Friday, 29 September 2023

LIBRO [Vista Previa]: Conflictos de Soberanía y Derecho y Política Internacional: Un Problema de Justicia Distributiva (Capítulo Cuatro)

Conflictos de Soberanía y Derecho y Política Internacional:

Un Problema de Justicia Distributiva

Por

Jorge E. Núñez

Capítulo Cuatro: ¿Hasta dónde pueden los Estados soberanos cooperar entre sí y limitar su libertad sin sacrificar su soberanía?

El Capítulo Dos demostró que aunque “soberanía” significa autoridad suprema, la autoridad siempre acepta limitaciones—es decir, la soberanía no es absoluta. En consecuencia, la soberanía es siempre de alguna forma compartida. Sin embargo, el Capítulo Tres mostró que la forma en que la soberanía puede ser compartida no siempre es justa, equitativa, u ofrece a los agentes participantes la misma situación relativa—por ejemplo, si existe una forma de compartirla desequilibrada o unilateral, cuando sólo uno de los agentes es en realidad quien dicta cómo proceder. Por lo tanto, es necesario para el éxito del modelo de “soberanía compartida egalitaria” demostrar cómo funcionan estas limitaciones, y también, que no implican la interferencia involuntaria respecto de la soberanía de cualquiera de los agentes participantes. Por lo tanto, antes de definir el modelo de “soberanía compartida egalitaria” en detalle, una pregunta debe ser respondida: cómo varios agentes pueden cooperar entre sí, limitar su libertad sin consecuencias negativas de jure o de facto, sin que alguno de los agentes dicte a la otras partes qué hacer o no hacer. Este problema surge porque la soberanía se observa principalmente como un concepto que implica un agente único, limitado de una manera u otra. Sin embargo, esta obra supone la existencia de múltiples agentes que tendrán una misma posición relativa con respecto al tercer territorio—es decir, una pluralidad de agentes que tienen el mismo poder, que están simultáneamente al mismo nivel—legalmente hablando, que son soberanos al mismo tiempo sobre el mismo territorio y población.

Con el fin de demostrar cómo dos Estados soberanos pueden compartir su soberanía, es decir, hasta qué punto los Estados soberanos pueden cooperar entre sí y limitar su libertad sin sacrificar su soberanía, es conveniente observar: a) en primer lugar, qué significa e implica el concepto de “soberanía” examinando sus elementos subatómicos o fundamentales; y b) en segundo lugar, cómo un concepto con características similares opera y acepta limitaciones sin cambiar su naturaleza. El primer punto se logrará mediante el uso del lenguaje propuesto por Wesley N. Hohfeld para el análisis legal.[1] Con el dominio de una serie de conceptos jurídicos básicos, será posible analizar un problema complejo como la “soberanía”, evitar malos entendidos en cuanto a su significado e implicaciones, y tener una idea más clara de cómo operan las limitaciones sin cambiar su naturaleza. Este último, por referencia a la “propiedad sobre uno mismo” como concepto.[2] Al igual que en el caso de la soberanía, la propiedad sobre uno mismo establece una relación particular entre un agente y algo: la autoridad suprema. A diferencia de la soberanía, esta autoridad suprema está presente a nivel del individuo. En otras palabras, la propiedad sobre uno mismo define la autoridad suprema que un individuo tiene sobre sí mismo; soberanía define la autoridad suprema que un Estado tiene sobre un territorio y población. Por lo tanto, a primera vista, tanto la propiedad sobre uno mismo cuanto la soberanía parecen ser supremas, singulares y por lo tanto no pueden compartirse. Más explícitamente, la propiedad sobre uno mismo tiene el mismo tipo de relación con una persona que tiene la soberanía respecto de un Estado: tanto la propiedad sobre sí mismo cuanto la soberanía son características esenciales en la definición de un individuo libre y un estado libre, respectivamente. Entonces, si las limitaciones en la forma de restricciones autoimpuestas o externas se pueden aplicar a la propiedad sobre sí mismo, las limitaciones en la forma de obligaciones autoimpuestas y externas se pueden aplicar a la soberanía. En consecuencia, como las limitaciones autoimpuestas o impuestas desde el exterior con respecto a la propiedad sobre uno mismo permiten que cualquier persona pueda cooperar con cualquier otro individuo, también las obligaciones autoimpuestas o impuestas desde el exterior sobre la soberanía permiten a los Estados cooperar con otros Estados sin disminuir su soberanía.

