Thursday, 3 April 2025

The International Criminal Court: Effectiveness, Hungary’s Withdrawal, and a Multidimensional Critique

 

The International Criminal Court: Effectiveness, Hungary’s Withdrawal, and a Multidimensional Critique

The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002 under the Rome Statute, seeks to prosecute individuals for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression when national courts fail. Its work, arguably noble yet flawed, mirrors the United Nations’ struggles to enforce global norms amidst complex conflicts. Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC on April 3, 2025, following Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit despite an ICC arrest warrant, underscores this tension. Issued in November 2024 for alleged war crimes in Gaza, the warrant places Netanyahu in a contentious spotlight, with Hungary’s exit—announced hours after his arrival—highlighting broader challenges to international justice. The Núñez 2023 framework, emphasizing multidimensionality, offers a lens to dissect these events, moving beyond unidimensional legalism to explore plural agents, contexts, and realms across linear and nonlinear dimensions.

The ICC emerged from a historical push for accountability post-World War II, building on the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials but aiming for a permanent tribunal. By April 2025, its membership stands at 124 states, reduced from 125 with Hungary’s exit. This contrasts with the UN’s near-universal 193 members, yet both share a common flaw: incomplete participation. Major powers—United States, Russia, China, and Israel—never joined the ICC, a gap Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) frames as a distributive justice issue, where powerful states evade accountability, fragmenting global norms. The Rome Statute’s opt-in nature, unlike the UN Charter’s broader mandate, limits jurisdiction, a linear vertical limitation the Núñez framework critiques as insufficient for pluralistic conflicts.

Historically, the ICC has investigated 31 cases and convicted 10 individuals by 2025 (ICC, 2025), a modest tally against the backdrop of 233,000 conflict-related deaths in 2024 (ACLED, 2025). Hungary’s departure, the first by an EU state, echoes earlier exits—Burundi (2017), Philippines (2019)—and threats from South Africa and Gambia, signaling a regressive trend. This parallels the UN’s Cold War-era paralysis, where veto powers stymied action, suggesting international bodies struggle with nonlinear state defiance.

Legally, the ICC’s mandate hinges on complementarity—stepping in where states fail—yet its effectiveness is curtailed by enforcement gaps. The 2023 warrant against Vladimir Putin for Ukraine war crimes, ignored by Mongolia in 2024, exemplifies this. Similarly, the November 2024 warrants against Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant for Gaza atrocities—starvation, murder, persecution—rely on member states’ cooperation, which often falters. The Núñez 2023 lens reveals a linear vertical assumption: authority flows from the court to states, expecting compliance. Yet, nonlinear chaos—states prioritizing sovereignty or alliances—disrupts this, as seen with Hungary hosting Netanyahu.

Politically, the ICC faces pressures akin to the UN’s Security Council dynamics. Territorial Disputes (2020) notes how geopolitical interests override legal norms—Russia’s UN vetoes shield Ukraine aggression, while US sanctions on ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan (2020, 2025) protect allies like Israel. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reports 50,000+ Palestinian deaths in Gaza since 2023, yet ICC action stalls, reflecting a regressive dimension: historical power imbalances persist, undermining universal justice. The court’s limited convictions—10 in over two decades—contrast with the UN’s 71 peacekeeping missions since 1948, yet both struggle to bridge intent and impact.

Hungary’s withdrawal, announced April 3, 2025, as Netanyahu arrived in Budapest, marks a pivotal challenge. The ICC warrant, issued November 21, 2024, cites “reasonable grounds” for Netanyahu’s responsibility in Gaza war crimes—over 50,000 deaths and 90% displacement (ACLED, 2025). Hungary, a Rome Statute signatory since 2001, was obliged under Article 87 to arrest him. Instead, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán welcomed Netanyahu with military honors, calling the ICC “politically biased” (BBC, 2025). The withdrawal, effective April 2026 per Article 127, aligns with Orbán’s pro-Israel stance and skepticism of supranational bodies, a self-referred act the Núñez framework identifies as prioritizing national interest over global duty.

This event mirrors nonlinear dynamics. Hungary’s defiance is chaotic—unpredictable yet deliberate—challenging the ICC’s linear authority. Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock decried it as “a bad day for international criminal law” (BBC, 2025), yet EU responses vary: Ireland and Spain pledge arrests, while Germany and France waver, citing jurisdictional doubts over Israel, a non-member. The US, also a non-member, sanctioned Khan in 2025, emboldening Netanyahu’s travel—his first European trip since the warrant, following a US visit in February. This diagonal cross-context influence—US-EU-Israel ties—complicates enforcement, a flaw Cosmopolitanism (2023) flags as unidimensional neglect of plural agents.

The Núñez 2023 framework dissects this crisis across dimensions:

  • Linear Dimensions: Vertically, the ICC assumes state compliance, a hierarchy broken by Hungary’s exit and non-members’ immunity (Israel, US). Horizontally, EU peer pressure fails—Hungary opts out, defying collective norms. Diagonally, external powers (US sanctions, Trump’s support) erode ICC legitimacy, a cross-context failure.
  • Nonlinear Dimensions: Hungary’s self-referred exit prioritizes sovereignty, a domestic lens over global justice. Regressive echoes of pre-ICC impunity resurface—powerful states evade accountability, as in colonial eras. Chaotic state reactions (Mongolia’s Putin visit, Hungary’s Netanyahu hosting) defy predictability, while randomness emerges in Trump’s sanctions, skewing outcomes.
  • Time and Space Variables: Eternalist claims—Israel’s self-defense vs. Palestine’s justice—clash with the ICC’s non-eternal timeline (2015-2024 investigations). Spatially, the narrow focus on Gaza misses integral diaspora advocacy (6 million Jews globally) and virtual threats (US cyber-sanctions), dimensions Cosmopolitanism urges inclusion of.

