Territorial Disputes in the Americas blog series. Post 22: Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium (ANE), game theory and international territorial disputes

 

Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE), game theory and international territorial disputes

The previous post applied Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and, therefore, involved assuming symmetry in the game’s structure. This time we will apply Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium (ANE) to the same scenario. This recognizes that different players have different strategies and payoffs due to their unique circumstances, resources, and objectives.

The following sections will explain how we might conceptualize this.

Setting Up the Game:

• Players: Argentina (A), United Kingdom (UK), Falkland Islanders (FI).
• Strategies:
  • A: {Invade, Negotiate}
  • UK: {Defend, Concede}
  • FI: {Support UK, Seek Neutrality}
• Payoffs: These are asymmetric due to different national interests, military capabilities, and domestic pressures:
• Argentina’s Payoffs:
  • Invade when UK Defends: High military and political cost, potential gain in national pride but international condemnation.
  • Invade when UK Concedes: Territorial gain, but possibly at the cost of future relations.
  • Negotiate with UK Defending: Avoids conflict but might lose claim over time.
  • Negotiate with UK Conceding: Diplomatic victory, less international backlash.
• United Kingdom’s Payoffs:
  • Defend against Invasion: High cost in terms of lives and resources but maintains sovereignty and national pride.
  • Concede to Invasion: Avoids war, but significant loss of prestige and territory.
  • Defend when A Negotiates: Ensures status quo, keeps international respect.
  • Concede when A Negotiates: Potentially peaceful transfer, but viewed as a political defeat domestically.
• Falkland Islanders’ Payoffs:
• Support UK when A Invades: Likely to maintain British identity but at the risk of conflict.
• Seek Neutrality when A Invades: Might avoid immediate conflict impact but future uncertain.
• Support UK when A Negotiates: Ensures cultural and political continuity.
• Seek Neutrality when A Negotiates: Might position FI to influence outcomes, but at the risk of being sidelined in decisions.

Asymmetric Nash Equilibrium Analysis

• Before Conflict:
  • A might see “Invade” as the optimal strategy if they overestimate the likelihood of UK conceding or if domestic pressures push for action, expecting a low-cost victory or a forced negotiation afterward.
  • UK would likely choose “Defend” due to the high value placed on sovereignty, knowing that conceding would be politically catastrophic.
  • FI might opt for “Support UK”, aligning with their preference for maintaining British governance, despite the risk of conflict.

This equilibrium leads to conflict because A’s strategy of invasion does not match with UK’s strategy of defense, and FI’s support for UK further escalates tensions.

• After Conflict:
  • A might shift to “Negotiate” if the costs of continued conflict or maintaining control over the islands become too high, or if international pressure mounts.
  • UK might also move towards “Negotiate” if the conflict’s endgame shows diminishing returns on defense or if public and international opinion favors dialogue.
  • FI could choose “Seek Neutrality” post-conflict, aiming to influence the negotiations by not being seen as a direct extension of UK policy, thereby gaining some leverage in determining their future.

An asymmetric equilibrium might be reached where:

• A negotiates with less aggressive intent, focusing on diplomatic solutions.
• UK maintains a defensive posture but engages in talks, aiming for a peaceful resolution that acknowledges their sovereignty.
• FI seeks a role in negotiations to ensure their rights and preferences are considered, potentially leading to a situation where all parties can claim some form of victory or at least mitigate losses.

Conclusion

In an asymmetric Nash Equilibrium, the strategies and payoffs are tailored to each player’s unique situation. The 1982 conflict can be seen as an outcome of such an equilibrium where Argentina’s invasion strategy met with the UK’s defense strategy, with the Islanders supporting the UK, leading to war.

Post-conflict, the dynamics shift towards negotiation, where each player’s strategy reflects a more nuanced understanding of the situation, leading to peacebuilding efforts where each side can achieve different but acceptable outcomes.

This model better captures the real-world complexities where not all players are playing the same “game” or have the same goals and constraints.

NOTE:

This blog series introduces, explains and assesses issues pertaining territorial disputes in the Americas including law, politics, culture, history and religion. There will be new posts every Monday and Friday.

PREVIOUS POST:

https://london1701.blogspot.com/2025/01/territorial-disputes-in-americas-blog_29.html

NEXT POST:

Other game theory models and the Falklands/Malvinas scenario

AUTHOR’S SAMPLE PEER-REVIEWED ACADEMIC RESEARCH (FREE OPEN ACCESS):

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AUTHOR’S PUBLISHED WORK AVAILABLE TO PURCHASE VIA:

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Monday 03rd February 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world