The Israel-Palestine difference and “What do people
want?”
Within
Israel and Palestine, there may be internal divisions, for example domestic
political parties wanting a different outcome. What should we do about it?
In
the case of negotiations about the sovereignty over the disputed territories
between Israel and Palestine we have 8,852,180 Israelis and 4,816,503
Palestinians (2,935,368 in the West Bank, 1,881,135 in the Gaza strip, 426, 533
in Jerusalem, and the rest in other areas).
There are several political parties
in Israel and in Palestine. Internal divisions are highly likely, I include
below several links in which you may find more information about the population
and the political parties in Israel and Palestine.
It
is evident that even though individuals may have similar needs and interests,
each may have an individual plan of life. For the purpose of this blog series
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES I am going to assume that Israel and Palestine (as two
different groups of people) have each a “State plan of life.”
In
relation to the disputed territories (Jerusalem, Gaza, West Bank, etc.) Israel
and Palestine seem to have the same plan of life: each wants the exclusive
sovereignty (de jure and de facto). I remind the reader we
covered the concepts of STATE and SOVEREIGNTY in previous posts.
In
order to avoid confusion about what a “State plan of life” means, it is
important to distinguish between an individual or personal interest (that of
each Israeli or Palestinian) and the interest of each claiming party as a whole
(that of Israel as a whole and that of Palestine as a whole).
Each
of the claimants (Israel and Palestine) is a community of people. The
individuals in these claiming parties have both common and conflicting
interests. But although each claiming party is formed by many different
individuals with different interests, each of these claiming parties has as a
collective group a common interest for the purpose of this series: sovereignty
over the disputed territories. Thus, this same element (the disputes
territories) is the centre of this particular conflict of interest.
It
follows from this that the political parties in Israel and Palestine may too
have different plans for the disputed territories. How do we put these
different plans together to move into negotiations?
In
order to answer the question, it is crucial to distinguish what Israelis and
Palestinians want and what their respective political parties “seem” to want.
We covered “issues at stake” before on this TERRITORIA DISPUTE series. The
reader may remember that domestic POLITICAL PRESTIGE is one of the reasons why
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES remain in a political and legal limbo.
To
assume all political parties want the best for their people is not realistic
(and naïve). Domestic political prestige is an important motivator to start and
maintain TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. For more details about political prestige and
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES follow the link below (the author deals with the
Sino-Indian border dispute yet the key arguments and the conclusion are
applicable to the Israel-Palestine difference).
How
do we know what Israelis and Palestinians as a whole want? That is to say,
regardless of each individual in Israel and Palestine, and each individual
political party, how do we know what each of these two populations want in
regard to the disputed territories?
The
answer is as simple as complex. Both Israel and Palestine have to follow a referendum
or a similar procedure. However, not any referendum will answer the question. A
referendum of this kind should acknowledge the many pitfalls previous
international examples had (I covered the referendums in the Falkland/Malvinas
islands, Gibraltar, Brexit, and Catalonia in 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017, respectively,
on this blog).
To
continue the discussion here we have to make use of the elements at hand now.
With the information available that covers Israel and Palestine it is possible
to assume both Israelis and Palestinians are finally open to reach a peaceful
and permanent solution. Many studies demonstrate this point. As an example:
“Polls
have shown that certain circumstances surrounding a hypothetical agreement are
positively correlated to levels of support on both sides. For instance, more
than one poll has shown that if Netanyahu were to accept a two-state solution –
even the Arab Peace Initiative – Israeli public opinion would follow. At the
same time, Palestinian support for the Arab Peace Initiative has consistently
polled higher than other proposals, and one very reputable poll conducted by
the Brookings Institution in late 2013 found that Palestinian support for a
two-state solution very similar to the six-point plan above would jump by
almost twenty percentage points (to nearly 60 percent) if Israel announced it
accepted the plan.”
Having
answered question 1, the attention shifts now to population, territory,
government and law (questions 2, 3, and 4). From tomorrow, we are going to
assume Israel and Palestine conducted negotiations and decided to settle the
difference by means of the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty.
NOTE:
This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, “Territorial Disputes and State
Sovereignty: International Law and Politics,” London and New York: Routledge,
Taylor and Francis Group, 2020 (forthcoming)
Previous
published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the
author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, “Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and
Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue,” London and New York: Routledge, Taylor
and Francis Group, 2017.
NEXT
POST: The Israel-Palestine difference and “What do we do with PEOPLE living in
the disputed territories?”
Wednesday 15th January 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701
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