This multidimensionality reveals why unidimensional legalism—arrest warrants alone—fails. The ICC, like the UN, assumes orderly progression, ignoring nonlinear pluralisms driving state behavior.

Bias allegations swirl around the ICC, paralleling UN critiques. Of 13 active investigations, four target African states (ICC, 2025), prompting postcolonial bias claims—a regressive echo Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) critiques as unfair resource distribution. Yet, the Netanyahu case shifts this narrative, targeting a Western ally. Israel’s “antisemitic” charge (BBC, 2025) invokes metaphysical axiological realms—values of justice vs. identity—suggesting political influence over legal purity. The Núñez framework questions fairness: why Gaza over Myanmar’s 40,000 deaths (UN, 2025)? Nonlinear diplomatic pressures—US support for Israel, EU divisions—may steer ICC priorities, a distortion unidimensional approaches miss.

The ICC’s state-centric model (124 members) mirrors the UN’s (193), yet both falter with non-members—Israel and the US evade ICC jurisdiction, as Russia and China block UN action. The Security Council’s veto power parallels the ICC’s enforcement reliance on states, both trapped in linear hierarchies. Regional bodies like the African Union face similar woes—Sudan’s 13,000 deaths (UNHCR, 2025) see no AU arrests—reflecting Territorial Disputes (2020) insight: unidimensional tools fail multidimensional conflicts. The World Economic Forum notes 60 active conflicts in 2025 (WEF, 2025), overwhelming both institutions’ capacities.

The ICC’s effectiveness appears limited—10 convictions against 60 conflicts and 233,000 deaths (ACLED, 2025) highlight a gap. The Núñez 2023 lens critiques its unidimensional legalism, ignoring nonlinear pluralisms like Hungary’s exit or US pressure. The UN’s 12 peacekeeping missions in 2025 struggle similarly, unable to halt Ukraine’s 15 million displaced (UNHCR, 2025). Both institutions aim high but lack enforcement teeth, a flaw Cosmopolitanism seeks to address through pluralistic inclusion.

If the ICC clings to linear strategies, the Núñez frameworks forecast:

  • Fragmentation (Regressive): Hungary’s exit may trigger others—Poland’s Donald Tusk hinted at leniency for Netanyahu (Euronews, 2025)—potentially halving membership to 60 by 2035, akin to UN reform debates.
  • Chaos (Nonlinear): Defiance (e.g., Netanyahu’s travel) could render 50% of warrants unenforced by 2030 (extrapolated from current trends), eroding credibility.
  • Stagnation (Time-Space): Eternalist disputes (Israel-Palestine) and spatial blind spots (cyber-crimes) may stall justice, risking 3 billion in conflict zones by 2030 (WEF, 2025).
  • Systemic Collapse: Unidimensional bias could see 30% of states abandon the ICC by 2040 (WEF risk scenario), forming rival justice blocs.

Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics (2023) proposes alternatives: shared sovereignty—e.g., Israel-Palestine co-managing ICC roles—integrates plural agents. Nonlinear tools like game theory could model state defiance, while time-space adaptation (virtual enforcement, eternalist mediation) addresses modern conflicts. Without such shifts, the ICC risks mirroring the UN’s fate—symbolic but sidelined.

The ICC’s work, while ambitious, stumbles under linear constraints, as Hungary’s withdrawal over Netanyahu’s visit exemplifies. The Núñez framework reveals a crisis of unidimensionality—legal mandates falter against nonlinear pluralisms, historical biases, and political pressures. Membership gaps, enforcement woes, and potential biases echo UN struggles, with 50,000 Gaza deaths and 233,000 global fatalities (ACLED, 2025) as grim markers. Without embracing multidimensionality—plural agents, nonlinear foresight, time-space fluidity—the ICC faces fragmentation and irrelevance. Hungary’s exit is a warning; the data demands a rethink to avert a lawless future.

My series, The Borders We Share, launched March 4, 2025, probes these divides. A sample post (https://drjorge.world/2025/03/11/the-borders-we-share-khemeds-oil-crimeas-shadow-post-2/) ties Crimea’s 2014 shadow—2 million under Russia—to Ukraine’s fight, blending fiction (Khemed’s oil) and reality. I advocate co-sovereignty to heal—readers are invited to explore these shared edges, from Black Sea to Arctic, where 2025’s fate unfolds. Post so far have included cases such s Antarctica, the Amazon region and Northern Ireland.

