JUEGO SOBERANO: COMO SOLUCIONAR CONFLICTOS DE SOBERANÍA (PARTE 17 DE 21)

HASTA AQUÍ…

Tenemos tres poblaciones (Khemed, Syldavia y Borduria) como parte de un conflicto o disputa de soberanía. Por alguna razón, cada parte reclama soberanía exclusiva sobre Khemed. Como su mundo podría perecer pronto, todos han decidido entablar negociaciones en relación con la soberanía sobre Khemed. Esto se debe principalmente a que el territorio de Khemed es rico en un metal muy raro que resultó ser necesario para la construcción de objetos voladores interestelares. Las tres partes piensan en usar estos objetos voladores interestelares en caso de que el mundo llegara a su fin y tuvieran que evacuar.

Post sobre Khemed, Syldavia y Borduria

Cada una de las partes ha elegido un representante. Los representantes de las tres poblaciones entrarán en las negociaciones sin saber a quién representan, pero con acceso a cualquier otra información sobre las tres partes, sus reclamos, y todo lo relacionado con Khemed y su soberanía. Al actuar de esta manera, se aseguran de que ninguna de las partes esté más o menos favorecida o en desventaja a la hora de elegir cómo se asignará la soberanía.

Post sobre los representantes y sus limitaciones

Suponemos que los representantes no saben a quiénes representan y tienen que aceptar que podrían representar a cualquiera de las tres poblaciones. Entonces, los representantes son impulsados ​​por la regla de maximin. El problema fue entonces determinar la naturaleza y el tamaño de cada parte particular de la soberanía.

Post previo sobre la teoría de la decisión

Los representantes revisaron y rechazaron una serie de posibles opciones para tomar una decisión sobre cómo compartir la soberanía en relación a Khemed.

Para recapitular, los representantes rechazaron la adquisición basada en el reclamo histórico, el interés de una sola de las partes, el principio de la diferencia e igualdad de porciones de soberanía.

Post anterior sobre derechos históricos

Post anterior sobre los beneficios para solamente uno

Post anterior sobre diferentes porciones de soberanía (1)

Post anterior sobre diferentes porciones de soberanía (2)

Post anterior sobre partes iguales de soberanía (1)

Post anterior sobre partes iguales de soberanía (2)

La soberanía implica muchos aspectos de muchos niveles diferentes. Esto no solamente se traduce en beneficios sino también en cargas. La sección anterior mostró que una elección cautelosa reconocería que la soberanía es compleja y que implica beneficios y cargas u obligaciones en diferentes áreas. Entonces, elegir cualquiera de las ideas antes mencionadas sería una decisión demasiado simplista que podría tener graves consecuencias para las poblaciones representadas.

La solución alcanzada debe ser aquella que, además de ser intuitivamente atractiva en las negociaciones para todos los representantes y aquellos a quienes representan, pueda aplicarse cuando finalicen las negociaciones de tal manera que las tres poblaciones quieran respetar el acuerdo alcanzado. Entonces, la solución debe ser de alguna manera beneficiosa para los tres. Khemed, Syldavia y Borduria, deben reconocer (en cierta medida) sus reclamos y el resultado no debe ser perjudicial para parte alguna en el conflicto.

Suele ser el caso pensar y asumir que la población del tercer territorio es la menos favorecida o está en una situación más precaria en comparación con la de los dos Estados soberanos. Pero eso no es necesariamente cierto en todos los casos. En nuestra historia, aunque Khemed puede estar en desventaja en algunas áreas en comparación con Syldavia y Borduria, es un hecho que el metal raro que todos necesitan está en Khemed. Entonces, no es fácil señalar a la parte menos favorecida.

Para tener éxito en la elección de un principio que se aplicará para la asignación de la soberanía, los representantes deben tener en cuenta algunas circunstancias:

a) cuando finalicen las negociaciones, las partes reclamantes se encontrarán en situaciones muy diferentes en muchas áreas;

b) que la parte menos favorecida puede ser pero no necesita ser Khemed;

c) que los conflictos de soberanía y la soberanía en sí son complejos, es decir implican beneficios y cargas u obligaciones en muchas áreas diferentes.

Para abordar el problema de la complejidad, los representantes primero deben aclarar cómo las partes no utilizarán ningún acuerdo alcanzado solamente en su beneficio. Es decir, el acuerdo no debe ser un subterfugio para ninguna forma de dominación de una o más partes demandantes en relación con el otro(s). Esto se debe a que, mediante la aplicación de la regla de maximin, es plausible pensar que los representantes tendrán una visión prudente en relación con el resultado final.

