BOOK PREVIEW [coming May 2017] Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. Chapter Five: Why is shared sovereignty desirable?

Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics

A Distributive Justice Issue

By Jorge E. Nunez

Previously:

About the Book.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter One: Introduction.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter One: General Structure.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter Two: Limited Sovereignty.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter Three: What should 'shared sovereignty' mean?

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter Four: How far can sovereign States cooperate together and limit their freedom without sacrificing their sovereignty?

Chapter Five:

Why is shared sovereignty desirable?

Introduction

Like any other conflict, sovereignty disputes can be addressed 

in different ways. The alternatives go from secession (with or 

without partition) in the form of self-determination and 

independence to continuing with the status quo. The task is 

now to evaluate when and why shared sovereignty is 

more desirable than any other international remedy. In other 

words, there are several ways of dealing with sovereignty 

conflicts. Some of them have proven to be effective, others 

are only theoretical solutions and some are—for whatever 

reason—not desirable. This Chapter will introduce and assess if 

it is reasonable—at least—to doubt the value of their 

application. That is because this project assumes the agents 

want a peaceful solution that acknowledges—to an extent—their 

claims. So, solutions that imply ignoring claims, unfair policies, 

use of force or any action that may go against an otherwise 

peaceful situation will be not viable.

Indeed, shared sovereignty may not be ‘one way fits all’. But 

this book is not suggesting that shared sovereignty is ‘the’ 

solution to all sovereignty conflicts. What these pages 

propose is a reasonable way to approach some of them. 

Therefore, by addressing the pitfalls of other international 

remedies that so far have proven to be inadequate in solving 

these types of sovereignty conflicts, it is possible to identify 

both the need of a peaceful solution and an opportunity to offer 

another way of dealing with them.

More preview posts coming in 2017.
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BOOK PREVIEW [coming May 2017] Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. Chapter Four: How far can sovereign States cooperate together and limit their freedom without sacrificing their sovereignty?

Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics

A Distributive Justice Issue

By Jorge E. Nunez

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Previously:

About the Book.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter One: Introduction.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter One: General Structure.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter Two: Limited Sovereignty.

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter Three: What should 'shared sovereignty' mean?

 

 

Introduction

Chapter Two demonstrated that although sovereignty means supreme authority, that authority always accepts limitations—i.e. sovereignty is not absolute. Consequently, sovereignty is always—to an extent—shared. However, Chapter Three showed that the way in which sovereignty may be shared is not always just, fair, or offering the participant agents the same relative situation—e.g. if there is unbalanced or unilateral sharing, when only one of the agents is actually dictating how to proceed. So, it is necessary for the success of the ‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ model to demonstrate how these limitations work, and also, that they do not imply involuntary interference with the sovereignty of any of the participant agents. Therefore, before defining the model of ‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ in detail, a question must be answered: how multiple agents can cooperate together, limit their freedom without negative consequences either de jure or de facto, so that none of the agents dictate to the other parties what to do or not to do. This problem arises because sovereignty is mainly seen as a concept that implies a single agent, limited in one way or another. However, this book assumes the existence of multiple agents that will have an equal relative position in respect to the third territory—i.e. a plurality of agents that have equal power, that are simultaneously at the same level—legally speaking, that are sovereign at the same time over the same territory and population.

In order to demonstrate how two sovereign States can share their sovereignty—i.e. how far sovereign States can cooperate together and limit their freedom without sacrificing their sovereignty—it is convenient to see: a) firstly, what the concept of ‘sovereignty’ means and implies by examining its subatomic or fundamental elements; and b) secondly, how a concept with similar features operates and accepts limitations without changing its nature. The former will be achieved by using Wesley N. Hohfeld language for legal analysis. By mastering a number of basic legal concepts it will be possible to analyse a complex one such as ‘sovereignty’, avoid misunderstandings with regards to its meaning and implications, and have a more clearly defined picture of how limitations operate without changing its nature. The latter, by reference to ‘self-ownership’ as a concept. As in the case of sovereignty, self-ownership establishes a particular relationship between an agent and something: supreme authority. Unlike sovereignty, this supreme authority is present at the level of the individual. In other words, self-ownership defines the supreme authority an individual has over himself; sovereignty defines the supreme authority a State has over a territory and people. Thus, at first glance both self-ownership and sovereignty appear to be supreme, singular and hence not shareable. More explicitly, self-ownership has the same kind of relation to an individual that sovereignty has to a State: both self-ownership and sovereignty are essential characteristics in defining a free individual and a free State, respectively. Then, if limitations in the form of self- or external constraints can be applied to self-ownership, limitations in the form of self- and external obligations can be applied to sovereignty. In consequence, as self- or externally imposed limitations in regard to self-ownership allow any individual to cooperate with any other individual, so self- or externally imposed obligations on sovereignty enable a State to cooperate with other States too without diminishing its sovereignty.

 

 

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