Territorial disputes: State and its elements. Population [Post 3]

We started this series of posts by defining territorial disputes. In relation to this point, Merrills tells us that a “dispute may be defined as a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law or policy in which the claim or assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or denial by another.”

Merrills, J.G. 2017. International Dispute Settlement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

This series of posts is centred on one particular kind of international disagreement: territorial disputes.

Post 1: Territorial disputes

 
We have already seen that territorial disputes have to do with two key concepts: STATE and SOVEREIGNTY.
We preliminary defined State as a group of people (population) that live in a certain territory and have in common a government and a system of norms (law).

Post 2: Territorial Disputes, State and Sovereignty

Although population, territory, government and law are the essential components in order to have a State, there are others elements (or sub-elements) that give it flesh: currency, market, defence, language, religion, etc.

For clarity in the exposition, we shall divide the analysis into the main four requirements and start from them:

a) population: the people that are the nation, the subjective element of the State. If we wanted to reduce the issue to its normative existence, we could say that the population of a State is determined by its law (for example, national citizen and foreigners).

As the intention as this point is to deconstruct the concept, we shall follow another approach by revising what characteristics may/may not be necessary in order to develop a group of people into a nation.

Is it necessary for a nation to have people from the same ethnic origin, professing the same religion or speaking the same language? We shall see these points separately:

• Language:

We do not think that having only one language is an indispensable requisite for a group of people to be a nation (hence, a State).

There are several cases in which although the State has one official language, its inhabitants speak others (Argentina’s official language is Spanish but the Welsh community in the Patagonia learns both, Spanish and Welsh at school).

Moreover, there are several States around the globe with more than one official language (South Africa, Montenegro, Israel, India, Perú, United Kingdom, to name a few).

 

• Ethnicity:

An ethnic group can be defined as that in which its members identify themselves with each other through a common background or heritage (real or assumed) that may consist in the language, culture, religion, race, etc. As we are considering religion and language separately, we shall focus on culture and race when dealing with ethnicity here.

Is to be black or white a requisite to be part of a community? Is it an African or Asian background necessary? Once again, there are several examples that have a direct answer to the question. In nowadays world, we observe most (if not all) States in which their population is conformed by individuals from various races and many different cultural backgrounds. Our vocabulary has even a word for such a phenomenon: cosmopolitan. The perfect example of a cosmopolitan society is the United Kingdom. Another one that reflects a harmonious merge between civilizations is Mexico. It appears that a common ethnicity is not fundamental so to constitute a nation.

• Religion:

There are States with official religions such as Argentina, Monaco, Vatican City (Roman Catholic), Iceland, Denmark (Lutheran), United Kingdom (Anglican), etc.

Nevertheless, there are several that are considered secular States; in other words, without any official State religion: Bolivia, France, United States, etc.

Moreover, those States that do have an official religion usually recognize in their Constitutions freedom of religion so although they do have an official one, their inhabitants are able to profess the religion of their choice.

As we have seen, the individuals that integrate the population of a certain State may have (and in most cases they do have) diverse beliefs, ethnic background, languages, etc. but they still can perfectly be considered as an integrated group of people able to be a nation and therefore, constitute a State.

 

Jorge Emilio Nunez

Twitter: @London1701
 

28th February 2018

Territorial disputes: key concepts "sovereignty" and "state" [Post 2]

Last time we introduced briefly "territorial disputes."

Territorial disputes: Introduction [Post 1]

In order to better understand what a territorial dispute is we have to be familiar with basic vocabulary used in law, politics and international relations. Two key words must be introduced: STATE and SOVEREIGNTY. That is because in all territorial disputes we will have at least one STATE claiming exclusive SOVEREIGNTY over a territory.

 

International public law offers a definition in article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of Rights and Duties of states (1933) that declares: “The [S]tate as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”

In tune with this definition the Oxford Dictionary of Law says that “[t]o qualify as a state the entity must have: (1) a permanent population […]; (2) a defined territory […]; (3) an effective government.”