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Thursday 04th April 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

The World Order in Crisis: A Multidimensional Analysis of Conflict Resolution Failures in 2025

 

The World Order in Crisis: A Multidimensional Analysis of Conflict Resolution Failures in 2025

As I reflect on the global landscape in April 2025, I am struck by the persistent and escalating conflicts that define our era—interstate wars, territorial disputes, and hybrid confrontations involving non-state actors and emerging technologies. The international order, anchored in institutions like the United Nations (UN), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and regional bodies, struggles to deliver peaceful and permanent resolutions. My multidimensional framework, articulated Cosmopolitanism, State Sovereignty and International Law and Politics: A Theory (Núñez, 2023), provides me with a lens to analyze these failures comprehensively. I move beyond unidimensional approaches—whether legal, political, or historical—to consider pluralisms (agents, roles, contexts, realms, and modes of existence) across linear and nonlinear dimensions, influenced by variables of time and space. In this analysis, I examine the current state of affairs, critique the world order’s shortcomings with specific examples—Israel-Palestine, Russia-Ukraine, Falklands/Malvinas, Kashmir, Antarctica, the South China Sea, and disputes in Africa—and predict the consequences if humanity fails to adopt new approaches.

In 2025, I observe a world where conflict has surged to unprecedented levels. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) records over 210,000 conflict events in the past year, with approximately 250,000 fatalities (ACLED, 2025). The UN oversees 13 peacekeeping missions and 25 special political missions, yet its influence wanes as Security Council vetoes—cast by Russia, China, and occasionally the United States—stymie decisive action (UN, 2025). The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2025 identifies armed conflict as the foremost threat, with 65 active conflicts globally, surpassing post-World War II highs (WEF, 2025). These conflicts are not merely traditional wars; they involve cyberattacks, drones, and non-state actors, rendering conventional remedies inadequate.

My framework in Núñez (2023) emphasizes pluralisms: diverse agents (states, communities, diasporas), roles (claimants, mediators, viewers), contexts (domestic, regional, international), realms (factual, normative, axiological), and modes of existence (ideal, cultural, metaphysical). I see the world order clinging to linear models—assuming orderly progression from dispute to resolution—while ignoring nonlinear dynamics like chaotic escalations or self-referred motives. Time (eternal vs. non-eternal claims) and space (physical vs. virtual domains) further expose the limitations of current mechanisms.

In Núñez 2023, I propose a linear dimensional model—vertical, horizontal, diagonal, and spiral—where interrelations among pluralisms are orderly and predictable (Núñez, 2023). The world order relies heavily on this logic, but I find it increasingly ineffective.

  • Vertical (Hierarchy): I observe the UN’s hierarchical structure presupposing state sovereignty and centralized authority. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent eastern incursions persist into 2025, with over 60,000 deaths since 2023 (ACLED, 2025). Russia’s veto power paralyzes the Security Council, undermining my vertical lens where a supreme authority should prevail. Similarly, in Kashmir, India’s revocation of Article 370 in 2019 and militarization—resulting in 600 deaths annually (ACLED, 2025)—defy UN resolutions, as vertical enforcement falters.
  • Horizontal (Peer Relations): I note the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, where Argentina and the UK maintain a tense stalemate. Horizontal diplomacy via the UN’s 1965 Resolution 2065 urging negotiation has yielded no progress by 2025, with Argentina’s naval exercises escalating tensions (Reuters, 2025). Equal footing is illusory when historical grievances and military disparities dominate. In the South China Sea, ASEAN’s peer-to-peer talks with China collapse as China’s militarized islands—housing 20% more troops since 2023 (CSIS, 2025)—override dialogue.
  • Diagonal (Cross-Context): I see Antarctica’s governance under the Antarctic Treaty System strained as Russia and China push resource claims, with 15% of surveyed ice zones contested by 2025 (Nature, 2025). Diagonal influences—like the US and Australia’s counter-moves—escalate rather than resolve tensions, as linear assumptions of cooperation fail.

These linear approaches assume predictable outcomes—settlement or escalation—but I find them blind to deeper complexities, as evidenced in the Israel-Palestine dispute, where UN Resolution 2334 (2016) condemning settlements is ignored, with 720,000 settlers in the West Bank by 2025 (Peace Now, 2025).

My framework also embraces nonlinear dimensions—self-referred, regressive, chaotic, and random—highlighting unconventional interrelations that the world order overlooks (Núñez, 2023).

  • Self-Referred: In the South China Sea, I observe China’s actions as self-driven, expanding claims over 80% of the region by 2025 (CSIS, 2025) not just against neighbors but to assert domestic legitimacy. The UNCLOS-based tribunal ruling (2016) is dismissed, as self-referred motives—national pride and resource control—override external norms. Similarly, Russia’s Crimea annexation reflects internal political consolidation, with 70% domestic approval sustaining it (Levada, 2025).
  • Regressive: I find Africa’s disputes, like Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict (2020-ongoing), regressing to colonial borders. By 2025, 45,000 deaths and 3 million displaced (UNHCR, 2025) reflect ethnic divides from British and Italian legacies. The African Union’s linear mediation fails as regressive loyalties to pre-state identities persist, echoing my nonlinear lens.
  • Chaotic: In Kashmir, I see chaotic dynamics as India, Pakistan, and China clash unpredictably, with 1,200 border incidents in 2025 (ACLED, 2025). Nonlinear flocking—militant groups and state forces—defies the UN’s 1948 ceasefire line, rendering linear solutions obsolete. The Israel-Palestine conflict mirrors this, with Hamas’s 2025 rocket attacks (up 25%, ACLED) and settler violence spiraling beyond control.
  • Random: Antarctica’s emerging disputes exhibit randomness, as non-claimant states like India deploy research stations with military undertones (10% troop increase, 2025, SIPRI). This defies the Treaty’s linear cooperation model, introducing unpredictable variables like climate-driven resource races.