[1] Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal (1913): 16-59; and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal (1917): 710-770.

[2] “Propiedad sobre uno mismo”, “autopropiedad” o “self-ownership” en inglés, también se definen como soberanía individual. Para un análisis exhaustivo ver Allan Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

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Capítulo Cinco: ¿Por qué la soberanía compartida es deseable?

Viernes 29 de Septiembre de 2023

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

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The Falkland/Malvinas Islands: A brief multidimensional view

Territorial disputes and a multidimensional view

Territorial disputes are a clear example of the zero-sum game played by the claimed and claiming agents, who feed their differences rather than recognizing their affinities. Current global events such as COVID-19 clearly show the necessity for a coherent, cohesive and comprehensive response to crises. World leaders and organizations are failing to address global issues in an efficient manner. In a similar vein, legal, political and international relations scholars assert dead-end arguments; futile hermeneutical, technical, conceptual and theoretical discussions; and seem oblivious to the urgency that crises present. Current and ongoing crises as well as the exacerbation of pre-existing conditions require urgency. The impact on legal and socio-political inequalities; economic ramifications of crises and the prospect for recovery depending on places and social characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, age, skill-levels, local government-support, etc.; and the effects on the environment require immediate attention.

The legal, political and international relations disciplines offer various potential remedies, procedures and organizations to deal with crises and solve these problems. Although these remedies, procedures and organizations are useful in certain situations, it is indisputable that they are ineffective at peacefully and permanently handling crises. If and when current models fail or consistently fall short of addressing global changes and crises, a requisite paradigm shift should be implemented. COVID-19 is one of several indicators that prove mankind as a whole needs to reframe crises, reassess situations and discard the frames of past paradigms. The outcomes of current fragmented and unidimensional analyses and responses to crises (as a result of the science of reference and its methodology and the agent in question, such as individuals, communities and states) cannot but have a limited significance in theory and practice.

This monograph entitled Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics: A Theory (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2023/24) introduces a multidimensional analysis that assesses the phenomena of pluralism of pluralisms. A pluralism of pluralism means the acknowledgment of a variety of agents (individuals, communities and states) that may play different roles in their interrelations (host, participant, attendees and viewers), and hence, the recognition of the plurality of subjects at play. Furthermore, these agents and players may act within several contexts (local, regional and international) and their interrelations simultaneously exist in three realms (rational, empirical and axiological). To add to this intricacy, the many views (law, politics, philosophy and non-scientific theories) about agents, players, contexts and realms contain both a horizontal and vertical dimension that should take into account the two variables of time and space.

The Falkland/Malvinas Islands

In its predecessor, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty: International Law and Politics (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2020), the author used this multidimensional view to assess and explain several territorial disputes, including Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

Arguably, the most notable ongoing territorial dispute in the Americas that include a former colonial power is over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. This dispute started as early as 1833, since the British settled. The territory at issue between Argentina and the United Kingdom include the islands and their dependencies, the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. The United Kingdom and Argentina have had continuous presence and/or claimed exclusive sovereign rights over the islands since 1833, both bilaterally and internationally with a climax in 1982 in a war between the two.

Argentina’s official position is that it has sovereignty over the islands based on historical entitlement and on the fact the United Kingdom is in direct violation of the principle of territorial integrity. The United Kingdom maintains that the Falkland/Malvinas Islands are an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom and, consequently, are an Associated Territory of the European Union. Meanwhile, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands official position is to acknowledge the right to self-determination and the aim to retain its links with the United Kingdom as a British Overseas Territory, self-governing, except for defense and foreign affairs. Sovereignty for the islanders, therefore, is not up for discussion.

According to the 2012 census the islands had 2841 inhabitants. Most of them (59%) considered themselves “Falkland Islanders” and 29% identified themselves as British. In March 2013, the Falkland/Malvinas Islanders voted in a referendum whether they wanted to remain as British Overseas Territory. The number of ballot papers issued was 1,522 while the votes cast at the referendum were 1,518. With a 92% turnout, there were 1,513 (99.8%) “Yes” votes and three (0.2%) “No” votes.