Martin, Elizabeth A. and Law, Jonathan, ed. 2006. A Dictionary of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

That means that a STATE has in principle three key elements:

• TERRITORY

• POPULATION

• GOVERNMENT (and LAW)

 

In very simple terms, that means that in principle: territories without people cannot be a state. People without territory cannot be a state (e.g. Tibetans). A group of people living in a territory without a government (independent from any other source of law) cannot be a state (e.g. Catalonia).

These three elements (territory, population and government) require one specific characteristic to be considered a fully fleshed state. What is that characteristic? It is SOVEREIGNTY.

There are many definitions of SOVEREIGNTY. A current and comprehensive definition of SOVEREIGNTY SAYS:

“[Sovereignty is] a Supreme authority in a [S]tate. In any [S]tate sovereignty is vested in the institution, person, or body having the ultimate authority to impose law on everyone else in the [S]tate and the power to alter any pre-existing law. […] In international law, it is an essential aspect of sovereignty that all [S]tates should have supreme control over their internal affairs […]”

Martin, Elizabeth A. and Law, Jonathan, ed. 2006. A Dictionary of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Putting these two concepts together: STATE and SOVEREIGNTY we have that a SOVEREIGN STATE is a group of people (POPULATION) who lives in a piece of land (TERRITORY) and has a common government EXCLUSIVELY able to create the highest law for them in that land.

We have a territorial dispute when more than one government (or group of people) aims to EXCLUSIVELY have sovereignty over the same territory.

 Jorge Emilio Nunez
 
Twitter: @London1701

26th February 2018

Territorial disputes: introduction [Post 1]

A dispute is a disagreement. A territorial dispute, in simple terms, is a disagreement about “who owns a territory.” In international relations, this means in principle there is a disagreement between at least two parties in relation to whom the sovereign is over a piece of land.

We regularly see on the news examples of territorial disputes. The most notorious are Jerusalem, Kashmir, Gibraltar, Catalonia, Falkland/Malvinas islands. Yet, there are many (many) more. The link below (Wikipedia) shows a list of 100+ current international territorial disputes.

 

List of territorial disputes
 

For a more evident illustration, the two images below highlight the countries that are part of current international territorial disputes worldwide.

 

 

 

Image from “HuffPost” [LINK] accessed 22/02/2018. This page includes a very brief account of a few territorial disputes.

 

Image from “Brilliant Maps” [LINK] accessed 22/02/2018. This page includes references to many territorial disputes.

 

The usual reasons most governments use to support these territorial disputes have to do with human rights. In reality, most of these disputes are centred on natural resources. Some of them are centred on religious, cultural and/or ethnic elements. The following posts will address territorial disputes individually and their respective reasons in each case for more detail.

In order to better understand what a territorial dispute is we have to be familiar with basic vocabulary used in law, politics and international relations. Two key words must be introduced: STATE and SOVEREIGNTY. That is because in all territorial disputes we will have at least one STATE claiming exclusive SOVEREIGNTY over a territory.

NEXT POST: State, sovereignty and territory

Jorge Emilio Nunez
 

Twitter: @London1701

23^rd February 2018

 

BOOK REVIEW: “Reclaiming the State." Mitchell & Fazi (2017) Pluto Press

“Reclaiming the State. A progressive Vision of Sovereignty for a Post-Neoliberal World.” William Mitchell and Thomas Fazi (2017) Pluto Press.

BOOK REVIEW

The book starts with an interesting INTRODUCTION title: “Make the left great again.” I immediately had to ask myself, “why the left?” In any case, the first sentences already mention Trump in the United States, Matteo Renzi in Italy and the European Union “unprecedented crisis of legitimation” (all p. 1) as “rejections of the (neo) liberal order that has dominated the world – an in particular the West – for the past 30 years.”