These nonlinearities reveal why I believe current mechanisms—UN resolutions, ICJ rulings, regional talks—fail to address the root causes or anticipate outcomes.

In Núñez 2023, I argue that time and space variables are critical to understanding sovereignty and cosmopolitanism’s failures.

  • Time (Eternal vs. Non-Eternal): In Israel-Palestine, I see eternalist claims—Jewish ties to Jerusalem (Torah) and Islamic sanctity (Quran)—clashing with non-eternal UN timelines (1947 Partition Plan). By 2025, 55,000 deaths since 2023 (ACLED) reflect a metaphysical deadlock the UN’s cosmological time—fixed procedures—cannot break. Kashmir’s Hindu-Muslim divide similarly pits eternalist narratives against temporal legal fixes, stalling peace.
  • Space (Physical vs. Virtual): I observe Russia-Ukraine spanning physical (Donbas) and virtual (cyberattacks disabling 15% of Ukraine’s grid, 2025, Ukrainian Gov) spaces. The UN’s narrow focus on physical sovereignty misses cyberspace’s integral role. In the Falklands/Malvinas, Argentina’s virtual propaganda—reaching 20 million online (X data, 2025)—contrasts with the UK’s physical control, complicating linear resolutions.

These variables highlight how traditional remedies—treaties, peacekeeping—assume static time and space, failing when conflicts transcend both, as in Antarctica’s virtual resource mapping or Africa’s diaspora-driven claims.

  1. Russia-Ukraine:
    • Failure: I see the UN Security Council paralyzed by Russia’s veto, with Minsk agreements defunct by 2025. Nonlinear drone warfare (25% of attacks, ACLED) outpaces linear diplomacy.
    • Data: 250,000+ total deaths, $500 billion in damages (World Bank, 2025).
    • Why: Vertical authority (UN) and horizontal talks (EU) miss chaotic arms flows (e.g., North Korea’s supplies).
  2. Israel-Palestine:
    • Failure: I note linear partition plans (Oslo, 1993) failing against nonlinear settler growth (720,000) and eternal claims. UN resolutions lack teeth.
    • Data: 55,000 deaths, 2 million displaced (UNHCR, 2025).
    • Why: Vertical mandates ignore diaspora (6.5 million Jews globally) and metaphysical stakes.
  3. Falklands/Malvinas:
    • Failure: I observe horizontal UN talks stalled since 1965, with Argentina’s naval drills (up 30%, Reuters, 2025) defying linear cooperation.
    • Data: $2 billion annual fisheries at stake (FAO, 2025).
    • Why: Linear diplomacy overlooks regressive colonial narratives.
  4. Kashmir:
    • Failure: I find UN resolutions (1948) unenforceable as chaotic clashes (1,200 incidents) and eternalist religious claims dominate.
    • Data: 600 deaths yearly, 1 million displaced (UNHCR, 2025).
    • Why: Linear legal fixes miss nonlinear militant dynamics.
  5. Antarctica:
    • Failure: I see the Treaty System buckling as nonlinear resource claims (15% contested zones) outpace linear cooperation.
    • Data: $1 trillion potential mineral value (Nature, 2025).
    • Why: Diagonal influences (China, Russia) defy vertical governance.
  6. South China Sea:
    • Failure: I note UNCLOS rulings (2016) ignored as China’s self-referred expansion (80% control) trumps horizontal ASEAN talks.
    • Data: $3.5 trillion trade disrupted (World Bank, 2025).
    • Why: Linear norms miss chaotic militarization.
  7. Disputes in Africa (e.g., Ethiopia-Tigray):
    • Failure: I observe AU’s linear mediation failing as regressive ethnic divides fuel 45,000 deaths (UNHCR, 2025).
    • Data: 3 million displaced, 30% food insecurity (WFP, 2025).
    • Why: Vertical talks overlook chaotic tribal networks.

Drawing from Núñez 2023, I identify key reasons:

  • Unidimensionality: I argue that the UN and ICJ focus on normative (legal) or factual (political) realms, neglecting axiological (values) and metaphysical (beliefs) dimensions. Kashmir’s religious tensions exemplify this gap.
  • Linear Bias: I note procedures assume orderly progression, missing nonlinear escalations—like the South China Sea’s militarized chaos.
  • Sovereignty Trap: I see state-centric norms sidelining non-state actors (e.g., 2.5 billion in conflict zones, WEF, 2025) and virtual spaces.
  • Time-Space Blindness: I highlight eternal claims (Israel-Palestine) and integral spaces (Antarctica’s resources) defying fixed remedies.

Using my multidimensional framework, I foresee dire consequences if the world order clings to outdated tools:

  1. Escalation (Nonlinear Chaos): I predict conflicts like Russia-Ukraine or Kashmir metastasizing, with ACLED projecting a 25% violence increase by 2026 (300,000 deaths). Trade losses could hit $3 trillion (World Bank, 2025) as drones and cyberattacks proliferate.
  2. Fragmentation (Regressive): I anticipate Africa’s disputes—like Ethiopia’s—deepening colonial scars, with 60% of states at risk of failure by 2035 (World Bank, 2025). Displacement could reach 25 million (UNHCR projection) as linear mediation falters.
  3. Stagnation (Self-Referred): I foresee self-driven conflicts—South China Sea, Falklands/Malvinas—entrenching, with local actors outpacing global fixes. Urban conflict zones could triple (UN Habitat, 2025), trapping 600 million.
  4. Polarization (Time-Space Clash): I expect eternalist claims (Kashmir) and virtual wars (Ukraine) to polarize powers, with US-China tensions cutting global GDP by 4% (IMF, 2025). Refugees could hit 120 million by 2030 (UNHCR).
  5. Collapse (Systemic): I warn that unidimensional rigidity could dismantle the UN by 2040, with 50% of states forming rival blocs (WEF scenario). Nonlinear randomness (e.g., AI conflicts) could spike violence 60%, affecting 3.5 billion.