The Falkland/Malvinas Islands territorial dispute includes a combination of domestic, regional and international contexts creating a stalemate. On the surface, the dispute seems to be centered on very clearly defined issues such as the historical claim, the principle of territorial integrity, economic value of exploring and exploiting the territory’s natural resources, and the geostrategic location of the islands and their dependencies and, potentially, part of Antarctica.

Although a stalemate may seem negative and governments are assumed to seek peaceful and permanent dispute settlement, the status quo in the Falklands/Malvinas serves other purpose and, therefore, guarantees an endless legal and political limbo. Huth explains the dynamics in a simple yet illuminating manner:

“[…] very often political leaders are not willing to take risks and undertake diplomatic initiatives that will break a long-standing stalemate in negotiations. Furthermore, leaders themselves are socialized into viewing the target as an adversary and, as a result, they are not predisposed to view concessions as a legitimate option. Furthermore, […] a history of military conflict with the target can be used by the military to justify larger budgets […]. The combined effect, then, is that the idea of offering concessions and proposing a unilateral initiative to break the stalemate is a policy option quite difficult to get on the policy agenda of political leaders within the challenger. Few voices are advocating such policies within the challenger, and the prevailing climate of opinion (both mass and elite) is opposed to such a change in policy.”[1]

“[…] leaders were typically constrained by domestic political forces to be very cautious in moving toward a compromise settlement, since popular and elite opinion, and often the military, was opposed to such a policy. […] In most situations the leader’s position of domestic power and authority was better served by continuing confrontation […]”[2]

In tune with this, for the internal context, it is important to observe how Britons and Argentineans refer to each other when they discuss the Falkland/Malvinas Islands issue. On both sides, the views are extremely biased and polarized with “positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.” The international context plays a role in terms of prestige because great powers would opt to go to war to preserve their status even if the practical results seem trivial. Unsurprisingly, politicians and governments in Argentina and the United Kingdom have not reached a settlement to the dispute since the internal, regional and international payoffs are higher by simply keeping the status quo. The direct influence over the domestic political status of the ruling power of the Falkland/Malvinas 1982 war at the time and currently the ongoing territorial dispute over the islands is unquestionable.

While the Falklands/Malvinas are an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom and, consequently, are an Associated Territory of the European Union, Argentina seems to leave the regional context outside of the dispute, unless it can help garner support from other continental actors. In that respect, it is open to question whether Argentina’s bargaining position could be strengthened by shifting the national-cause stance for a more regional approach: instead of “the Malvinas/Falklands are Argentine,” “the Malvinas/Falklands are American (or Latin American).”

In Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty: International Law and Politics (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2020), the author includes in the analysis relevant references and several case studies such as the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Kashmir, Crimea, Northern Ireland, the Mexico–United States border, Cyprus, the Israel-Palestine difference, Guantanamo bay, the Caribbean, Amazonia, indigenous rights and territorial claims over Antarctica.

A new paradigm

The forthcoming monograph Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics: A Theory (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2023/24) sketches a reconceived way of an approach to understanding the relationship between individuals, communities and states. Indeed, in order to coordinate separate and sovereign legal systems, additional and continued research is a task that deserves further exploration. The chapters attempt to take the first steps in creating that path.

Territorial disputes at large are an example of crises in which both sovereignty and cosmopolitanism play a defining role. As a whole, the monograph shows the complexity present in issues that include different agents in order to make evident a crucial point, often ignored or neglected: The apparent tension between sovereignty and cosmopolitanism may be more thoroughly and adequately considered, and arguably resolved, if the scholarly exploration embraces a multidimensional approach. Undoubtedly, it may be the case that a particular agent, their role, a context, a realm or a mode of existence is more significant than the other pluralities or their subgroups with regard to a singular case that compromises sovereignty and cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, it is in the multidimensional understanding as multi-agent, multi-contextual, multi-realm and multi-existence nature of these issues that a more robust account of their intricacies can be achieved. Therefore, by having a more robust account of their intricacies, it may be possible to reimagine in theory, and hopefully, in practice, a way of dealing with them peacefully and permanently.

