The Israel-Palestine difference and how the
egalitarian shared sovereignty may work. Previous considerations
The
latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centered the attention
on the Israel-Palestine difference. The last two posts introduced the
EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to the people in
Israel and Palestine (and the diaspora, refugees and settlers) respectively.
In
general, by applying the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY, the inhabitants of the
disputed territories would be citizens of both sovereign states, they would
have a common passport (an Israeli/Palestinian passport) valid in the disputed
territories.
In terms
of religion, as the second pre-requisite recognizes basic non-political
liberties, freedom of belief would be adopted at a constitutional level, so
that no one may be discriminated based on religion. The lexically prior
prerequisite of non-political liberties controls this.
A
few points have to be clear about I mean by both sovereign states.
First,
we have maintained in all these posts that Israel is de jure and de facto a
state whilst Palestine is a de facto state.
Israel would continue having de jure and
de facto sovereignty over any
non-disputed territories that are not part of the original difference. Israel
and Palestine, therefore, would share de
jure and de facto sovereignty only
over the disputed territories. That means that Palestine would have de jure sovereignty recognition (and all
that this implies).
Secondly,
sovereignty territorially defined is
a modern concept. Sovereignty per se
is not. Sovereignty territorially defined has to do with the European
transition between the Middle Ages into the Modern Era (Bodin in Continental
Europe, France, and Hobbes in England). Until that point in history,
sovereignty was a personal attribute.
In
that sense, Palestinians have de facto
sovereignty over the disputed territories (they actually live there) and can
have de jure sovereignty by means of
international law (for example, recognition by their peers; in our case,
Israel). I have academic publications about the concept of “sovereignty” and
its limited nature in which I show that these limitations enhance rather than
diminishing the concept since they make cooperation possible. For the purpose
of this series (since they are for the general public) I intentionally avoid
technicalities and jargon.
Thirdly,
Israel and Palestine would have to agree on the actual details about how to
acquire the joint nationality and/or citizenship. The options may include one,
all or a combination of them (birthright, jus
sanguinis, blood line, descent or ancestry, and residence). For example,
whether by simply demonstrating actual settlement on the disputed territories
is enough evidence or if a minimum term is required. This and any other issue
has to do with the avoidance of people moving into the disputed territories
only to secure themselves the newly agreed legal status (and consequent
rights).
In
particular, as the difference in this example is given by the larger society
and stronger economy in Israel, this state would have a stronger constraint in
being a welcoming party for the inhabitants (input-to-output ratio principle).
In that sense, the main concerns for the inhabitants of the disputed
territories (security, human rights violations, terrorism). That is because,
although Palestine would also have the obligation to welcome them as its
citizens in its territory, these people would have the right to opt to be
nationals of both States (that is to say, they have the right to relocate).
Concerning
the particular issue of human rights, reciprocal control amongst the two parties
(egalitarian consensus principle) could secure an improvement in the present
situation (a point discussed in more detail when dealing with government in
this series and this particular TERRITORIAL DISPUTE). In particular, employment
opportunities generated within the boundaries of the disputed territories
because of the exploitation of natural resources, could be the result of a
joint enterprise, details of which will be discussed when considering
territory.
NOTE:
This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, “Territorial Disputes and State
Sovereignty: International Law and Politics,” London and New York: Routledge,
Taylor and Francis Group, 2020 (forthcoming)
Previous
published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the
author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, “Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and
Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue,” London and New York: Routledge, Taylor
and Francis Group, 2017.
NEXT
POST: The Israel-Palestine difference and territory
Tuesday 21st January 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701
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