The authors claim “[t]he reasons for this backlash are rather obvious.” From the financial crisis of 2007-9 to the post-crisis policies of fiscal austerity and wage deflation, they explain the “decline of the left” in terms of both “the electoral decline” and “the decline of core left values.” (p. 2)

Quoting Gerbaudo the authors think that sovereignty is a master-frame of contemporary policies “given neoliberalism’s war against sovereignty.” (p. 3) They add that national sovereignty was the centre of Trump and Brexit campaigns. (p. 3) They follow this idea by saying that the problem “is not national sovereignty as such, but the fact that the concept in recent years has been largely monopolised by the right and the extreme right […] through its xenophobic and identitarian agenda.” (p. 4)

The authors pose questions: “why has the left not been able to offer working classes and increasingly proletarianised middle classes a credible alternative to neoliberalism and to neoliberal globalisation?” and “why has not been able to develop a progressive view of national sovereignty?” (p. 4) According to them, and following Streeck, “a progressive vision of national sovereignty should aim to reconstruct and redefine the national state as a place where citizens can seek refuge ‘in democratic protection, popular rule, local autonomy, collective goods and egalitarian traditions.” (p. 13)

Part I goes from Keynes to neoliberalism, touching upon the Great Depression, austerity, Hitler, World Word II, the welfare state,  Bretton Woods, the dollar instead of gold, the UK’s embrace of monetarism, Friedman. In the end, globalisation has resulted in the state increasingly powerless against the “forces of the market" and countries have no other choice than to abandon national economic strategies. (p. 74) As a result, by “mid-1990s, no less than 57 developing countries had become poorer in per capita income than 15 years earlier – and in some cases than 25 years earlier.” (p. 103)

Part II starts with the promising heading “Towards a progressive vision of sovereignty.” (p. 161) It fails to deliver. Or if there is a new vision, it is a very burry one.

The monograph is interesting in what has to do with the historical account of the financial and monetary system in some countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and part of Europe. However, the way in which some others are addressed (notably Asia, Africa and Latin America) is extremely shallow.

Although “State” and “Sovereignty” are terms that appear in the title and subtitle, respectively, the book does not address any of these expressions from a jurisprudential, conceptual, or even substantial point of view. It is a criticism of financial and monetary theories and policies applied by some parties in some countries at some points in history.

Whether the authors’ critical views may be applied by analogy to other policies, theories, disciplines, countries or times in history is up to the reader to decide.

JUEGO SOBERANO: COMO SOLUCIONAR CONFLICTOS DE SOBERANÍA (PARTE 21 DE 21)

Al aplicar estrictamente la igualdad, todos los agentes recibirían los mismos beneficios y contribuirían por igual a las cargas. ¿Cómo cumpliría Borduria su deber de defender a Khemed? ¿Cómo se defenderían los Khemedianos? Lo mismo podría decirse sobre los recursos naturales porque, aunque los Khemedianos, los Syldavianos y los Bordurianos recibirían la misma participación en términos de propiedad, los Khemedianos y los Bordurianos no tendrían los medios para explotarlos. Se pueden presentar otros varios ejemplos, pero el punto es claro. No es razonable ni justo esperar que tres partes con diferentes situaciones comparativas en muchas áreas diferentes contribuyan de la misma manera o reciban un retorno igual.

Sin embargo, aplicar el principio de diferencia en la misma forma puede tener consecuencias similares. Syldavia es la menos favorecida en términos de recursos naturales, por lo que recibirán una mayor participación. Khemed está menos favorecido que Syldavia en términos de defensa, por lo que este último proporcionará los medios para defender el tercer territorio. Pero Borduria es la menos favorecida en términos de riqueza, los recursos naturales en su territorio no forman parte del acuerdo, por lo que no están en discusión, y no tienen ningún medio para defender a Khemed (los Bordurianos ni siquiera pueden defenderse). ¿Tendría Borduria que recibir una mayor parte de los beneficios resultantes de la explotación de los recursos naturales en Khemed con los medios proporcionados por Syldavia? De hecho, esto parece inaceptable.