The complexity sovereignty and cosmopolitanism presents is challenging. By accepting the fact that states will not forfeit their sovereignty and that individuals should have a minimum set of guarantees protected by law regardless of their individual circumstances, this monograph argues for positive law cosmopolitanism. States could retain their sovereignty and at the same time individuals would enjoy a minimum set of legal guarantees recognized beyond jurisdictional differences.

[1] Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 171-172.

[2] Ibid, 178-179.

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Friday 29th September 2023

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Friday, 15 September 2023

LIBRO [Vista Previa]: Conflictos de Soberanía y Derecho y Política Internacional: Un Problema de Justicia Distributiva (Capítulo Tres)

Conflictos de Soberanía y Derecho y Política Internacional:

Un Problema de Justicia Distributiva

Por

Jorge E. Núñez

Capítulo Tres: ¿Qué debe significar “soberanía compartida”?

Si no existe soberanía absoluta, toda soberanía es de algún modo limitada. El Capítulo Dos demostró que una de las maneras en que la soberanía es limitada es el hecho de que puede ser compartida (por ejemplo, representantes y representados, el Rey y la Iglesia, etc.). Sin embargo, ¿cómo puede ser compartida la soberanía cuando se trata de Estados? Desafortunadamente, no hay una respuesta única pero existen varias maneras en las que se puede compartir la soberanía. Es decir, existen varias concepciones de “soberanía compartida.” Entre todas las concepciones de “soberanía compartida”, una puede utilizarse para resolver los conflictos de soberanía—la que esta obra tiene la intención de proponer. Este Capítulo desarrolla una posible forma de caracterizar “soberanía compartida” con el fin de resolver algunos conflictos de soberanía.

Muchos estudiosos de la teoría jurídica y política y las relaciones internacionales utilizan la expresión “soberanía compartida” y terminología similar para referirse a varias realidades diferentes. Es principalmente por esta razón, y con el fin de evitar una confusión innecesaria, que a estas diferentes concepciones se les dará un nombre específico. La lista puede no ser exhaustiva y no necesita serlo. Esto se debe a que el objetivo es únicamente ilustrar la vasta utilización de términos que a primera vista parecen apropiados en la discusión de conflictos internacionales. Al argumentar en contra de estos puntos de vista anteriores, será posible definir negativamente las características que debe denotar la “soberanía compartida.” Como resultado, esto dará lugar a la caracterización de los problemas que una concepción reconcebida debe abordar con el fin de ofrecer una solución justa y equitativa para los conflictos de soberanía.

Usos anteriores de la terminología

La primera concepción es “soberanía compartida neo-colonial.” Los defensores de esta posición aplican la etiqueta de “soberanía compartida” a situaciones en las que existe un Estado soberano (por lo general uno débil)[1] y una organización internacional u otro Estado “auxiliando” al primero de una manera u otra. En este caso, se define como:

“Las entidades de soberanía compartida son creadas por un acuerdo voluntario entre las autoridades políticas nacionales reconocidas y un actor externo, como otro estado o una organización regional o internacional.” Además, “dichos arreglos pueden limitarse a áreas de temas específicos como la política monetaria o la gestión de los ingresos del petróleo.”[2]

Algunas características son inmediatamente evidentes en la cita anterior: en primer lugar, es un acuerdo real voluntario; en segundo lugar, no todas las partes tienen que ser Estados soberanos (pueden serlo autoridades políticas nacionales reconocidas, organizaciones regionales o internacionales); en tercer lugar, se puede limitar a áreas específicas (los ejemplos dados se relacionan con economía y finanzas).[3] Algunos autores afirman que los estados débiles pueden observar esta propuesta como una solución a sus problemas, ya que—estos autores mantienen—“librados a sus propios medios, Estados colapsados y mal gobernados no se compondrán a sí mismos ya que poseen una limitada capacidad administrativa, sobre todo en lo que se refiere al mantenimiento de la seguridad interna.”[4] Por lo tanto, las organizaciones internacionales o Estados fuertes estarían apoyando el desarrollo en ciertas áreas de los Estados que por cualquier causa se consideran débiles.

