Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 26) [Post 186]

 

Natural resources and the Persian Gulf

The previous post introduced the way in which natural resources may be distributed, and the fact that there are other elements for consideration (for example, exploration and exploitation). How can this work here?

In the case of the Persian Gulf, the many parties (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates) could be co-owners of the natural resources located in the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone.

Undoubtedly, there are several differences amongst Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates. Therein, some of these differences show how the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY could work.

The first difference is given by the fact the inhabitants possess the total of natural resources at stake (100%). By applying the egalitarian shared sovereignty, each party receives the rights to the same ideal portion (an equal percentage of the ownership of natural resources, minus original ownership of the inhabitants of the islands in question). 

It would be either over simplistic or naïve to imagine Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates be able to explore and exploit to the same level their shares of natural resources (second difference). However, each of them individually have some elements that put them in a better position in relation to the rest, for example local work force, geographical proximity (third difference).

With all these differences in mind, the party most developed technically and economically could explore and exploit natural resources (as they are in the best position to do it), and both the inhabitants adjacent to areas rich in natural resources could offer the work force for the joint venture and grant privileges in terms of location to companies that take the exploration and exploitation. Thus, less advantaged parties in terms of means for exploration and exploitation could also offer the most advantaged party certain exclusive rights in the sea-zone that overlaps with their jurisdictions.

Continuous assistance from, for example, Saudi Arabia or Iran, to other parties might become a permanent feature (it may lead to domination or an unbalanced relationship).  To avoid this, in the example, Saudi Arabia or Iran, respectively, would have to help the others in developing their means of exploration and exploitation to relatively the same level they have.

At the beginning of the agreement Saudi Arabia or Iran would be contributing more towards the exploration and exploitation and hence have a larger return. However, these uneven distributions of burdens and benefits amongst the parties would only be in the short term. Natural resources and all that they imply in terms of rights and obligations are part of a wider agreement that has a target: the Persian Gulf.

Finally, the way in which each party redistributes the benefits of this shared model within each population is entirely a matter of national or local distribution and hence may have various forms. That is to say, the egalitarian shared sovereignty gives the basic structure of the solution; the details are subject to actual rather than hypothetical negotiation. As an example, the resultant revenues of some or all the joint activities could be destined to a distribution fund benefiting all the inhabitants.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

Natural resources and the Persian Gulf and the historical account

Monday 25th January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 25) [Post 185]

 

The Persian Gulf, natural resources and the egalitarian shared sovereignty

Yesterday, the post introduced the issue of natural resources and their distribution (ownership, exploration, exploitation, gains and losses) in the context of a particular region with several TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: the Persian Gulf.

The differences in relation to natural resources imply several different aspects (for example, means for the exploration and exploitation, geographical location, relevant knowledge, etc.). It is for that reason that the shares will be represented as bundles of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. However, in terms of property rights, all the parties will have the co-ownership of the natural resources (minus the ones originally owned by the inhabitants), and this will involve both rights and obligations.

A combination of elements may fit in the aim of the egalitarian shared sovereignty if and only if the combined elements or resources that an agent may exploit could not be exploited to the same efficient extent in any other way (for example, joint ventures).

Two points must be made clear: because the model aims to safeguard the interests of all the parties, the different combinations of natural resources in the bundle is in terms of their exploration and exploitation—not their ownership or the distribution of consequent benefits; and as this requirement is defined by bundles, each bundle may be constituted of diverse elements that taken together offer the same outcome: an efficient exploitation. Therefore, this implies a solution by means of an efficient model with safeguards for all the participants.

The egalitarian shared sovereignty has a twofold application in terms of natural resources. First, the most efficient combination of exploration and exploitation of natural resources bearing in mind the differences amongst the parties. Second, any party better off in relation to a given difference will make sure the other parties are able to exploit their respective share of natural resources to the same extent—when possible—or compensate the inequality. 

Consequently, even if variations appeared in the future in terms of either natural resources—e.g. drought, scarcity, lack of trading value—or the level of development or wealth of any of the agents, their ownership rights would still be the same for all of them as well as their rights and obligations in terms of exploitation and the way benefits were allocated.

Next time how all this could work with the Persian Gulf and all the claiming parties.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

Natural resources and the Persian Gulf

Friday 22nd January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 24) [Post 184]

 

The Persian Gulf and the distribution of natural resources

Today’s post is about natural resources and the Persian Gulf. It is one of the most controversial elements in any TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. It is usually the case the real reasons behind these TERRITORIAL DISPUTES is different (domestically, for example, level of popularity of ruling party, corruption, unemployment, security, etc.; regionally and internationally, geostrategic location, bargaining power, debt, etc.). 

Often, natural resources are used to justify ongoing disputes (or to create new ones). Furthermore, whilst many of the TERRITORIAL DISPUTES have to do with local and regional interests to start and to remain unresolved, most of them are beneficial to external powers (as we have seen with the previous posts, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China are amongst these).

