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) decries this—10 million displaced in Sudan—while Territorial Disputes (2020) notes vetoes paralyze action.

Evidence vs. Manipulation

Parts 6-9 warned of narrative wars—2025 amplifies this. Al-Shabaab claims Somali sovereignty threats, yet offers no proof (Africa Part 14). DRC’s M23 asserts precision, but civilian deaths surge (ACLED). Territorial Disputes (2020) demands rigor—evidence ties tolls to military aims, not proven targeting, despite UN claims.

New Paths: Regional Solutions

Africa’s disputes expose global order’s collapse—centralized bodies fail, as Parts 23-25 predicted. Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023) urges multi-agent solutions; Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025) refines this: regional bodies over a paralyzed UN. The Arab League’s 2002 model could inspire—ECOWAS or SADC mediating Sudan’s split, or IGAD brokering Ethiopia-Eritrea peace with Djibouti as guarantor (Africa Part 25). Co-sovereignty—shared Nile waters or Congo Basin zones—could balance security and survival (Sovereignty Conflicts, 2017). This demands mindset shifts—Sahel juntas resist (FRS), and militias rigidify lines.

Conclusion

Africa’s territorial disputes in 2025—Sudan’s 10 million displaced, DRC’s Goma fall, Ethiopia-Eritrea’s brinkmanship—mirror my 2020 research: justice skews (Sahel’s 11,000 dead), complexity entrenches (DRC’s proxy war), and pluralism fractures (UN-AU rifts). Parts 1-5 rooted this historically, 6-15 exposed legal-political rot, 16-25 urged new lenses. Evidence ties civilian tolls to military aims (ACLED), yet manipulation clouds truth (UN data gaps). The current order fails—Sovereignty Conflicts demands equity, Territorial Disputes adaptability, Cosmopolitanism multi-agent hope. Regional guarantors and co-sovereignty offer paths, if rigid mindsets yield. My posts (below), free online, trace this fault line; readers can join this reimagining.

Invitation to “The Borders We Share”

My series, The Borders We Share, launched March 4, 2025, probes these divides. A sample post (https://drjorge.world/2025/03/11/the-borders-we-share-khemeds-oil-crimeas-shadow-post-2/) ties Crimea’s 2014 shadow—2 million under Russia—to Ukraine’s fight, blending fiction (Khemed’s oil) and reality. I advocate co-sovereignty to heal—readers are invited to explore these shared edges, from Black Sea to Arctic, where 2025’s fate unfolds. Next week, Post #3: Sherlock’s Docks, Ireland’s Edge: Clues to Equal Ground (i.e. Imagine Sherlock Holmes untangling a dockside brawl over fish and fog—then picture Northern Ireland’s border after Brexit, a real-life riddle of fences and feelings).

Links to Previous Posts

AUTHOR’S SAMPLE PEER-REVIEWED ACADEMIC RESEARCH (FREE OPEN ACCESS):

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AUTHOR’S PUBLISHED WORK AVAILABLE TO PURCHASE VIA:

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Wednesday 26th March 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

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