 

Para recapitular, hay dos Estados soberanos Syldavia y Borduria que reclaman la soberanía sobre Khemed, un tercer territorio insular poblado. Las tres poblaciones a través de sus representantes acordaron compartir la soberanía sobre Khemed. Ellos entienden que están lidiando con muchos problemas, y estos muchos problemas implican tanto beneficios como cargas. Entonces, pedirles a todos que contribuyan por igual y que reciban un retorno igual no es la solución. Tampoco es mejor para una actividad dada contribuir más y los menos favorecidos en cualquier otra actividad reciban un beneficio mayor. Pueden conducir a la dominación o a la asistencia continua. También saben que mantendrán el acuerdo bajo los tres pre-requisitos, mantienen la no interferencia recíproca y se consideran recíprocamente iguales. Además de esto, saben que es un acuerdo específico que solamnte se refiere al tercer territorio; es decir, este no es un acuerdo basado en razones humanitarias, justicia doméstica o global.

Por lo tanto, los representantes de Khemed, Syldavia y Borduria han decidido:
Khemedianos, Syldavianos y Bordurianos tienen el mismo derecho a participar en todos los aspectos de la soberanía sobre Khemed. Es decir, todos tienen la oportunidad de presentar y enmendar propuestas en relación con cada aspecto de la soberanía sobre Khemed (principio de consenso igualitario). Khemed comparte en porciones iguales los recursos naturales con Syldavianos y Bordurianos. Syldavia comparte en partes iguales los medios para su explotación con Khemed y Borduria. Y Borduria, debido a su ubicación geográfica, otorgará privilegios especiales para las empresas de Khemedi y Syldavia solamente relacionadas con la explotación de recursos naturales en Khemed.

De hecho, Khemed o Borduria pueden tener problemas para explotar con el mismo nivel de eficiencia que Syldavia sus recursos naturales. Por lo tanto, Syldavia debe asegurarse de que los otros agentes alcancen el mismo nivel de explotación o dividan los beneficios resultantes entre las tres partes por igual mientras tanto; es decir, es un modelo compartido dirigido.

 

El principio se puede ver en una imagen más amplia en general con diferentes actividades. Al principio, cuanto más pequeña y grande sea la contribución, menor y mayor será el rendimiento, respectivamente. Pero como el acuerdo apunta a evitar la dominación (no interferencia segura) y tiene un objetivo, es de esperar una relación de contribución-retorno más equilibrada entre las partes que surgirá a largo plazo. Es decir en el ejemplo, al principio Khemed sería defendido por Syldavia, y este último también contribuiría a la explotación de los recursos naturales en la isla (principio de eficiencia). En principio, los Syldavianos recibirían una mayor parte de los beneficios resultantes.

Pero, debido al acuerdo específico, Syldavia debe asegurarse de que tanto Khemed como Borduria alcancen relativamente el mismo nivel para la defensa del tercer territorio y la explotación de los recursos naturales (condición de equilibrio). Es entonces cuando las contribuciones entre los tres serán más parecidas, así como los rendimientos.
Mientras tanto, y para disminuir la brecha entre las contribuciones y los beneficios, los bordurianos podrían usar la diferencia que tienen a su favour; es decir, geográficamente proximidad significa un comercio bilateral más accesible con Khemed, una respuesta más rápida y posiblemente más efectiva en caso de amenaza o ataque internacional, etc., cosas que Syldavia no puede ofrecer.

Además, como el primer prerrequisito prohíbe las interferencias de cualquier tipo, y el segundo prerrequisito protege específicamente las libertades no políticas, las diferentes creencias religiosas entre los Khemedianos y los Bordurianos no pueden utilizarse para la ventaja o la desventaja de ninguna de las poblaciones. Eso es porque están en un cierto orden de prioridad. En otras palabras, el principio y los requisitos previos están ordenados léxicamente. En esto, no transgresión de: a) el principio de no interferencia o no dominación; b) las libertades no políticas básicas; y c) los principios reconocidos por la ley de los pueblos, se permiten bajo cualquier excusa o razón incluso si eso significa no cumplir con el principio de 'soberanía compartida igualitaria.'