In 2025, I see a world order buckling under conflicts it cannot resolve peacefully or permanently. My multidimensional approach (Núñez, 2023) reveals how linear tools—UN resolutions, treaties—fail to grasp pluralisms’ complexity across time and space. From Israel-Palestine’s eternalist deadlock to the South China Sea’s chaotic expansion, these examples underscore the need for new ways. If humanity persists with outdated methods, I predict escalation, fragmentation, and systemic collapse. Embracing multidimensionality—acknowledging nonlinear dynamics, diverse agents, and time-space variables—offers a path to reimagine conflict resolution for a fractured world.

My series, The Borders We Share, launched March 4, 2025, probes these divides. A sample post (https://drjorge.world/2025/03/11/the-borders-we-share-khemeds-oil-crimeas-shadow-post-2/) ties Crimea’s 2014 shadow—2 million under Russia—to Ukraine’s fight, blending fiction (Khemed’s oil) and reality. I advocate co-sovereignty to heal—readers are invited to explore these shared edges, from Black Sea to Arctic, where 2025’s fate unfolds. Post so far have included cases such s Antarctica, the Amazon region and Northern Ireland.

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Thursday 04th April 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Tuesday, 1 April 2025

The Borders We Share: Atlantis Rising, Antarctic Thaw (Post 5)

 

The Borders We Share: A New Way to Fix a Broken World

Picture this: Atlantis, the fabled island of legend, surges from the ocean depths—its golden ruins sparking a frantic race among explorers to claim its sunken treasures. Now shift your gaze to Antarctica, a frozen frontier where nations jostle for dominance over ice-locked resources beneath a rapidly warming sky. One is a myth born from Plato’s ancient quill; the other, a tangible expanse of ice and ambition. In my series The Borders We Share, I’m diving into these twin tales of territorial rivalry—one imagined, one all too real—exploring how clashing claims might sink us into conflict or, with a bit of ingenuity, lift us toward cooperation. Let’s plunge into these stories and see if sharing the stakes can calm the storms they stir.

Ever since I was a kid, Plato’s Atlantis gripped me—a lost world of concentric cities swallowed by the sea, a puzzle of power and possession that’s haunted imaginations for millennia. Those submerged towers posed a question that still echoes: who owns what lies beneath? In The Borders We Share, I’m chasing that mystery, transforming tales of territorial strife into blueprints for shared success. Over the past weeks, we’ve roamed Sherwood’s outlawed woods clashing with the Amazon’s tangled roots, and followed Sherlock Holmes slicing through London’s docks and Ireland’s jagged edges. Today, we’re diving deeper—into Atlantis’ mythical waters and Antarctica’s icy plains—realms where rival claims spark both peril and possibility. Strap in; the journey’s about to get cold and wild.

Let’s start with Atlantis, a story I’m spinning anew from its public-domain roots. Imagine it’s 2025, and a seismic jolt off Santorini in the Aegean Sea thrusts a marvel into the sunlight: golden spires breaching the waves, marble corridors shimmering with salt-crusted grandeur, a drowned empire Plato sketched in 360 BCE. Two factions leap into the fray. The Triton League, a rugged band of Greek divers, claims kinship—leaked lab reports from Athens University tout a 30% genetic match to ancient bones dredged from the site, a lineage they say ties them to Atlantis’ lost people. Against them stands the Neptune Pact, a polished U.S.-UK consortium armed with cutting-edge tech—submersibles charting every crevice, drones buzzing over relics, chasing whispers of ancient alloys that could revolutionize engineering. The stakes dazzle: divers estimate $10 billion in gold dusts the seafloor, per rough tallies in maritime journals; Forbes speculates patents on rediscovered tech could double that haul. Tensions flare—nets are slashed, drones plummet into the deep, subs graze each other in midnight skirmishes. Greece invokes heritage, waving UNESCO’s banner; the Pact cites maritime salvage law, brandishing contracts and coordinates. The Aegean churns with conflict—who truly owns this resurrected realm?

Now pivot to Antarctica, a sprawling 1.4 million square miles of ice—Earth’s seventh continent, hoarding 60% of the planet’s freshwater, according to NASA’s latest figures. Seven nations—Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the UK—etched their claims between 1908 and 1939, staking flags on grounds of discovery, proximity, and colonial bravado. Argentina and Chile anchor their bids in geography—stations like Argentina’s Esperanza (founded 1952) and Chile’s Base O’Higgins dot the ice, overlapping the UK’s “Falklands sector” declared in 1908 via Letters Patent. Australia, France, New Zealand, and Norway nod to each other’s boundaries, but Argentina and Chile’s sectors collide with the UK’s, a frozen standoff detailed in Chapter 9 of my forthcoming 2025 book, Territorial Disputes in the Americas (Routledge). The 1959 Antarctic Treaty halts new claims, suspending sovereignty disputes in a diplomatic deep freeze, yet its 1991 Protocol faces review in 2048—a deadline that looms like a storm on the horizon. Heavyweights like the U.S. (with McMurdo Station’s 1,000-strong crew), Russia (drilling at Vostok), and China (five bases, including Great Wall since 1985) hover without formal claims, their sights set on oil—200 billion barrels, per a 2008 USGS estimate—natural gas, and krill harvests topping 500,000 tons annually, per CCAMLR records. Latin America’s players—Brazil’s 40-year PROANTAR program, Peru’s three-decade expeditions, Uruguay’s Artigas base, Ecuador’s Maldonado outpost—push for influence. Ice loss accelerates—10% since 2010, NOAA warns—unveiling riches that fuel a simmering race. Can this cold contest thaw without shattering?

