Territorial Disputes in the Americas blog series. Post 23: Other game theory models and territorial disputes: the Falklands/Malvinas scenario

 

Other game theory models and territorial disputes: the Falklands/Malvinas scenario

Several other game theory models can be applied to the Falklands/Malvinas scenario, each offering different insights into the strategic interactions between Argentina, the UK, and the Falkland Islanders:

Chicken Game (Hawk-Dove Game):

• Description: This model is about two players deciding whether to be aggressive (Hawk) or cooperative (Dove). The best outcome for each player is when they act aggressively while the other cooperates, but mutual aggression leads to severe consequences.
• Application: In the Falklands/Malvinas case, Argentina and the UK could each choose between an aggressive military stance or a more conciliatory diplomatic approach. The equilibrium where both act like Hawks leads to conflict, while a mixed strategy might result in one side backing down, preventing war but potentially leading to concessions.

Escalation Game:

• Description: This model looks at how conflicts escalate from small disputes to larger conflicts, often with each side increasing its commitment based on the other’s actions.
• Application: The conflict could be seen as a series of escalatory moves where initial small actions (like establishing a military presence or asserting sovereignty) lead to larger commitments (full-scale invasion, naval blockades). Understanding the points of no return or de-escalation could highlight where peace initiatives might be injected.

Bargaining Game (or War of Attrition):

• Description: Players decide how long they’re willing to continue in a conflict or negotiation, with the outcome depending on who gives up first.
• Application: This could reflect the prolonged negotiations after the conflict where both countries might have been willing to endure economic sanctions, international criticism, or domestic pressure until one side’s resolve or resources waned, potentially leading to a peace agreement.

Repeated Games:

• Description: Models where players interact multiple times, allowing for strategies like tit-for-tat or cooperation based on past behaviors.
• Application: Post-conflict relations between Argentina and the UK can be seen through this lens, where both nations have to consider long-term relationships, trade, and diplomacy. Each interaction can inform the next, promoting cooperation if both see mutual benefits in peace.

Signaling Games:

• Description: Here, one player sends a signal (like military buildup or diplomatic overtures) to influence the other’s perception of their resolve or intentions.
• Application: Before and during the conflict, both Argentina and the UK engaged in signaling through military movements, public statements, and diplomatic channels. Analyzing these signals could show how misinterpretations or miscommunications led to war, or how clear signals might have prevented conflict.

Zero-Sum vs. Non-Zero-Sum Games:

• Description: Zero-sum suggests one’s gains are another’s losses, while non-zero-sum allows for mutual gains or losses.
• Application: Initially, the conflict might have been perceived as zero-sum (one country gains territory, the other loses it). However, post-conflict strategies might lean towards non-zero-sum, where peace, cooperation, and economic ties could benefit both nations, reshaping the game into one where mutual benefits are possible.

Multi-Level Games:

• Description: Robert Putnam’s model where international negotiations are influenced by domestic politics.
• Application: For both Argentina and the UK, domestic political pressures, public opinion, and the need to maintain or gain political power played significant roles in their international strategies. This model would highlight how internal political dynamics shaped external actions.

Each of these models can provide a different lens through which to view the motivations, strategies, and outcomes of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, capturing various aspects from escalation, signaling, and bargaining to the influence of domestic politics on international relations. Obviously, real-world scenarios often combine elements from multiple game theory models, reflecting the complexity of human decision-making processes.

NOTE:

This blog series introduces, explains and assesses issues pertaining territorial disputes in the Americas including law, politics, culture, history and religion. There will be new posts every Monday and Friday.

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Territorial disputes and Núñez’s frameworks: the Falklands/Malvinas case

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Friday 07th February 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

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