The Persian Gulf and
the Role of Outside Powers
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES such as the ones in the Persian Gulf have to do
with domestic and international elements. As Huth says “states leaders are both
national security managers as well as domestic politicians seeking to maintain
their position of influence and power. As such, the foreign policy goals of
state leaders should reflect the pursuit of both external security as well as
domestic political gain.”
Huth, Paul K.
2001. Standing Your Ground. Territorial Disputes and International Conflict.
The University of Michigan Press.
After
the collapse of the Soviet Union and America’s stunning success in the Gulf
War, the United States stood virtually unopposed in the Persian Gulf region.
Over the coming decade, however, the United States is likely to find itself on
a more crowded playing field as several outside powers, notably European
countries, Russia, and China, compete for enhanced influence and access.
These
countries, driven by geopolitical, economic, and strategic motivations, will pursue
their own agendas, objectives, and priorities that will often clash as well as
converge with U.S. policies and interests. Their support or opposition will be
an important determinant of U.S. success in implementing its policy
initiatives.
Central
to the UK government’s new strategy is the establishment of a network of
facilities and partnerships designed to secure a permanent British military
presence in the Gulf. New and enlarged bases in countries such as Dubai, Oman
and Bahrain will enable the UK to present a more assertive position in the
region, and to safeguard the all- important outward ow of gas and oil.
At the
same time, British arms companies continue to sell vast amounts of weaponry to
support the Gulf states’ own military expansion. Since 2010, the UK government
has approved over 6,000 individual export licences to arms companies serving
the region, with a combined value of £16 billion.
In
the broader universe of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Middle East generally
ranks after the United States, Europe, and China and Asia. The Kremlin again
sees Russia as a great power on a global scale, and as such it cannot ignore a
region so close geographically, so rich in hydrocarbons, and so unstable
socially and politically as the Middle East.
Moscow’s withdrawal from the
Middle East under then president Mikhail Gorbachev at the start of the rst Gulf
War marked the decline of the Soviet Union’s superpower status. Russia’s
reappearance as a player in the Middle East under President Vladimir Putin has
the aim of restoring the country’s position as a great power outside of the
former USSR.
With the start of the military intervention in Syria in 2015, and
the U.S.-Russian diplomatic e ort that accompanied it, the Middle East has
become a key testing ground for Russia’s attempt to return to the global stage.
China’s
rise is shaping up to be the most salient development of international politics
and economics in the early 21st century, and Beijing is increasingly searching
for stable sources of energy to power its ballooning economy. This has meant
that China’s relations with resource-rich Persian Gulf states have become more
intensive even as Beijing has become more pragmatic in its approach to the
region.
Whereas once China viewed events in the Gulf region through the lens of
its own revolutionary ideology, its relations with Middle Eastern nations are
now driven more by energy concerns. Chinese state-owned oil companies are now
aggressively bidding for contracts in the Gulf, and there is a clear Chinese
presence in regional commerce.
The
posts this week will center the attention on the role these external powers
(mainly, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China) have in the
Persian Gulf.
The United States and the Persian Gulf
The United Kingdom and the Persian Gulf
Russia and the Persian Gulf
China and the Perrsian Gulf
Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701
26th November 2018
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