These aren’t mere turf wars—they’re torrents of human ambition, swirling through history, law, and desire. For Atlantis, the Triton League’s divers cling to identity—a 30% genetic link, they insist, verified by Athens University’s labs, rooting their claim in a national saga spun from Plato’s Timaeus and Critias. The Neptune Pact counters with cold calculation—submersibles map a 50-mile ruin off Santorini, GPS-locked, chasing tech worth $5 billion, per Forbes’ analysts, like ancient batteries hinted at in waterlogged scrolls. Time stretches back 2,300 years to Plato’s telling; space narrows to a jagged underwater plateau. A nonlinear twist emerges—Russian subs, silent and Kremlin-backed, skirt the edges, per rumors on X, probing for their own slice of the prize.

Antarctica’s tangle runs deeper. Argentina ties its claim to its “Provincia de Tierra del Fuego,” a geopolitical thread that loops in the Falklands/Malvinas—lose one, and the other frays, Buenos Aires warns. Chile’s Decreto 1747 of 1940 carves out 53°–90°W; the UK’s 1908 Patent counters with 20°–80°W south of 50°S, a colonial echo. The Treaty’s Article IV suspends these assertions—Argentina’s Orcadas base (1904), Chile’s contiguity, the UK’s legal parchment—yet Russia’s Vostok station extracts 3,600-meter ice cores, the U.S.’s McMurdo hums with activity, and China’s bases multiply. Time spans from colonial footprints to 2048’s tipping point; space shrinks as ice shelves like Larsen C fracture (2017’s rift a stark sign), guarding 70% of Earth’s freshwater, per SCAR data. Nonlinearity creeps in—Brazil’s PROANTAR eyes krill quotas (500,000 tons yearly, CCAMLR notes), while India’s 2023 UN speech hints at a global reframe. Agents—states, scientists, corporations—pull at the seams; the ice creaks under the strain.

Zero-sum games drown us all. In Atlantis, the feud buries $10 billion in gold beneath legal quicksand—subs corrode, relics crumble in silt. Antarctica’s scramble courts chaos—200 billion barrels of oil tempt war, per USGS, while 2023’s 5,000-ton krill haul signals ecological strain, per WWF. My solution: egalitarian shared sovereignty. For Atlantis, blind negotiators—Greece’s Triton and the Pact—divide the spoils. Triton curates heritage—golden orbs and marble friezes fill museums; Neptune harvests tech—alloy formulas split 50/50, patents funding both sides; local fishers work the waters, Russia sidelined. Four principles guide it: all voices count (divers, execs), roles match strengths (Triton’s historians, Neptune’s engineers), rewards reflect input (relics showcased, tech sold), and the strong bolster the weak—Neptune seeds Triton’s digs with $1 million yearly.

Antarctica demands a council—seven claimants, plus the U.S., Russia, China, and a Latin bloc (Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador). Vertically, claimants preserve legacy—Argentina logs Orcadas’ history; powerhouses drive science—U.S. ice cores, Russia’s Lake Vostok microbes; the Latin bloc manages krill quotas. Horizontally, zones emerge: 20% each for claimants’ heritage (e.g., Norway’s Dronning Maud), 30% shared for research (joint bases), profits—$1 billion yearly from krill and tourism—uplift all. Time locks in post-2048, with 10-year reviews; space splits by longitude (e.g., 0°–60°W), shelves like Ross Sea co-stewarded. Nonlinear risks—China’s bases, oil lust—are tamed by inclusion and green tech delays (e.g., carbon capture). The payoff? Ice endures, wealth spreads—harmony trumps havoc.

Skeptics sneer: “Sovereignty doesn’t share.” For Atlantis, Greece digs in—30% DNA is their bloodline, Athens polls cry; the Pact’s $5 billion rigs roar ownership, per Wall Street. Time—2,300 years of myth—hardens pride; space—50 miles—chokes compromise. Russian subs loom, trust fractures. In Antarctica, the UK’s 1908 Patent and Argentina’s province are non-negotiable; the U.S. and Russia covet oil, not talks. The Treaty’s freeze holds ‘til 2048—why budge? China’s bases flex power; the Latin bloc falters—Peru’s budget lags, per 2023 figures. Sharing feels like a fairy tale against such ice-hard realities.

But history whispers back: Atlantis’ myth belongs to all—Plato gifted it freely; divers need rigs, rigs need roots. The Treaty rallied 12 nations in 1959, 54 now, per ATS; Latin America’s 11 states share a colonial scar and tongue—cohesion’s possible, per my 2025 analysis. Reason can melt doubt, as it did in ‘59—force it, and it sticks.

