The Persian Gulf and the Military Balance
The
latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centered the attention
on the Persian Gulf. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED
SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to this particular issue.
Today’s
post will cover defense:
What
would happen if another party with no part in the original conflicts decided to
invade or exploit natural resources in the Persian Gulf?
In the hypothetical scenario
that an alien party to the area decided to invade the region or exploit natural
resources, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop
are as follows:
a) the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the
new agent would take over the islands, exploit natural resources in land and the
continental shelf;
b) one of the sovereign states may respond to the invasion
and defend the area;
c) some or all the neighbors may respond to the invasion
and defend jointly or independently area.
At
the same time, states have the right and are obliged to defend their own
interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defense is fair and
just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in
a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should
be defending the territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a
common interest for all the involved parties: the areas under dispute.
In
addition to the way in which the parties would defend the area, there are two other crucial elements that
need to be agreed, even if joint defense was the case:
a) the extent to which
the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate
resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their
forces against the other two parties);
b) and the extent to which one considers
what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both
the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best
adapted to defending it.
Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on
the obligation to defend. However, how would Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq,
Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates share the defense?
The
egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be
crucial in order to have shared defense: a) Resources; b) Training and
opportunities; c) Safety of all the parties (how to avoid misuse of power).
What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The
differences in the case of defense are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location;
economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities;
number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these
differences work together in an efficient form.
The
Persian Gulf presents a case with very different levels of defense power and
development in terms of their respective defense systems (input-to-output ratio
principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two
ways:
a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution
(principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in
the area, the geostrategic location, and the equipment, resources and any means
best adapted to defending it;
b) the agent with the better comparative
situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or
granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso).
It
is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same
level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are
able to defend the area (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign
states).
Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth
status and defense development among the involved participants, the reciprocal
obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to
produce the most efficient result.
Next
time: natural resources and the Persian Gulf.
NOTE: based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017.
Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive
Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter:
@London1701
05th
December 2018
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