The
Persian Gulf presents several TERRITORIAL DISPUTES in which several
international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same
area. Regionally, with a direct or indirect implication, we have Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq.
In addition to
the regional claimants, there are many other international actors. The previous
posts introduced the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China.
The
solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst them because it
is assumed that the sovereignty over the disputes territories can be granted to
only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept
(that is to say, exclusive, and not shareable).
Post 7: Territorial disputes: sovereignty
Post 8: Territorial disputes: sovereignty (cont.)
The
Persian Gulf is a clear example of a zero sum game, with many negative outcomes
of different sorts (e.g. inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension
in international relations, and threat to local, regional and international
peace).
Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas
and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they
tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level (e.g.
effects on international price of oil, war). There are many issues at stake
domestically and internationally.
Post 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake
Time
to solve the disputes in the Persian Gulf. Territory, in principle, can be
defined as an area owned and possessed by the population (in land, water, space
and, perhaps, cyberspace). Like population, it may have features that could
cause controversy in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The next posts will review some of
the features that constitute territory using the Persian Gulf conflicts as examples.
Next time we center the attention on borders, natural resources and defense.
Let us remember the way in why this series propose to deal with
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The allocation of sovereignty will be given by: a)
equal right to participate (egalitarian consensus principle); b) the nature and
degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular
objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency); c) each party
receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what
that party cooperates with (input-to-output ratio principle); and d) provided
the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation
rights has the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium
(equilibrium proviso). I call this way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts or
disputes the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY.
Many
questions are to be expected. Amongst them: How is that translated into
geographical borders amongst the many claimants? What about the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources? Finally, in the hypothetical scenario that a
party alien to the original dispute decided conduct activities (for example,
exploitation of natural resources, invasion), who should defend the disputed
area?
The
next posts on this blog series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES will cover these
questions.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice
Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter:
@London1701
03rd December 2018
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