[…]

[1] Para mayor detalle acerca de Estados débiles, colapsados y pseudo-Estados ver Tanja E. Aalberts, “The Sovereignty Game States Play: (quasi-)States in the International Order,” International Journal for the semiotics of law 17 (2004): 245-257; Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs 84 (2005): 153-163; Paul Collier, “The Political Economy of State Failure,” Oxford Review of economic policy 25 (2009): 219-240; y muchos otros.

[2] Stephen D. Krasner, “The Case of Shared Sovereignty,” Journal of democracy 16 (2005): 69-83. En particular, incorporando la idea de “soberanía compartida” como se caracteriza por Krasner ver Richard Caplan, “From Collapsing States to Neo-trusteeship: the Limits to Solving the Problem of ‘Precarious Statehood’ in the 21st Century,” Third World Quarterly 28 (2007): 231-244; Brennan M. Kraxberger, “Failed States: Temporary Obstacles to Democratic Diffusion or Fundamental Holes in the World Political Map?,” Third World Quarterly 28 (2007): 1055-1071.

[3] Análisis con respecto a las aplicaciones de esta forma de interpretar la soberanía compartida pueden verse en Hadii Mamudu and Donley T. Studlar, “Multilevel Governance and Shared Sovereignty: European Union, Member States, and the FCTC,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 22 (2009): 73-97; Kari A. Hartwig and others, “AIDS and ‘Shared Sovereignty’ in Tanzania from 1987 to 2000: a Case Study,” Social Science and Medicine 60 (2005): 1613-1624.

[4] Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty, New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security 29 (2004): 85-120.

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Próxima entrada en el blog

Capítulo Cuatro: ¿Hasta dónde pueden los Estados soberanos cooperar entre sí y limitar su libertad sin sacrificar su soberanía?

Viernes 15 de Septiembre de 2023

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes in the Americas: A brief multidimensional view

Territorial disputes and a multidimensional view

Common roots to territorial disputes in the Americas

All major territorial differences in the Americas have their roots in the colonial period. Colonialism resulted in artificial borders in America. Formerly cohesive communities were divided or decimated. It is a fact some of these communities had relations that were far from peaceful before colonial times. Yet, it is also true that some areas have been in constant struggle since then. Territorial disputes (inter-states and within the newly formed states) have translated into poverty, humanitarian crisis, arms trafficking, guerrilla activity, and many more negative outcomes.

The Europeans fixed American boundaries based on European political considerations, and usually without regard to tribal and ethnological factors. As a result of the European partition, several American boundaries grouped together different ethnic groups in a single state, divided ethnic or national groups, or created a state with physical characteristics that hindered social, political or economic stability.

There are three clear periods that distinguish how the territory in the Americas was divided before the European intervention: sociologically, between the European dominance of the continent and American states independence; politically, only centered on European interests; and after each individual state in the Americas achieved different forms of self-government.

Pre-Columbian times

The population in the New World was between 54 and 112 million in Pre-Columbian times. However, by the time of colonization, fewer than 10 million indigenous people survived.

The populations were either part of great empires¾i.e. Aztecs, Mayas and Incas¾or formed disseminated tribes. In all cases, the geographical distribution had to do with a religious component tied to basic needs such as the provision of food, safe surroundings, and access to water. Some populations achieved a highly advanced development in terms of language, beliefs, sciences, social fairness, economy, and politics.

In terms of borders, there were already territorial disputes mainly in cases of expansion. Some of the populations were more prone to territorial conquest than others.

Post-Columbian but pre-independence times

With little regard to the original occupants of the land, the European colonial times marked a change in the socio-political dynamics across the Americas. Although English, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish conquests have their own peculiarities in the way they dealt with local populations, all cases resulted in a profound change. The former Aztec, Mayan and Incan Empires were dismantled and many tribes simply became extinct.

In terms of territorial definition, European rulers created borders using European understanding of concepts such as sovereignty and state. See, for example, the Papal bulls of Alexander VI Inter caetera, Inter caetera II, Eximiae devotionis and Dudum siquidem. Inter caetera grants the Spanish monarchs sovereignty erga omnes over the territories to the west in the Americas while Inter caetera explicitly includes Portuguese sovereignty and a line of demarcation. Unsurprisingly, none of these documents mention the indigenous population.

