Monday, 10 February 2025

Territorial Disputes in the Americas blog series. Post 24: Territorial disputes and Núñez’s frameworks: the Falklands/Malvinas case

 


Territorial disputes and Núñez’s frameworks: the Falklands/Malvinas case

The sections below include brief analyses integrating Dr. Jorge Emilio Nunez’s theoretical frameworks from 2017 and 2023 with a focus on how game theory might work within this scenario:

  • Framework for Peace:
    • Shared Sovereignty: Argentina and the UK, as hosts in Nunez’s terminology, would engage in negotiations to establish a shared governance model. This model would involve both nations having a role in certain aspects of governance, like international relations, defense, or resource management, while local governance would be more directly influenced by the islanders.
    • Falkland Islanders’ Role: As participants or attendees, depending on their involvement, the islanders would have their say in how shared sovereignty is structured. Their participation could be crucial in shaping local policies, cultural preservation, and daily governance, ensuring that any peace agreement reflects their will and protects their rights.
    • Justice and Equity: The focus would be on achieving an equitable outcome where historical claims are acknowledged but not at the expense of the islanders’ right to self-determination. This would involve both countries agreeing to a form of sovereignty that doesn’t claim absolute control but allows for a just distribution of power.

  • Diverse Agents and Roles:
    • Argentina and UK as Hosts: They host the dispute but must navigate their roles to accommodate not just their own interests but also those of the islanders and the international community.
    • Falkland Islanders as Participants or Attendees: Their participation level would dictate their influence on negotiations. As participants, they’d have a direct role in discussions; as attendees, they might influence through public opinion, referendums, or advisory roles.
    • International Community: Other states, international organizations, or NGOs would act as viewers or attendees, providing support, mediation, or serving as platforms for dialogue.
  • Application of Game Theory in Nunez’s Framework:
  • Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Equilibrium: In Nunez’s shared sovereignty model, the traditional game of who gets full control could shift towards a symmetric equilibrium where both Argentina and the UK agree on mutual benefits from shared governance. However, the asymmetry comes from the different stakes each has – Argentina with a historical claim, the UK with current governance, and the islanders with their livelihood and identity. An asymmetric Nash equilibrium might be where each party’s strategy considers the others’ unique interests, leading to a negotiated outcome.
  • Chicken Game: If both nations play “Hawk” in the traditional sense, seeking full sovereignty, conflict persists. Nunez’s approach would have both consider being “Doves,” where the game becomes about cooperation rather than conquest, with the islanders influencing which nation might back down or adapt their strategy towards shared governance.
  • Bargaining Game: Here, Nunez’s frameworks suggest a game where the duration of negotiation is influenced by how much each party values peace, economic cooperation, and international standing. The islanders’ voice could extend or shorten this game by affecting public opinion in Argentina and the UK, pushing for a resolution that acknowledges their rights.
  • Repeated Games: The ongoing relationship between Argentina, the UK, and the islanders could be seen as a series of interactions where past behavior informs future strategy. Nunez’s cosmopolitan approach encourages strategies where cooperation in one area (like environmental protection) strengthens trust for broader sovereignty agreements.
  • Signaling and Escalation: Nunez’s theories would emphasize signaling intentions towards shared governance rather than traditional signaling of military or political strength. Escalation would be managed not through military means but through diplomatic channels, with signals of openness to share sovereignty potentially de-escalating tensions.

  • Mediation with Game Theory: Mediators would use game theory to understand each player’s best response strategies, encouraging moves towards shared sovereignty by highlighting mutual benefits and the costs of continued conflict.
  • Legal and Institutional Frameworks: Game theory can predict how different legal structures might be accepted or resisted, helping to craft agreements that align with Nunez’s distributive justice and cosmopolitanism.
  • Incentives for Cooperation: By framing peace as a non-zero-sum game, where all can gain from economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and a stable South Atlantic, game theory can guide the negotiation process to find points of mutual interest.

Game theory, one of the novel elements included in Nunez’s frameworks, would not just predict conflict but could be used to design strategies for cooperation, emphasizing the roles, preferences, and potential for mutual gain among all parties involved. This approach would require a shift in traditional thinking about sovereignty, focusing on long-term peace and justice rather than immediate territorial control.

This blog series introduces, explains and assesses issues pertaining territorial disputes in the Americas including law, politics, culture, history and religion. There will be new posts every Monday and Friday.

Núñez’s frameworks and quantum entanglement

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Monday 10th February 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

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