The International Criminal Court: Effectiveness, Hungary’s Withdrawal, and a Multidimensional Critique
Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002 under the Rome Statute, seeks to prosecute individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression when national courts fail. Its work, arguably noble yet flawed, mirrors the United Nations’ struggles to enforce global norms amidst complex conflicts. Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC on April 3, 2025, following Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit despite an ICC arrest warrant, underscores this tension. Issued in November 2024 for alleged war crimes in Gaza, the warrant places Netanyahu in a contentious spotlight, with Hungary’s exit—announced hours after his arrival—highlighting broader challenges to international justice. The Núñez 2023 framework, emphasizing multidimensionality, offers a lens to dissect these events, moving beyond unidimensional legalism to explore plural agents, contexts, and realms across linear and nonlinear dimensions.
Historical Context and Membership
The ICC emerged from a historical push for accountability post-World War II, building on the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials but aiming for a permanent tribunal. By April 2025, its membership stands at 124 states, reduced from 125 with Hungary’s exit. This contrasts with the UN’s near-universal 193 members, yet both share a common flaw: incomplete participation. Major powers—United States, Russia, China, and Israel—never joined the ICC, a gap Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) frames as a distributive justice issue, where powerful states evade accountability, fragmenting global norms. The Rome Statute’s opt-in nature, unlike the UN Charter’s broader mandate, limits jurisdiction, a linear vertical limitation the Núñez framework critiques as insufficient for pluralistic conflicts.
Historically, the ICC has investigated 31 cases and convicted 10 individuals by 2025 (ICC, 2025), a modest tally against the backdrop of 233,000 conflict-related deaths in 2024 (ACLED, 2025). Hungary’s departure, the first by an EU state, echoes earlier exits—Burundi (2017), Philippines (2019)—and threats from South Africa and Gambia, signaling a regressive trend. This parallels the UN’s Cold War-era paralysis, where veto powers stymied action, suggesting international bodies struggle with nonlinear state defiance.
Legal and Political Effectiveness
Legally, the ICC’s mandate hinges on complementarity—stepping in where states fail—yet its effectiveness is curtailed by enforcement gaps. The 2023 warrant against Vladimir Putin for Ukraine war crimes, ignored by Mongolia in 2024, exemplifies this. Similarly, the November 2024 warrants against Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant for Gaza atrocities—starvation, murder, persecution—rely on member states’ cooperation, which often falters. The Núñez 2023 lens reveals a linear vertical assumption: authority flows from the court to states, expecting compliance. Yet, nonlinear chaos—states prioritizing sovereignty or alliances—disrupts this, as seen with Hungary hosting Netanyahu.
Politically, the ICC faces pressures akin to the UN’s Security Council dynamics. Territorial Disputes (2020) notes how geopolitical interests override legal norms—Russia’s UN vetoes shield Ukraine aggression, while US sanctions on ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan (2020, 2025) protect allies like Israel. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reports 50,000+ Palestinian deaths in Gaza since 2023, yet ICC action stalls, reflecting a regressive dimension: historical power imbalances persist, undermining universal justice. The court’s limited convictions—10 in over two decades—contrast with the UN’s 71 peacekeeping missions since 1948, yet both struggle to bridge intent and impact.
Hungary’s Withdrawal and Netanyahu’s Visit
Hungary’s withdrawal, announced April 3, 2025, as Netanyahu arrived in Budapest, marks a pivotal challenge. The ICC warrant, issued November 21, 2024, cites “reasonable grounds” for Netanyahu’s responsibility in Gaza war crimes—over 50,000 deaths and 90% displacement (ACLED, 2025). Hungary, a Rome Statute signatory since 2001, was obliged under Article 87 to arrest him. Instead, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán welcomed Netanyahu with military honors, calling the ICC “politically biased” (BBC, 2025). The withdrawal, effective April 2026 per Article 127, aligns with Orbán’s pro-Israel stance and skepticism of supranational bodies, a self-referred act the Núñez framework identifies as prioritizing national interest over global duty.
This event mirrors nonlinear dynamics. Hungary’s defiance is chaotic—unpredictable yet deliberate—challenging the ICC’s linear authority. Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock decried it as “a bad day for international criminal law” (BBC, 2025), yet EU responses vary: Ireland and Spain pledge arrests, while Germany and France waver, citing jurisdictional doubts over Israel, a non-member. The US, also a non-member, sanctioned Khan in 2025, emboldening Netanyahu’s travel—his first European trip since the warrant, following a US visit in February. This diagonal cross-context influence—US-EU-Israel ties—complicates enforcement, a flaw Cosmopolitanism (2023) flags as unidimensional neglect of plural agents.
Multidimensional Analysis
The Núñez 2023 framework dissects this crisis across dimensions:
- Linear Dimensions: Vertically, the ICC assumes state compliance, a hierarchy broken by Hungary’s exit and non-members’ immunity (Israel, US). Horizontally, EU peer pressure fails—Hungary opts out, defying collective norms. Diagonally, external powers (US sanctions, Trump’s support) erode ICC legitimacy, a cross-context failure.
- Nonlinear Dimensions: Hungary’s self-referred exit prioritizes sovereignty, a domestic lens over global justice. Regressive echoes of pre-ICC impunity resurface—powerful states evade accountability, as in colonial eras. Chaotic state reactions (Mongolia’s Putin visit, Hungary’s Netanyahu hosting) defy predictability, while randomness emerges in Trump’s sanctions, skewing outcomes.