Post-independence times

The states formed after colonial times applied the principle of uti possidetis juris by which they assumed to have sovereignty over their formerly-colonial areas. Nevertheless, these previously “settled” borders proved to be unclear or non-existent and generated competing claims that resulted in territorial disputes.

At this stage, the Monroe, Calvo and Drago doctrines were central to preventing the formerly colonial powers from interfering with the newly formed states in the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine appeared in the 19th century when European states intended to recover their colonies in the Americas. The President of the United States proclaimed in one of his speeches (December 2, 1823) what later would be considered basic principles of public international public: a) no colonization, b) non-intervention of European states in the affairs of America, and c) reciprocal non-intervention in European affairs. The Calvo and Drago doctrines are similar in that they prohibit the intervention of a sovereign state if the purpose of that intervention is solely to oblige that the target state to fulfil its international financial obligations. They are also referred to European intervention in American countries and their internal affairs (specifically, Venezuela and its international public debt in 1901).

In Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty: International Law and Politics (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2020), the author includes in the analysis relevant references and several case studies: The Falklands/Malvinas Islands, the Mexico–United States border, Guantanamo bay, the Caribbean, Amazonia, indigenous rights and territorial claims over Antarctica.

A new paradigm

Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics: A Theory (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2023/24) sketches a reconceived way of an approach to understanding the relationship between individuals, communities and states. Indeed, in order to coordinate separate and sovereign legal systems, additional and continued research is a task that deserves further exploration. The chapters attempt to take the first steps in creating that path.

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Friday 15th September 2023

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Friday, 1 September 2023

LIBRO [Vista Previa]: Conflictos de Soberanía y Derecho y Política Internacional: Un Problema de Justicia Distributiva (Capítulo Dos)

Conflictos de Soberanía y Derecho y Política Internacional:

Un Problema de Justicia Distributiva

Por

Jorge E. Núñez

Capítulo Dos: Soberanía limitada

El punto de partida del proyecto es, como era de esperar, el concepto de “soberanía.” Sin embargo, este concepto presenta un problema: que la soberanía es a menudo entendida como absoluta, ilimitada y por lo tanto no puede ser compartida. Este Capítulo tiene la intención de demostrar que no existe tal cosa como la soberanía absoluta—es decir que soberanía limitada es la norma, aunque la naturaleza de las limitaciones varía. Ergo, si la soberanía se puede limitar, esto implica que podría ser compartida.

Dada la importancia de la idea de soberanía respecto al tema y al argumento de la obra, el presente Capítulo tendrá que dar (i) un análisis completo y riguroso del concepto de “soberanía” y, al hacerlo, (ii) examinar las caracterizaciones principales de la noción. Vale la pena señalar en este punto que el concepto de “soberanía” no es crucial per se para este proyecto, excepto en que tiene limitaciones. Por lo tanto, a fin de dar un análisis completo de “soberanía” y con el objetivo de demostrar que siempre es limitada—de ahí compartible—la primer tarea (i) se concretará con un análisis conceptual; la última tarea (ii), a través de la identificación de los teóricos o cuerpos de literatura que entienden la soberanía como absoluta y una breve descripción de algunos pensadores principales que consideran a la soberanía limitada.

El concepto de “soberanía”

Las limitaciones conceptuales tienen que ver con cualquier término dado y su aplicación dentro de un cierto dominio. Por lo tanto, cada concepto tiene características definitorias que lo hacen de alguna manera limitado. En otras palabras, un concepto identifica un grupo en particular de fenómenos de acuerdo con ciertos criterios. Con respecto a un concepto como la soberanía estos criterios cambian con el tiempo como así también las situaciones de las personas, las creencias, suposiciones o justificaciones cambian. Por otra parte, los criterios que los escritores piensan que están usando no son siempre los que resultan ser realmente los que están utilizando cuando se examinan los fenómenos y lo que estos autores expresan respecto a ellos.[1] Por ejemplo, siguiendo una definición clásica del concepto que es central en esta obra:

“[La soberanía es] una autoridad Suprema en un Estado. En cualquier Estado la soberanía recae en la institución, persona o cuerpo que tiene la máxima autoridad para imponer el derecho sobre todos los demás en el Estado y el poder de alterar derecho preexistente. […] En derecho internacional, es un aspecto esencial de la soberanía que todos los Estados deben tener el control supremo sobre sus asuntos internos […]”[2]