Jorge Emilio Núñez

20 de noviembre de 2017

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 17 OF 21)

SO FAR…

We have three populations (Khemed, Syldavia, and Borduria) part of a sovereignty conflict or dispute. For whatever reason, each party claims exclusive sovereignty over Khemed. Since their world might perish soon they have all decided to go into negotiations in relation to the sovereignty over Khemed. That is mainly because Khemed’s territory is rich in a very rare metal that happened to be necessary for the construction of inter-stellar flying objects. All three parties think of using these inter-stellar flying objects in the event the world came to an end and needed to evacuate.

Post introducing Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria

Each of the parties has chosen a representative. The representatives of the three populations will go into the negotiations without knowing whom they represent but with access to any other information about the three parties, their claims, and anything and everything related to Khemed and its sovereignty. By acting in this way, they ensure that none of the parties is more or less advantaged or disadvantaged when choosing how sovereignty will be allocated.

Post about the representatives and their limitations

We have assumed that the representatives do not know whom they represent and they have to accept that they might be representing any of the three populations. So, the representatives are driven by the rule of maximin. The issue then was to determine the nature and size of each particular share of sovereignty.

Previous post on decision theory

The representatives reviewed and rejected a series of possible options in order to make a decision about how to share the sovereignty over Khemed.

To recapitulate, the representatives rejected just acquisition, the best interest of only one of the parties, the difference principle, and equal shares.

Previous post on historical entitlement

Previous post on benefits to only one

Previous post on different shares of sovereignty (1)

Previous post on different shares of sovereignty (2)

Previous post on equal shares of sovereignty (1)

Previous post on equal shares of sovereignty (2)

Sovereignty implies many aspects of many different levels. Not only is this translated in benefits but also burdens. The previous section showed that a cautious choice would acknowledge both that sovereignty indeed is complex and that it implies benefits as well as burdens in different areas. So, to choose any of the aforementioned ideas would be an over simplistic decision that may result in grave consequences for the represented populations.

The solution reached must be one that, apart from being intuitively appealing in the negotiations for all the representatives and those whom they represent, and can be applied when negotiations are over in such a way that the three populations want to respect the agreement reached. Then, the solution must be somehow beneficial to the three Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria, must recognise (to an extent) their claims and the result is not detrimental to any of them.

It is usually the case to think and assume that the population in the third territory is the least advantaged or in a more precarious situation in comparison to that of the two sovereign States. But that is not necessarily true in all cases. In our history, although Khemed may be at disadvantage in some areas in comparison to  Syldavia and Borduria, it is a fact the rare metal they all need is in Khemed. Then, it is not easy to point out the least advantaged party.

In order to succeed in choosing a principle to be applied for the allocation of sovereignty the representatives must bear in mind some circumstances:

a) when they finish the negotiations the claiming parties will be in very different situations in many areas;

b) that the least advantaged party may be but does not need to be Khemed;

c) that sovereignty conflicts and sovereignty itself are complex—i.e. they imply both benefits and burdens in many different areas.

In order to address the issue of complexity the representatives must first make clear how the parties will not use any agreement reached for their benefit only. That is to say, the agreement must not be a subterfuge for any form of domination from one or more claiming parties in relation to the other(s). That is because by application of the maximin rule it is plausible to think the representatives will have a cautious view in relation to the final result.

Jorge Emilio Núñez

20th November 2017

BOOK [Abstract and General Structure] "Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics"

Sovereignty Conflicts and 

International Law and Politics

A Distributive Justice Issue

By Jorge E. Núñez

© 2017 – Routledge

Abstract

We are used to seeing and accepting as fact that in one territory there is one population governed by an ultimate authority, with a common legal bond or system of norms. What would happen if that one territory and population had two ultimate and hierarchically equal sovereigns (legally speaking) and, at the same time, two valid sets of norms? Would it be possible, for instance, that Israel and Palestine had sovereign authority at the same time over Jerusalem? Would it be possible that Argentina and the United Kingdom were at one time sovereign over the territory and population of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands? What about Russia and Ukraine having the same degree of sovereign power over Crimea? 

There are many cases that can be characterised as sovereignty conflicts in which international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same piece of land. Besides, these conflicts have a particular feature: their solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst the agents because it is thought that the sovereignty over the third territory can be granted to only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept—i.e. exclusive, and not shareable.

In light of this obsession with absolute, long-standing disputes still continue to be presented around the world as a zero sum game, with many negative outcomes of different sorts—e.g. social struggle, bad governance, inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension in international relations, and threat to local and international peace. Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level—e.g. effects on international price of oil, arms trafficking, terrorism, war.