Questions in terms of the distribution of natural resources

• What are natural resources and who owns them? 
• What do we do with the natural resources in the Persian Gulf? 
• What happens in the zone in which jurisdictions and interests overlap? 

Any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the inhabitants of those areas that are populated or where migration is high. Let us remember there are several claiming parties and different realities in terms of law, politics, economy, religion, etc.: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates.

To recapitulate, natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. 

Some states are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a state. But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

There are two key connected issues with natural resources. 

First and more evident, who owns them. 

But, even if Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates agreed to distribute natural resources, other highly controversial issues remain. This is not only a matter of distribution because the resources have to be explored, exploited, or piped, and someone has to do the work, and someone, whether a private individual or the state, has to own the means for their exploration and exploitation.

The EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY may rule out extreme situations:

• ownership, public or private, should be totally in the hands of the territory where the mines, etc., are situated, without regard to the needs of the sovereign states; or 
• it should be totally in the hands of the one of the sovereign states; or
• existing ownership should automatically continue; or 
• everything should be left to the market. 

In brief, in order to acknowledge the controversial features that natural resources present and still apply the egalitarian shared sovereignty solution and hence distribute them, the following points have to be addressed: 

a) just distribution as the aimed outcome; 

b) the ownership system of natural resources; 

c) the exploitation system; 

d) the gains and losses of the involved agents; 

e) the needs and capabilities of all parties.

Tomorrow, some key issues to take into consideration before we assess how all this could work with the Persian Gulf and all the claiming parties.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf, natural resources and the egalitarian shared sovereignty

Thursday 21st January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 23) [Post 183]

 

The Persian Gulf and the Military Balance

The latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centered the attention on the Persian Gulf. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to this particular issue.

Today’s post will cover defense:

What would happen if another party with no part in the original conflicts decided to invade or exploit natural resources in the Persian Gulf? 

In the hypothetical scenario that an alien party to the area decided to invade the region or exploit natural resources, who would defend them? The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows: 

a) the neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the new agent would take over the islands, exploit natural resources in land and the continental shelf; 

b) one of the sovereign states may respond to the invasion and defend the area; 

c) some or all the neighbors may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently area.

At the same time, states have the right and are obliged to defend their own interests and their population. Consequently, any act of defense is fair and just as long as it is a result of an illegitimate threat or attack. However, in a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, it seems difficult to determine the one who could/should be defending the territory in the event of an attack on what appears to be a common interest for all the involved parties: the areas under dispute.

In addition to the way in which the parties would defend the area,  there are two other crucial elements that need to be agreed, even if joint defense was the case: 

a) the extent to which the burden can be made proportionate, with those with more of the appropriate resources taking the larger share (if they can be trusted not to turn their forces against the other two parties); 

b) and the extent to which one considers what combination of contributions will be the most efficient, using, e.g., both the local knowledge of the people in the territory, and the equipment best adapted to defending it. 

Indeed, if they take on sovereignty, they must take on the obligation to defend. However, how would Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates share the defense?

The egalitarian shared sovereignty addresses the three elements that seem to be crucial in order to have shared defense: 

a) Resources; 

b) Training and opportunities; 

c) Safety of all the parties (how to avoid misuse of power). 

What does it mean if the agents have different level of development? The differences in the case of defense are numerous—e.g. geostrategic location; economic resources; level of military development; training and facilities; number of troops; etc. A combination of contributions can make these differences work together in an efficient form.

The Persian Gulf presents a case with very different levels of defense power and development in terms of their respective defense systems (input-to-output ratio principle). Then, the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be fulfilled in two ways: 

a) following the most efficient combination in terms of contribution (principle of efficiency)—e.g. using both the local knowledge of the people in the area, the geostrategic location, and the equipment, resources and any means best adapted to defending it; 

b) the agent with the better comparative situation—in whatever aspect—may contribute in developing the other parties or granting them exclusive privileges (equilibrium proviso).

It is clear that the egalitarian shared sovereignty aims only to achieve the same level of opportunity and development for all the involved parties so they are able to defend the area (not the territory that is already part of the sovereign states). 

Thus, even if there were variations in the future in terms of wealth status and defense development among the involved participants, the reciprocal obligation would always be the same for all the agents, i.e. to combine to produce the most efficient result.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf and the distribution of natural resources

Wednesday 20th January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 22) [Post 182]

 

The Persian Gulf and Territorial Disputes: borders, defense and natural resources 

We re-introduced the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY yesterday. Today we will present some key elements related to the Persian Gulf.

From our previous posts, we have learnt so far that some of the main concerns related to the Persian Gulf are:

Borders

This could be a matter of controversy. In the particular case of territorial sea, although it may seem that borders are not an issue—as the difference has to do with several islands—the exclusive economic zone often creates tension between many of the claiming parties. 

For instance, who has the right to explore that exclusive sea-zone? What happens in the zone in which two or more claiming parties overlap? As this point is intrinsically linked to natural resources, it will be examined after introducing the latter.

Defense

National defense will be seen here as the protection of any interest a state has—e.g. possessions, territory, and population—through different means—e.g. military, economic, and diplomatic. 

