The egalitarian
shared sovereignty solves sovereignty conflicts because it simply acknowledges
the facts, because: a) that sovereignty conflicts and sovereignty are complex issues;
b) that complexity is given by these issues being constituted by activities and
goods that imply both benefits and burdens; and c) that the claiming agents are
most probably in very different comparative situations in many senses.
We do not have
the problem of defining equality because we are not referring to the parties
but to the target, the third territory. All the parties receive equal shares of
sovereignty since these shares are ideal (they only represent their right to
equal benefits and the obligation to equal contributions and only in what is
referred to the third territory).
Thereby, if they
can make equal contributions, they will receive equal benefits. We do not even
think of their relative situations as members of the international society.
They are equal or not in as much as it is referred to the target, the third
territory.
Coincidentally,
if they cannot fulfil their obligations to the same extent, their returns will
be affected. It is when the qualitative differences come into play. And they
are referred to the situation of each of the parties in relation to a specific
good in what matters only to the third territory.
To give an
example, if a party A cannot defend the third territory because it does not
have any means of defence, then it cannot contribute (so its return will be
lessened). As we have two pre-requisites and a targeted agreement, the other
two parties B and C will have to assist party A in as much as their assistance
is needed to let party A have a similar contribution in regards to that
specific good or activity (in the example, parties B and C will assist in the
development of the means of defence of party A, but only in as much as it is
necessary for the defence of the third territory).
Indeed, the
egalitarian shared sovereignty provides for the legitimacy of initial
differences in the benefits and burdens of the parties in a way that the
equality principle does not. So when we reach the ultimate egalitarian shared
sovereignty goal of equilibrium amongst the parties, there will be no problem
in knowing what ‘equal shares’ require since these will be similar shares of
each of the goods relevant to sovereignty (output) amongst three agents with
similar level of use of their respective shares (input). I use the term
‘similar’ rather than ‘identical’ when I refer to the final shares since there
will be obviously some elements that because of factual restrictions or
limitations cannot be equally or identically used, or at least not to the same
extent in the literal meaning of these expression such as geographical
proximity.
Conclusion: Crimea, the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty, and
Utopia
Following the
previous paragraphs, the next post will introduce a hypothetical situation in
order to show how the egalitarian shared sovereignty works in the context of
the Crimean sovereignty dispute. The aim of this example is to demonstrate how
by acknowledging certain features and by applying the criteria mentioned
before, a shared sovereignty model can work, at least in theory. Note that the
following paragraphs will use an oversimplified view with reference to some key
points usually controversial in any sovereignty conflict and that therefore are
present in the Crimean case.
Jorge
Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701 20th June 2018
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