International relations and legal and political scholarly literature offer various potential remedies that one could use to solve the problem. These include independence, self-determination and free association—to name a few. Although these remedies are useful in certain conflicts, they are futile in several others. Hence, these conflicts remain unresolved and in a legal and political limbo. 

This book offers a fair and just way of dealing with certain sovereignty conflicts by neutralising elements that are responsible for the stagnation of this kind of disputes. Indeed, one of these elements is the historical argument that is intrinsically related to memory and emotion as instruments of national identity. I propose to see these conflicts from a different yet broad. Therein, I view the problem as a distributive justice issue following the work of Rawls. That is because distributive justice principles are a particularly appropriate tool to address sovereignty issues, just as they have previously been applied in assigning rights and obligations in other social institutions. As a consequence, reviewing different theories (e.g. ‘first come, first served’; just acquisition; the principle of equality) may help us to resolve the problem. This book aims to explore if a solution that certainly is desirable can also be possible and may offer a peaceful way of solving sovereignty conflicts through the use of principles of distributive justice.

Keywords 

Absolute Sovereignty, Limited Sovereignty, State Sovereignty, Sovereignty Conflicts, Distributive Justice, Rawls, Malvinas, Falklands, Kashmir, Gibraltar, Jerusalem, Catalonia, Kuril islands, Cyprus, Crimea, Quebec

General structure

To evaluate the potential for using principles of distributive justice to resolve certain kinds of sovereignty conflicts, the monograph is divided into three Parts. The First Part—i.e. Chapters One and Two—includes discussion on two preliminary potential pitfalls to this project that is the use of Rawlsian methodology and the use of the concept of ‘sovereignty’. Chapter One, the Introduction, presents some simplifying assumptions and the basic elements that constitute this study and in particular goes through the critical discussion on Rawls methodology in order to justify its application here. Chapter Two will address a key task in developing the new approach: to examine if the concept of ‘sovereignty’, which is assumed by many to be absolute, can be (and in fact, actually is) limited. This Chapter follows two lines of analysis: a) conceptual; and b) historical. 

The Second Part—i.e. Chapters Three, Four, and Five—introduces and explores the current state of affairs in international law and politics in terms of conceptual elements and potential remedies to sovereignty conflicts. Chapter Three will focus on assessing the need for a revised ‘shared sovereignty’. This and similar expressions have been used in the political and legal literature before. However, its meaning remains tangled, with specific real cases or national and international agendas making it difficult to be applied to different realities. It is for that reason this Chapter will review different ways in which this concept (in various versions or conceptions) and similar ones have been previously applied in legal and political scholarly literature. Chapter Four will examine self-ownership as a way to define sovereignty. More precisely, if it can be established that sovereignty may in theory be limited and the need of a revised ‘shared sovereignty’ the next step will be to evaluate how sovereignty can be shared—i.e. how a State can limit itself by sharing its rights and obligations and still remain sovereign. Therein, this Chapter will assess the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in parallel with the concept of ‘self-ownership’. That is because by using an analogous concept such as self-ownership that implies supreme authority but yet accepts limitations it becomes clearer how limitations can work in another supposedly supreme concept such as sovereignty. Chapter Five highlights the main remedies applied at international level to sovereignty conflicts and will explore each in order to determine whether any of them could be a reasonable solution to the sovereignty conflicts object of this project. What this Chapter will argue is that there is a need for a reasonable solution that the reviewed international remedies cannot offer.

The Third Part—i.e. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight—will explore the use of Rawlsian methodology in order to put a solution to certain sovereign conflicts, and discuss if the outcome is a reasonable remedy for them. Chapter Six will introduce and explore: a) the conditions for achieving justice—toleration, peace, etc.; b) why the ‘just acquisition’ principle may not work; and c) why the Rawlsian method of conceiving of the respective claimants as behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ just might. The latter is of utmost importance as the analysis will be conducted under these circumstances; that is, in an original position in which the three representatives will be in a particular situation, both in regard to their particular circumstances and that of the original position itself. Chapter Seven will test the proposed model by working out what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would best, realise it. In order to do that this Chapter will make use of some sovereign conflicts to show that the model can be extended from the general principles to workable institutions that realise those principles in: a) population; b) territory; c) government and law; and d) all that they imply (e.g. defence, natural resources, financial system). Finally, Chapter Eight will conclude by assessing the model’s potential and highlighting any possible limitations and implications. 

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