NOTA: Publicación basada en el Capítulo 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Jorge Emilio Núñez

9 de febrero de 2018

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 21 OF 21)

By applying equality strictly, the agents would all receive equal benefits and contribute equally towards the burdens. How would Borduria fulfil its duty to defend Khemed? How would Khemedians defend themselves? The same could be said about natural resources because although Khemedians, Syldavians and Bordurians would receive the same share in terms of ownership, Khemedians and Bordurians would not have the means to exploit them. Several other implications could be drawn but the point is clear. It is both unreasonable and unfair to expect three parties with different comparative situations in many different areas to contribute in an equal manner or to receive an equal return.

Nevertheless, to apply the difference principle in the same form may have similar consequences. Syldavia is the least advantaged in terms of natural resources, so they will receive a larger share. Khemed is less advantaged than Syldavia in terms of defence, so the latter will provide the means to defend the third territory. But Borduria is the least advantaged in terms of wealth, the natural resources in its territory are not part of the agreement so they are not under discussion, and they do not have any means to defend the third territory (Bordurians cannot even defend themselves). Would they have to receive a larger share of the benefits resultant from the exploitation of natural resources in Khemed with means provided by Syldavia? Indeed, this seems unacceptable.

 

To recapitulate, there are two sovereign States Syldavia and Borduria claiming sovereignty over Khemed, a third populated insular territory. The three populations through their representatives agreed on sharing sovereignty over Khemed. They understand that they are dealing with many issues—i.e. activities or goods, and these many issues imply both benefits and burdens. So, to ask all of them to contribute equally and receive an equal return is not the solution. Neither is it for the better off in any given activity to contribute more and the least advantaged in any other activity to receive a larger benefit. They may either lead to domination or to continuous assistance. And because they do also know that they will maintain the agreement under the three pre-requisites, they keep their reciprocal non-interference and consider themselves reciprocally equals. In addition to this, they know it is a targeted agreement only referring to the third territory—i.e. this is not an agreement based on humanitarian reasons, domestic or global justice.

Thereby, the representatives of Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria have decided:

Khemedians, Syldavians and Bordurians have all the same right to participate in every aspect of the sovereignty over Khemed. That is to say, they all have the opportunity to present and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty over Khemed (egalitarian consensus principle). Khemed shares in equal portions natural resources with Syldavians and Bordurians. Syldavia shares in equal portions the means for their exploitation with Khemed and Borduria. And Borduria, because of their geographical location, will grant special privileges for both Khemedian and Syldavian enterprises only related to the exploitation of natural resources in Khemed (or any other activity but it must be related to Khemed).

 
Indeed, either Khemed or Borduria may have issues in exploiting at the same level of efficiency as Syldavia their shares of natural resources. Hence, Syldavia must make sure that both the other agents reach the same level of exploitation or divide the benefits resultant amongst the three parties equally in the meantime—i.e. it is a targeted shared model.

The principle can be seen in a larger picture across the board with different activities. At first, the smaller and the larger the contribution, the smaller and the larger the return respectively. But as the agreement aims to avoid domination (secure non-interference) and has a target, it is to be expected a more evenly shared contribution-return relationship amongst the parties will emerge in the long term. That is to say in the example, at first Khemed would be defended by Syldavia, and the latter would as well contribute to the exploitation of the natural resources in the island (principle of efficiency). In principle, Syldavians would receive a larger share of the resultant benefits—i.e. the larger the contribution, the larger the return since Syldavia is contributing towards both defence and exploitation of natural resources in a larger manner than the other two agents (input-to-output ratio principle). This covers the burdens-benefits part.

But, because of the targeted agreement, Syldavia must make sure both Khemed and Borduria reach relatively the same level for the defence of the third territory and the exploitation of natural resources (equilibrium proviso). It is then when the contributions amongst the three will be more even as well as the returns.

Meanwhile, and in order to lessen the gap between contributions and benefits, Bordurians could use the difference they have in their favour—i.e. geographically proximity means a more accessible bilateral commerce with Khemed, faster and possibly more effective response in case of international threat or attack, etc., things that Syldavia cannot offer.