Atlantis’ gleam and Antarctica’s chill aren’t just prizes—they’re mirrors: a diver’s heir seeking origins, a researcher guarding a planet’s heartbeat. The Borders We Share bets we can rise—split the depths, not the bonds. Next week, “Narnia’s Ice, Cyprus Split: Thrones in Balance” probes frozen crowns and sundered isles. I’m Dr. Jorge—join me at https://drjorge.world or (https://x.com/DrJorge_World)—let’s surface this together.

  • Núñez, J.E. (2017). Sovereignty Conflicts (Ch. 6, 7).
  • Núñez, J.E. (2020). Territorial Disputes (Ch. 1, 6).
  • Núñez, J.E. (2023). Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (Ch. 1, 6, 7).
  • Núñez, J.E. (Forthcoming 2025). Territorial Disputes in the Americas (Ch. 9).

New posts every Tuesday.

  1. Entangled Worlds, Shared Futures: A New Border Blueprint
  2. Khemed’s Oil, Crimea’s Shadow: Splitting the Stakes
  3. Sherlock’s Docks, Ireland’s Edge: Clues to Equal Ground
    1. 3.1. Bonus
  4. Sherwood’s Green, Amazon’s Roots: Forests for All

Section 1: Foundations of the Multiverse (Posts 1–6)

6.Narnia’s Ice, Cyprus Split: Thrones in Balance

Narnian kings divide; Cyprus partition.

State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Tuesday 01st April 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Wednesday, 26 March 2025

Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Conflicts in Africa: The Situation in 2025

 

Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Conflicts in Africa: The Situation in 2025

Africa’s territorial disputes and sovereignty conflicts remain a crucible of historical legacies, legal ambiguities, political rivalries, and sociocultural tensions as of March 2025. Rooted in colonial border-drawing and exacerbated by post-independence struggles, these disputes—spanning over 100 active cases—persist as volatile clashes over land, identity, and power. My research, distilled in 25 posts from October to November 2020 (e.g., Territorial Disputes: Africa, Parts 1-25), predicted their endurance absent radical rethinking—a forecast borne out by recent escalations. Through Sovereignty Conflicts (2017), Territorial Disputes (2020), and Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023), I probe justice, complexity, and pluralism, while my forthcoming Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025) informs broader resolution proposals.

In March 2025, tensions flared anew across the continent. On March 13, posts on X reported Ethiopia and Eritrea mobilizing forces near their border, with Tigray officials warning of imminent war amid internal power struggles—a legacy of the 1998-2000 war and the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict (Africa Part 8). Reuters noted Sudan’s ongoing civil war, with over 10 million displaced since 2023, as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) vie for Khartoum (Africa Part 15). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, seized Goma in January 2025 (ACLED), displacing thousands and reigniting the Rwanda-DRC proxy war (Africa Part 12). Meanwhile, the Sahel’s jihadist expansion—Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—saw fatalities in Niger surge 60% in 2024 (Africa Center), threatening Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s sovereignty (Africa Part 19).

My 2020 posts (Parts 1-5) traced Africa’s disputes to colonial partitions—e.g., the 1884 Berlin Conference—imposing arbitrary borders that ignored ethnic realities. Part 6 foresaw escalation without equitable resource division, now evident in Sudan’s 10 million displaced and DRC’s 2025 Goma crisis. Parts 10-15 critiqued international inertia, mirrored today in stalled UN-AU mediation efforts.

Africa’s sovereignty conflicts stem from a colonial past that carved 54 states from diverse ethnic tapestries (Africa Part 2). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 upheld these borders to avert chaos, yet this froze tensions—e.g., Somalia-Somaliland’s unresolved split (Africa Part 14). The 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea war, sparked by the Badme dispute, killed 70,000 over a barren strip, reflecting colonial cartography’s enduring scars (Africa Part 8). In Western Sahara, Morocco’s 1975 annexation defied Spain’s exit, leaving the Polisario Front’s independence bid unresolved (Africa Part 11). Parts 1-5 argued these historical fault lines—Ottoman, British, French legacies—set precedents for today’s violence.

Legally, the UN Charter and AU Constitutive Act affirm territorial integrity, yet enforcement falters. The 2000 Algiers Agreement ending Ethiopia-Eritrea’s war awarded Badme to Eritrea, but Ethiopia’s non-compliance persists (Africa Part 9). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on Nigeria-Cameroon’s Bakassi Peninsula in 2002, yet local resistance lingers (Africa Part 13). In Sudan, neither SAF nor RSF faces ICC accountability for 2023-2025 atrocities, despite Geneva Convention breaches (Africa Part 20). Parts 16-20 argued legal frameworks collapse without enforcement—Ethiopia’s border defiance and Sudan’s impunity prove this.

Politically, domestic fragility fuels disputes. Sudan’s 2023 coup dissolved a transitional government, splitting power between SAF and RSF (Africa Part 15). DRC’s weak state enables M23’s resurgence, with Rwanda’s backing reflecting regional power plays (Africa Part 12). The Sahel’s juntas— Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger—exit from ECOWAS in January 2025 (FRS) signals sovereignty assertions against regional norms (Africa Part 19). Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) frames this as distributive injustice—land and rights skew toward stronger actors—while Territorial Disputes (2020) notes empirical deadlock (10 million displaced in Sudan) and value clashes (security vs. self-determination).

