The Persian Gulf, natural resources and the
egalitarian shared sovereignty
Yesterday,
the post introduced the issue of natural resources and their distribution
(ownership, exploration, exploitation, gains and losses) in the context of a
particular region with several TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: the Persian Gulf.
The
differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects
(for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical
location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will
be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens.
However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the
co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the
inhabitants), and this will involve both rights and obligations.
A
combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared
sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may
exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way
(for example, joint ventures).
Two
points must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of
all the parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle
is in terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the
distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by
bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together
offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a
solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the
participants.
The
egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural
resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and
exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the
parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will
make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of
natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the
inequality.
Consequently,
even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural
resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of
development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still
be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of
exploitation and the way benefits were allocated.
Next
time how all this could work with the Persian Gulf and all the claiming
parties.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive
Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter:
@London1701
07th
December 2018
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