SO FAR…
We have three
populations (Khemed, Syldavia, and Borduria) part of a sovereignty conflict or
dispute. For whatever reason, each party claims exclusive sovereignty over
Khemed. Since their world might perish soon they have all decided to go into
negotiations in relation to the sovereignty over Khemed. That is mainly because
Khemed’s territory is rich in a very rare metal that happened to be necessary
for the construction of inter-stellar flying objects. All three parties think
of using these inter-stellar flying objects in the event the world came to an
end and needed to evacuate.
Each of the
parties has chosen a representative. The representatives of the three
populations will go into the negotiations without knowing whom they represent
but with access to any other information about the three parties, their claims,
and anything and everything related to Khemed and its sovereignty. By acting in
this way, they ensure that none of the parties is more or less advantaged or
disadvantaged when choosing how sovereignty will be allocated.
We have
assumed that the representatives do not know whom they represent and they have
to accept that they might be representing any of the three populations. So, the
representatives are driven by the rule of maximin. The issue then was to
determine the nature and size of each particular share of sovereignty.
The
representatives reviewed and rejected a series of possible options in order to
make a decision about how to share the sovereignty over Khemed.
To
recapitulate, the representatives rejected just acquisition, the best interest
of only one of the parties, the difference principle, and equal shares.
Sovereignty
implies many aspects of many different levels. Not only is this translated in
benefits but also burdens. The previous section showed that a cautious choice
would acknowledge both that sovereignty indeed is complex and that it implies
benefits as well as burdens in different areas. So, to choose any of the
aforementioned ideas would be an over simplistic decision that may result in
grave consequences for the represented populations.
The solution
reached must be one that, apart from being intuitively appealing in the
negotiations for all the representatives and those whom they represent, and can
be applied when negotiations are over in such a way that the three populations
want to respect the agreement reached. Then, the solution must be somehow
beneficial to the three Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria, must recognise (to an
extent) their claims and the result is not detrimental to any of them.
It is usually
the case to think and assume that the population in the third territory is the
least advantaged or in a more precarious situation in comparison to that of the
two sovereign States. But that is not necessarily true in all cases. In our
history, although Khemed may be at disadvantage in some areas in comparison to Syldavia and Borduria, it is a fact the rare
metal they all need is in Khemed. Then, it is not easy to point out the least
advantaged party.
In order to
succeed in choosing a principle to be applied for the allocation of sovereignty
the representatives must bear in mind some circumstances:
a) when they
finish the negotiations the claiming parties will be in very different
situations in many areas;
b) that the
least advantaged party may be but does not need to be Khemed;
c) that
sovereignty conflicts and sovereignty itself are complex—i.e. they imply both
benefits and burdens in many different areas.
In order to
address the issue of complexity the representatives must first make clear how
the parties will not use any agreement reached for their benefit only. That is
to say, the agreement must not be a subterfuge for any form of domination from
one or more claiming parties in relation to the other(s). That is because by
application of the maximin rule it is plausible to think the representatives
will have a cautious view in relation to the final result.
Jorge Emilio
Núñez
20th November
2017
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