To recapitulate,
we have two sovereign States Russia and Ukraine claiming sovereignty over
Crimea, the third populated territory in our model. The three populations
through their representatives agreed on sharing sovereignty over Crimea. They
understand that they are dealing with many issues such as activities or goods,
and these many issues imply both benefits and burdens. So, to ask all of them
to contribute equally and receive an equal return is not the solution. Neither
is it for the better off in any given activity to contribute more and the least
advantaged in any other activity to receive a larger benefit. They may either
lead to domination or to continuous assistance. And because they do also know
that they will maintain the agreement under the three pre-requisites, they keep
their reciprocal non-interference and consider themselves reciprocally equals.
In addition to this, they know it is a targeted agreement only referring to the
third territory: this is not an agreement based on humanitarian reasons, domestic
or global justice.
In order to make
the egalitarian shared sovereignty work by acknowledging the many differences
amongst the parties, we have to foresee the possibility that one party (or some
of them) may contribute more and the other parties considerably less, so it
would imply an unbalanced relationship that may indeed lead to a) domination or
neo-colonialism; or b) continuous assistance.
Thereby,
egalitarian shared sovereignty understood as a balancing principle amongst
Crimea, Russia, and Ukraine—bearing in mind their differences—implies:
Crimea, Russia,
and Ukraine have all the same right to participate in every aspect of the
sovereignty over Crimea. That is to say, they all have the opportunity to
present and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty over
Crimea (egalitarian consensus principle). Crimea shares in equal portions
natural resources with Russia and Ukraine. Russia shares in equal portions the
means for their exploration and exploitation with Crimea and Ukraine. And
Ukraine, because of their geographical location, will grant special privileges
for both Crimean and Russian enterprises only related to the exploitation of
natural resources in Crimea (or any other activity but it must be related to
Crimea).
Indeed, either
Crimea or Ukraine may have issues in exploiting at the same level of efficiency
as Russia their shares of natural resources. Hence, Russia must make sure that
both the other agents reach the same level of exploitation or divide the
benefits resultant amongst the three parties equally in the meantime, that is
it is a targeted shared model.
The principle
can be seen in a larger picture across the board with different activities. At
first, the smaller and the larger the contribution, the smaller and the larger
the return respectively. But as the agreement aims to avoid domination (secure
non-interference) and has a target, it is to be expected a more evenly shared
contribution-return relationship amongst the parties will emerge in the long
term. That is to say in the example, at first Crimea would be defended by
Russia, and the latter would as well contribute to the exploitation of the
natural resources in the peninsula (principle of efficiency). In principle,
Russian would receive a larger share of the resultant benefits—the larger the
contribution, the larger the return, and let us remember that Russia is
contributing towards both defence and exploitation of natural resources in a
larger manner than the other two agents (input-to-output ratio principle). This
covers the burdens-benefits part.
But, as we have
a targeted agreement, Russia must make sure both Crimea and Ukraine reach
relatively the same level for the defence of the third territory and the
exploitation of natural resources (equilibrium proviso). It is then when the
contributions amongst the three will be more even as well as the returns.
Meanwhile, and
in order to lessen the gap between contributions and benefits, Ukrainians could
use the difference they have in their favour: geographically proximity means a
more accessible bilateral commerce with Crimea, faster and possibly more
effective response in case of international threat or attack, etc., things that
Russia cannot offer.
Moreover, as the
first and second pre-requisite grants non-domination and non-political
liberties, different religious beliefs between could not be used for the
advantage or disadvantage of any of the populations. That is because they are
in a certain order of priority. This principle is applicable only to
sovereignty over the third territory and to what concerns the third territory
(and all that this implies).
Thus, the principle and the pre-requisites are
lexically ordered (Rawls 1999, pp. 53 in fine and 54 supra) both
mutually and in relation to the egalitarian shared sovereignty. In other words,
no transgression of: a) non-domination or non-interference; b) the basic
non-political liberties; and c) the principles recognised by the law of
peoples, is allowed under any excuse or reason even if that means not
fulfilling the ‘egalitarian shared sovereignty.’
The lexical
order dictates the priority amongst the pre-requisites and the principle if
there is a conflict in practice. Indeed, the pre-requisites and the
‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ are intended as a single conception and not to
work individually. However, reality may show instances in which to apply the
principle could go against one or both pre-requisites. Therefore, the
lexicographic or lexical preference ordering applies. That is because the
agents will have multiple criteria motivating their choices. As they will have
a ranking of priorities, the choice amongst the different alternatives will
follow the highest criterion. Inversely, by respecting the egalitarian shared
sovereignty we know the agents will take into account both pre-requisites.
The main reason
to proceed this way is to secure a real ‘equal footing’. Indeed, as a result of
the lexical order basic rights will only be compared with other basic rights,
powers and prerogatives with other powers and prerogatives, and so on. Thereby,
arrangements that could imply trading basic non-political liberties for, for
example, the exploitation of natural resources, could be avoided. So, none of
the agents could use their relative better position at the expense of any of
the other parties.
Jorge
Emilio Núñez
22nd June 2018
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