Moreover, as the first pre-requisite prohibits interferences of any kind, and the second pre-requisite specifically protects non-political liberties, different religious beliefs between Khemedians and Bordurians could not be used for the advantage or disadvantage of any of the populations. That is because they are in a certain order of priority. In other words, the principle and the pre-requisites are lexically ordered. Therein, no transgression of: a) the non-interference or non-domination principle; b) the basic non-political liberties; and c) the principles recognised by the law of peoples, is allowed under any excuse or reason even if that means not fulfilling the ‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ principle.

  
NOTE: Post based on Chapter 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 

Jorge Emilio Núñez

9^th February 2018

JUEGO SOBERANO: COMO SOLUCIONAR CONFLICTOS DE SOBERANÍA (PARTE 20 DE 21)

El representante de cada parte (Syldavia, Borduria y Khemed) se ven privados de conocimiento con respecto a qué parte representan. Por lo tanto, es razonable para ellos y es probable que acepten que cada parte tiene derecho a participar en cada aspecto de la soberanía, independientemente de sus circunstancias particulares (es decir, su desarrollo o capacidad), porque nadie querría que se quedara fuera. En otras palabras, estarían de acuerdo en que, idealmente, tendrían una participación "igual" de soberanía sobre Khemed, lo que significa que los tres demandantes tendrían la misma posición o estatus. Ahí, las tres partes (Syldavia, Borduria y Khemed) tendrían derecho a participar y el proceso de toma de decisiones en cada caso estaría sujeto a un consenso igualitario. Es decir, a las tres partes se les debe otorgar una contribución igual en el proceso de toma de decisiones. Todos ellos tienen la oportunidad de presentar y enmendar propuestas en relación con todos los aspectos de la soberanía de Khemed.

Un segundo punto tiene que ver con circunstancias reales. Los representantes reconocerían que una vez que finalicen las negociaciones, las tres partes tendrán situaciones muy diferentes (por ejemplo, desarrollo económico, sistema de defensa, medios para la explotación de recursos naturales, leyes, etc.). Por lo tanto, es razonable pensar que los representantes estarían de acuerdo en que el grado de participación de cada parte variará según la capacidad de contribución de cada parte. También es razonable suponer que cada parte también estaría interesada en cada aspecto de la soberanía. Por lo tanto, y teniendo en cuenta estas dos circunstancias (es decir, el derecho igual a participar y la diferente capacidad para contribuir), es razonable mantener que cada parte estaría interesada en que cada aspecto de la soberanía se maneje de la manera más eficiente.

 

Un tercer punto sería determinar el nivel de entrada y salida de cada parte con respecto a cada objetivo / área / actividad relacionada con la soberanía sobre el tercer territorio. En principio, los representantes pueden pensar en distribuir qué beneficios o derechos gozará cada parte dependiendo del nivel de contribución que la parte haga. De hecho, reconocen que algunas partes podrán hacer una contribución mayor o mayor que otras. Sin embargo, surge un problema inmediato. Los representantes se darían cuenta de que al hacer que la salida dependa del nivel de la entrada de cada parte, esto podría resultar en un subterfugio para la dominación. Es decir, la parte que está en mejores condiciones contribuye más a una o más áreas y, por lo tanto, obtiene una participación mayor, mientras que las otras dos partes no pueden hacer el mismo nivel de contribución que se traduciría en una parte de beneficios ad eternum.

Pero si los representantes agregaron una salvedad para asegurarse de que la parte con mayor capacidad -y, por lo tanto, mayores derechos de participación inicial- tendría la obligación de equilibrar a las otras dos partes, la propuesta se vuelve razonable. Esto se debe a que garantiza la distribución actual más eficiente de derechos y obligaciones, pero también garantiza que la parte que actualmente se beneficia más tenga la obligación de colocar a las otras dos partes en una posición en la que puedan contribuir por igual, es decir. tiene la carga de ayudar a las otras dos partes a adquirir la capacidad de contribuir por igual a ese objetivo / área / actividad particular de soberanía sobre Khemed. Ahí, el partido con mayor capacidad en cualquier área estaría de acuerdo con esto porque no hay otra manera de tener la cooperación de los otros dos, y las otras dos partes estarían de acuerdo porque este arreglo requiere que reciban algo inmediatamente y eventualmente obtendrán el capacidad de tener una parte igual, y de lo contrario no obtendrían nada.