Evidentemente, hay muchas otras definiciones de soberanía que pueden ser citadas.[3] Algunas de ellas se examinan más adelante en este Capítulo a través de una revisión histórica. Sin embargo, esta definición clásica muestra ya que hay varias nociones relacionadas con soberanía: autoridad suprema, institución /persona /cuerpo, miradas o visiones del mismo concepto hacia adentro y hacia afuera, poder, y otras tantas. De hecho, esta miríada de nociones hace de la soberanía un concepto complejo. Esto se debe a que como palabra, “soberanía” tiene las mismas dificultades lingüísticas que cualquier otra unidad de la lengua presenta (ambigüedad, vaguedad, textura abierta según la clasificación de Hart).[4] ¿Es que la única problemática presentada por tal concepto? Responder a la pregunta afirmativamente sería demasiado simplista (o demasiado optimista); contrariamente, no sólo tiene esta palabra en particular las mismas cuestiones lingüísticas que cualquier otro término puede potencialmente tener, sino que también posee características específicas que la hacen valiosa, pero extremadamente compleja. Es un término de múltiples facetas que tiene influencia en la política, el derecho, y muchas otras áreas con varias implicaciones conceptuales en todas ellas. De esta manera, la atención se encuentra centrada en primer lugar en el análisis de algunas de estas implicaciones conceptuales—es decir las que están vinculadas a esta obra. Los tipos de cuestiones conceptuales consideradas aquí incluyen:

Confusión entre autoridad suprema e ilimitada o absoluta y cómo los diferentes tipos de límites—por ejemplo internos, internacionales, religiosos—se relacionan con el concepto de soberanía.
Si la soberanía es una forma de autoridad o poder, o ambos.
La distinción relacionada entre la soberanía de jure y de facto.
Si la soberanía es una característica de una institución o de una persona o grupo de personas. En relación con esto, la diferencia entre la soberanía como algo poseído por un Estado (por ejemplo, Estados Unidos, Argentina) y la soberanía como algo que puede o no puede ser poseído por una institución dentro de un Estado (por ejemplo, la soberanía parlamentaria en el Reino Unido, la ausencia de una singular institución soberana dentro de los Estados Unidos).
Lo que es para un Estado ser “internamente” y “externamente” soberano.
La noción de soberanía “popular.”
Si la soberanía es algo poseído dentro de una jurisdicción limitada (por ejemplo, “tengo autoridad sobre la materia X pero no sobre cuestiones Y y Z, pero mi autoridad sobre X es definitiva y completa, así que soy soberano sobre X”) o si la soberanía debe implicar una noción de jurisdicción ilimitada.

[1] Genaro Carrió, Notas sobre Derecho y Lenguaje (Argentina: Abeledo Perrot, 1965).

[2] Elizabeth A. Martin and Jonathan Law, ed., A Dictionary of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[3] Ver Robert Jackson, ed., Sovereignty at the Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), en partic. p. 148, n. 10.

[4] Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 124-154.

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Capítulo Tres: ¿Qué debe significar “soberanía compartida”?

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Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

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Territorial disputes and the South China Sea: A brief multidimensional view

Territorial disputes and a multidimensional view

Multilayer and multi-contextual territorial disputes and positive versus negative synergy

There are several issues at stake in any territorial dispute and some are constant or, arguably, more relevant than others depending on each case and the context of reference—i.e. domestic, regional and international. They may center on any of the elements that characterize a political community—i.e. territory, population, government and law. Indeed, territorial disputes may be characterized by reference to territorial sub-elements such as strategic location, territorial integrity and natural resources, to name a few. Yet, territorial disputes may be as well based on population—e.g. bordering minorities, refugee’s crisis, common ethnicity, etc. —government and law—e.g. political unification, leader’s prestige, legal entitlement.