- Time and Space Variables: Eternalist claims—Israel’s self-defense vs. Palestine’s justice—clash with the ICC’s non-eternal timeline (2015-2024 investigations). Spatially, the narrow focus on Gaza misses integral diaspora advocacy (6 million Jews globally) and virtual threats (US cyber-sanctions), dimensions Cosmopolitanism urges inclusion of.
This multidimensionality reveals why unidimensional legalism—arrest warrants alone—fails. The ICC, like the UN, assumes orderly progression, ignoring nonlinear pluralisms driving state behavior.
Potential Bias in Decision-Making
Bias allegations swirl around the ICC, paralleling UN critiques. Of 13 active investigations, four target African states (ICC, 2025), prompting postcolonial bias claims—a regressive echo Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) critiques as unfair resource distribution. Yet, the Netanyahu case shifts this narrative, targeting a Western ally. Israel’s “antisemitic” charge (BBC, 2025) invokes metaphysical axiological realms—values of justice vs. identity—suggesting political influence over legal purity. The Núñez framework questions fairness: why Gaza over Myanmar’s 40,000 deaths (UN, 2025)? Nonlinear diplomatic pressures—US support for Israel, EU divisions—may steer ICC priorities, a distortion unidimensional approaches miss.
Comparison to the UN and Other Bodies
The ICC’s state-centric model (124 members) mirrors the UN’s (193), yet both falter with non-members—Israel and the US evade ICC jurisdiction, as Russia and China block UN action. The Security Council’s veto power parallels the ICC’s enforcement reliance on states, both trapped in linear hierarchies. Regional bodies like the African Union face similar woes—Sudan’s 13,000 deaths (UNHCR, 2025) see no AU arrests—reflecting Territorial Disputes (2020) insight: unidimensional tools fail multidimensional conflicts. The World Economic Forum notes 60 active conflicts in 2025 (WEF, 2025), overwhelming both institutions’ capacities.
Effectiveness Assessment
The ICC’s effectiveness appears limited—10 convictions against 60 conflicts and 233,000 deaths (ACLED, 2025) highlight a gap. The Núñez 2023 lens critiques its unidimensional legalism, ignoring nonlinear pluralisms like Hungary’s exit or US pressure. The UN’s 12 peacekeeping missions in 2025 struggle similarly, unable to halt Ukraine’s 15 million displaced (UNHCR, 2025). Both institutions aim high but lack enforcement teeth, a flaw Cosmopolitanism seeks to address through pluralistic inclusion.
Predictions via my Frameworks
If the ICC clings to linear strategies, the Núñez frameworks forecast:
- Fragmentation (Regressive): Hungary’s exit may trigger others—Poland’s Donald Tusk hinted at leniency for Netanyahu (Euronews, 2025)—potentially halving membership to 60 by 2035, akin to UN reform debates.
- Chaos (Nonlinear): Defiance (e.g., Netanyahu’s travel) could render 50% of warrants unenforced by 2030 (extrapolated from current trends), eroding credibility.
- Stagnation (Time-Space): Eternalist disputes (Israel-Palestine) and spatial blind spots (cyber-crimes) may stall justice, risking 3 billion in conflict zones by 2030 (WEF, 2025).
- Systemic Collapse: Unidimensional bias could see 30% of states abandon the ICC by 2040 (WEF risk scenario), forming rival justice blocs.
A Multidimensional Path Forward
Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics (2023) proposes alternatives: shared sovereignty—e.g., Israel-Palestine co-managing ICC roles—integrates plural agents. Nonlinear tools like game theory could model state defiance, while time-space adaptation (virtual enforcement, eternalist mediation) addresses modern conflicts. Without such shifts, the ICC risks mirroring the UN’s fate—symbolic but sidelined.
Conclusion
The ICC’s work, while ambitious, stumbles under linear constraints, as Hungary’s withdrawal over Netanyahu’s visit exemplifies. The Núñez framework reveals a crisis of unidimensionality—legal mandates falter against nonlinear pluralisms, historical biases, and political pressures. Membership gaps, enforcement woes, and potential biases echo UN struggles, with 50,000 Gaza deaths and 233,000 global fatalities (ACLED, 2025) as grim markers. Without embracing multidimensionality—plural agents, nonlinear foresight, time-space fluidity—the ICC faces fragmentation and irrelevance. Hungary’s exit is a warning; the data demands a rethink to avert a lawless future.
Invitation to “The Borders We Share”
My series, The Borders We Share, launched March 4, 2025, probes these divides. A sample post (https://drjorge.world/2025/03/11/the-borders-we-share-khemeds-oil-crimeas-shadow-post-2/) ties Crimea’s 2014 shadow—2 million under Russia—to Ukraine’s fight, blending fiction (Khemed’s oil) and reality. I advocate co-sovereignty to heal—readers are invited to explore these shared edges, from Black Sea to Arctic, where 2025’s fate unfolds. Post so far have included cases such s Antarctica, the Amazon region and Northern Ireland.
AUTHOR’S SAMPLE PEER-REVIEWED ACADEMIC RESEARCH (FREE OPEN ACCESS):
State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)
AUTHOR’S PUBLISHED WORK AVAILABLE TO PURCHASE VIA:
Thursday 04th April 2025
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
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