En resumen, significa:

1. Igual derecho a participar (principio de consenso egalitario)

2. La naturaleza y el grado de participación dependen de la eficiencia para cocretar el objetivo/área/actividad en particular (principio de eficiencia)

3. Cada parte recibe beneficios (en términos de derechos y oportunidades) que dependen de su contribución (principio propocional de entrada-salida)

CONDICION:

4. Pero la parte con mayor habilidad y por consiguiente, mayor participación inicial de derechos, tiene la obligación de llevar a las otras dos partes hacia el equilibrio (condicion de equilibrio)

  
NOTA: Publicación basada en el Capítulo 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Jorge Emilio Núñez

2 de febrero de 2018

SOVEREIGN GAME: HOW TO SOLVE SOVEREIGNTY CONFLICTS (PART 20 OF 21)

The representative of each party (Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed) they are deprived of knowledge in regard to which party they represent. So, it is reasonable for them and likely to agree that each party has a right to participate in each aspect of sovereignty, regardless of their particular circumstances (i.e. their development or ability) because no one would want to be left out. In other words, they would agree that ideally they would have “equal” shares of sovereignty over Khemed, which means that the three claimants would have equal standing or status. Therein, all three parties (Syldavia, Borduria and Khemed) would have a right to participate and the decision making process in each case would be subject to egalitarian consensus. That is to say, all the three parties should be granted an equal input into the decision making process. They all have the opportunity to present, and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty of Khemed.

 

A second point has to do with factual circumstances. The representatives would acknowledge that once the negotiations were over all the three parties would have very different situations (e.g. economic development, defence system, means for exploitation of natural resources, law, and so on). So it is reasonable to think that the representatives would agree that the degree of each party’s participation would vary according to each party’s ability to contribute. It is also reasonable to suppose that each party would as well have an interest in each aspect of sovereignty. Therefore, and bearing in mind these two circumstances (i.e. equal right to participate and different ability to contribute) it is reasonable to maintain that each party would have an interest in each aspect of sovereignty being handled in the most efficient manner.

 

A third point would be to determine the level of input and output of each party with regard to each objective/area/activity related to the sovereignty over the third territory. In principle, the representatives may think of distributing what benefits or rights each party would enjoy depending on the level of contribution that the party makes. Indeed, they acknowledge that some parties will be able to make a bigger or larger input than others. However, an immediate problem arises. The representatives would realise that by making the output dependant on the level of each party’s input this could result in a subterfuge for domination. That is to say, the better off party contributing more towards one or more areas and therefore securing a larger stake while the other two parties were unable to make the same level of contribution that would be translated in an ad eternum share of benefits.

 

But if the representatives added a proviso in order to make sure that the party with greater ability—and therefore greater initial participation rights—would have the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium, the proposal becomes reasonable. That is because it ensures the most efficient current distribution of rights and obligations but also ensures the party that currently benefits most has an obligation to bring the other two parties up to a position where they can contribute equally—i.e. it has the burden to assist the other two parties to acquire the ability to contribute equally to that particular objective/area/activity of sovereignty over Khemed. Therein, the party with the greater ability in whatever area would agree to this because there is no other way of having the cooperation of the other two, and the other two parties would agree because this arrangement requires they receive something immediately and will eventually gain the ability to have an equal share, and they would otherwise get nothing.

 

In brief, it means:

 

1. Equal right to participate (egalitarian consensus principle)

 

2. Nature and degree of participation depends on efficiency of accomplishing the particular objective/area/activity at issue (principle of efficiency)

  
3. Each party receives a benefit (in terms of rights and opportunities) that depends on what that party contributes with (input-to-output ratio principle).

 

PROVISO:

4. But the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights has the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium (equilibrium proviso)

 

NOTE: Post based on Chapter 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

 

Jorge Emilio Núñez

2^nd February 2018