Issues at stake can be assessed in their individuality or together, in one or several contexts. However, it is only when a territorial dispute is explored in synergy that it becomes meaningful. To be more precise, the traditional scholarly studies in legal and political sciences center on the same question, the question of territorial disputes. However, legal and political sciences fasten on only one aspect of legal or political reality: on the existential; or an idealistic legal or political aspect, on the essential. The former views only the certainty, the factual power; the latter sees territorial disputes only from the angle of justice and fairness. It is not that one view or segment in these views is more important than the others. Different studies have simply suppressed one member of the relation in favor of the other. Instead, a more comprehensive analysis should think of an ideal or non-ideal, and empirical or theoretical view of territorial disputes as neither antagonistic nor identifiable, but somehow related as different individual members, components or objects of that whole that may stand in a fruitful exchange with one another provided they are assessed in positive synergy.

Territorial disputes in Asia: The South China Sea and the multidimensional analysis

The highly complex area of the South China Sea encompasses the domestic, regional and international contexts. With $3.37 trillion total trade in 2016 and 40% of the global liquefied natural gas trade transited through the area in 2017 the South China Sea presents a tremendously complex geopolitical jigsaw with many issues at stake including sovereignty claims made by several agents.

China affirms the territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea whilst, according to the Chinese government, upholding peace and stability in the area. China’s claims of sovereignty over the sea face several regional challengers such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. China claims all the islands off the coast. China occupies nine islands while Malaysia occupies three, the Philippines five, Brunei two, and Taiwan occupies one small islet. The complete coastline of Vietnam is enveloped by the South China Sea. More recently, China has increased efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea by physically increasing the size of islands, creating new islands and by constructing ports, military installations, and airstrips.

Because Vietnam has a 2,000-mile coastline facing the East Sea (South China Sea) and 50% of its population lives along the coast, the government sees maritime as its greatest security threat. In 2016, approximately $1.6 billion was destined to maritime defense capabilities, but this is expected to increase to $2 billion by 2020. The Vietnamese Navy and Air Force had very little capacity to protect Vietnam’s maritime interests, but over the past decade both services have undergone some modernization. China has a direct influence over Vietnam in the area. For example, in March 2018, following pressure from China, Vietnam ended a partnership with Repsol to drill for oil at Vanguard Bank in the South China Sea.

Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has changed the role as resistance against China’s position in the South China Sea, while simultaneously downgrading security cooperation with the United States—its treaty ally. However, data, show that traditional allies like Japan, the United States, and Europe lead the investment landscape in the Philippines.

Malaysia has preferred to rely on diplomacy and consensus that avoids embarrassing other states in addressing its maritime disputes in the South China Sea. After securing Malaysia’s claim on three Spratly islands through military occupation, Mahathir’s administration focused greater diplomatic efforts to get all disputing parties including China to consult with each other; using the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a main platform for these discussions. The “Mahathir Doctrine” maintains that the South China Sea should be a sea of cooperation, connectivity, and community–building, not confrontation or conflict.

Brunei’s claim is relatively limited in comparison to the other five claimant states. Brunei claims only a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the terms of UNCLOS, in addition to several land features falling within its legally delimited boundaries in the southern portion of the sea, including Louisa Reef, Owen Shoal and Rifleman Bank. In direct contrast to each of the other claimants, Brunei does not occupy any land features in the sea and maintains no permanent military presence in the area to enforce its claim. The unspoken arrangement whereby Brunei remains silent on the South China Sea issue in order to secure Chinese investment has the potential to benefit both countries.

Like many other territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the origin of the contemporary dispute between China and Indonesia can be traced back to the 1947 map drawn by Nationalist Chinese diplomats featuring a dashed line encircling much of the South China Sea. In every version, one of the dashes intersects the northern boundary of Indonesia’s declared EEZ north of the Natunas, around 1400 kilometres from the Chinese mainland. The waters in the disputed area are an important fishery and the seabed below is home to large natural gas reserves.

The South China Sea constitutes today’s most difficult foreign policy dilemma for Cambodia since ASEAN and China are both crucially important for the kingdom’s security and economic development. Cambodia’s position on the South China Sea is aimed at continuing implementing the declaration of conduct (DOC); urging ASEAN and China to make the utmost effort to finalize the code of conduct (COC); and encouraging countries concerned to discuss and resolve their issue because ASEAN is not a court.

Several of these states, namely Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, are members of ASEAN. Indonesia, which is also an ASEAN member, has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) generated from the Natuna Islands, overlapping China’s so-called ‘nine-dash-line claim’ in the South China Sea.

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Friday 1st Septembert 2023

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world