There are several states in which the army and navy are not big, well equipped or trained enough in order to defend their territory or population but they are still respected as states. There are others that in fact do not have military defense at all, their defense being the responsibility of another country or an international organization—e.g. OTAN.

There seems to be no problem with defense. The territory being defended is obviously desirable although the task is one which can be shared. However, what would happen if another party—i.e. a sovereign state with no part in the conflict—decided to invade the third territory? In the hypothetical scenario an external party to the region decided to invade the Persian Gulf, who would defend the area? 

The ways in which the situation may develop are as follows:

a) The regional neighbor countries may remain neutral; consequently, the external agent would take over the area if the inhabitants were unable to defend themselves (or in the case of uninhabited islands or the sea);

b) one of the sovereign states may respond to the invasion and defend the third territory;

c) all sovereign states may respond to the invasion and defend jointly or independently the area.

Natural resources

Natural resources are any material in raw condition present in the territory, organic or mineral, that is not initially a product of any kind of human activity. Some states are rich in natural resources, others are not: no particular amount of natural resources defines a state. 

But, the distribution of natural resources is usually one of the main problems when dealing with sovereignty disputes even though the involved sovereign States may already be wealthy ones; it is a feature that always presents controversy.

In the case of the Persian Gulf and oil, any decision over this point has particular importance since it could affect the future the legal and political balance in the region.

Next time both are combined (the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and the elements detailed before) to offer a potential ideal solution.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf and the Military Balance

Tuesday 19th January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 21) [Post 181]

 

The Persian Gulf and Territorial Disputes: Solutions

The Persian Gulf presents several TERRITORIAL DISPUTES in which several international agents claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same area. Regionally, with a direct or indirect implication, we have Saudi Arabia, Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq. 

In addition to the regional claimants, there are many other international actors. The previous posts introduced the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China. 

The solution seems to require a mutually exclusive relation amongst them because it is assumed that the sovereignty over the disputes territories can be granted to only one of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept (that is to say, exclusive, and not shareable).

Post 7: Territorial disputes: sovereignty

Link to the complete document

Post 8: Territorial disputes: sovereignty (cont.)

Link to the complete document

The Persian Gulf is a clear example of a zero sum game, with many negative outcomes of different sorts (e.g. inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension in international relations, and threat to local, regional and international peace). 

Thus, while these conflicts are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional and—even—the international level (e.g. effects on international price of oil, war). There are many issues at stake domestically and internationally.

Post 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake

Link to the complete document

Time to solve the disputes in the Persian Gulf. Territory, in principle, can be defined as an area owned and possessed by the population (in land, water, space and, perhaps, cyberspace). Like population, it may have features that could cause controversy in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The next posts will review some of the features that constitute territory using the Persian Gulf conflicts as examples. Next time we center the attention on borders, natural resources and defense.

Let us remember the way in why this series propose to deal with TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. The allocation of sovereignty will be given by: 

a) equal right to participate (egalitarian consensus principle); 

b) the nature and degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency); 

c) each party receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party cooperates with (input-to-output ratio principle); and 

d) provided the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium proviso). 

I call this way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts or disputes the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY.

Many questions are to be expected. Amongst them: 

How is that translated into geographical borders amongst the many claimants? 

What about the exploration and exploitation of natural resources? 

Finally, in the hypothetical scenario that a party alien to the original dispute decided conduct activities (for example, exploitation of natural resources, invasion), who should defend the disputed area?

The next posts on this blog series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES will cover these questions.

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: 

The Persian Gulf and Territorial Disputes: borders, defense and natural resources 

Monday 18th January 2021
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Juris North Roundtables 2021: Kelsen (starting April 2021)

 

Wednesday 13th January 2021

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

 

Juris North monthly discussions (January-April 2021)

Week 1. Wednesday 27th January 2021, at 3pm, Changing Paradigm in India’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy: Reflection of Socio-Economic Jurisprudence in Covid era, Dr Priti Ramani Nayyar, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi, India.

 

Week 2. Wednesday 24th February 2021, at 3pm, Climate Change Ethics for an Endangered World [Book Launch], Dr Thom Brooks, Professor, Dean & Chair in Law and Government, Durham Law School, United Kingdom.

 

Week 3. Wednesday 24th March 2021, at 3pm, The Unwritten Brazilian Constitution: Human Rights in the Supremo Tribunal Federal [Book Launch], Dr Rubens Becak and Dr Jairo Lima, University of Sao Paulo and State University of Northern Parana, respectively, Brazil.

 

Week 4. Wednesday TBA April 2021, at TBC, Title TBC, Dr Bruce Ackerman, Professor, Yale University, United States.

 

Eventbrite link to book your free tickets:

https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/juris-north-legal-and-political-philosophy-discussion-group-tickets-136397629983

Wednesday 13th January 2021

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

Advanced Academic Legal Research [video]

 

How to do academic socio-legal research. Writing an academic research proposal. Dr Jorge E. Nunez https://drjorge.world

Monday 11th January 2021