Sociologically, Africa’s 3,000+ ethnic groups clash over land tied to identity (Africa Part 3). The Bawku chieftaincy dispute in Ghana, pitting Mamprusi against Kusasi, escalated in 2024, spilling into North East region (ACLED) (Africa Part 17). In Nigeria’s Niger Delta, oil wealth stokes Ijaw-Itsekiri tensions, predating but intensified by extraction (Africa Part 22). Culturally, pastoralist-farmer conflicts—e.g., Fulani vs. Anti-balaka in Central African Republic (CAR)—blend livelihood disputes with ethnic divides (Africa Part 18). Parts 6-9 warned of narrative wars—2025’s “ethnic cleansing” claims in DRC lack evidence but inflame tensions.

Religiously, disputes intertwine with faith. Somalia’s Al-Shabaab insurgency leverages Islam to challenge Mogadishu’s sovereignty (Africa Part 14), while CAR’s Christian-Muslim clashes reflect colonial-era divides (Africa Part 18). Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023) sees this as a multi-agent tangle—state, rebels, faiths—distorting truth.

Domestically, weak governance breeds conflict. Sudan’s 48% internally displaced population (Africa Center) reflects state failure (Africa Part 15). Regionally, the Horn of Africa’s Ethiopia-Eritrea-Somalia triangle destabilizes borders, with Eritrea’s March 2025 mobilization echoing 1998 (Africa Part 8). The Great Lakes’ DRC-Rwanda rift, with Angola’s failed December 2024 mediation (ACLED), shows regional peace’s limits (Africa Part 12). Internationally, foreign powers exploit vacuums—Russia and UAE back Sudan’s RSF, while China eyes DRC minerals (Africa Center) (Africa Part 23). Parts 10-15 flagged UN-AU weakness—2025’s vetoed Sudan resolutions (UN) affirm this.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) records 39,787 deaths in Sudan by July 2024, civilians outnumbering fighters (Africa Part 21). In DRC, M23’s January 2025 Goma takeover followed 2024’s 25% violence spike (ACLED). The UN’s March 13, 2025, Sudan report alleges “genocidal acts” but lacks raw data, risking bias (Africa Part 24). Parts 21-25 predicted civilian tolls from advanced warfare—Sahel’s 11,000 deaths in 2024 (Africa Center) bear this out.

The UN-AU partnership, vital per October 2024 Security Council briefings, falters. Sudan’s crisis—world’s largest displacement—sees no ceasefire (Africa Part 15). DRC’s July 2024 ceasefire collapsed by December (ACLED), with Rwanda rejecting Kinshasa talks (Africa Part 12). The AU’s Mediation Support Unit (2016) and ECOWAS’s decline (FRS) underscore institutional limits (Africa Part 23). Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) decries this—10 million displaced in Sudan—while Territorial Disputes (2020) notes vetoes paralyze action.

Parts 6-9 warned of narrative wars—2025 amplifies this. Al-Shabaab claims Somali sovereignty threats, yet offers no proof (Africa Part 14). DRC’s M23 asserts precision, but civilian deaths surge (ACLED). Territorial Disputes (2020) demands rigor—evidence ties tolls to military aims, not proven targeting, despite UN claims.

Africa’s disputes expose global order’s collapse—centralized bodies fail, as Parts 23-25 predicted. Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023) urges multi-agent solutions; Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025) refines this: regional bodies over a paralyzed UN. The Arab League’s 2002 model could inspire—ECOWAS or SADC mediating Sudan’s split, or IGAD brokering Ethiopia-Eritrea peace with Djibouti as guarantor (Africa Part 25). Co-sovereignty—shared Nile waters or Congo Basin zones—could balance security and survival (Sovereignty Conflicts, 2017). This demands mindset shifts—Sahel juntas resist (FRS), and militias rigidify lines.

Africa’s territorial disputes in 2025—Sudan’s 10 million displaced, DRC’s Goma fall, Ethiopia-Eritrea’s brinkmanship—mirror my 2020 research: justice skews (Sahel’s 11,000 dead), complexity entrenches (DRC’s proxy war), and pluralism fractures (UN-AU rifts). Parts 1-5 rooted this historically, 6-15 exposed legal-political rot, 16-25 urged new lenses. Evidence ties civilian tolls to military aims (ACLED), yet manipulation clouds truth (UN data gaps). The current order fails—Sovereignty Conflicts demands equity, Territorial Disputes adaptability, Cosmopolitanism multi-agent hope. Regional guarantors and co-sovereignty offer paths, if rigid mindsets yield. My posts (below), free online, trace this fault line; readers can join this reimagining.

Invitation to “The Borders We Share”

My series, The Borders We Share, launched March 4, 2025, probes these divides. A sample post (https://drjorge.world/2025/03/11/the-borders-we-share-khemeds-oil-crimeas-shadow-post-2/) ties Crimea’s 2014 shadow—2 million under Russia—to Ukraine’s fight, blending fiction (Khemed’s oil) and reality. I advocate co-sovereignty to heal—readers are invited to explore these shared edges, from Black Sea to Arctic, where 2025’s fate unfolds. Next week, Post #3: Sherlock’s Docks, Ireland’s Edge: Clues to Equal Ground (i.e. Imagine Sherlock Holmes untangling a dockside brawl over fish and fog—then picture Northern Ireland’s border after Brexit, a real-life riddle of fences and feelings).


State Sovereignty: Concept and Conceptions (OPEN ACCESS) (IJSL 2024)

AMAZON

ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Wednesday 26th March 2025

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

X (formerly, Twitter): https://x.com/DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world