The
latest posts on this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES centred the attention on
the Israel-Palestine difference. The last two posts introduced the EGALITARIAN
SHARED SOVEREIGNTY and some key elements related to the people in Israel and
Palestine (and the diaspora, refugees and settlers) respectively.
In
general, by applying the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY, the inhabitants of the
disputed territories would be citizens of both sovereign states, they would have
a common passport (an Israeli/Palestinian passport) valid in the disputed
territories. In terms of religion, as the second pre-requisite recognises basic
non-political liberties, freedom of belief would be adopted at a constitutional
level, so that no one may be discriminated based on religion. The lexically
prior prerequisite of non-political liberties controls this.
A few
points have to be clear about I mean by both sovereign states:
First,
we have maintained in all these posts that Israel is de jure and de facto a
state whilst Palestine is a de facto state.
Israel would continue having de jure and
de facto sovereignty over any
non-disputed territories that are not part of the original difference. Israel
and Palestine, therefore, would share de
jure and de facto sovereignty only
over the disputed territories. That means that Palestine would have de jure sovereignty recognition (and all
that this implies).
Secondly,
sovereignty territorially defined is
a modern concept. Sovereignty per se
is not. Sovereignty territorially defined has to do with the European
transition between the Middle Ages into the Modern Era (Bodin in Continental
Europe, France, and Hobbes in England). Until that point in history,
sovereignty was a personal attribute. In that sense, Palestinians have de facto sovereignty over the disputed
territories (they actually live there) and can have de jure sovereignty by means of international law (for example,
recognition by their peers; in our case, Israel). I have academic publications
about the concept of “sovereignty” and its limited nature in which I show that
these limitations enhance rather than diminishing the concept since they make
cooperation possible. For the purpose of this series (since they are for the
general public) I intentionally avoid technicalities and jargon.
Thirdly,
Israel and Palestine would have to agree on the actual details about how to
acquire the joint nationality and/or citizenship. The options may include one,
all or a combination of them (birthright, jus
sanguinis, blood line, descent or ancestry, and residence). For example, whether
by simply demonstrating actual settlement on the disputed territories is enough
evidence or if a minimum term is required. This and any other issue has to do
with the avoidance of people moving into the disputed territories only to
secure themselves the newly agreed legal status (and consequent rights).
In
particular, as the difference in this example is given by the larger society
and stronger economy in Israel, this state would have a stronger constraint in
being a welcoming party for the inhabitants (input-to-output ratio principle).
In that sense, the main concerns for the inhabitants of the disputed
territories (security, human rights violations, terrorism). That is because,
although Palestine would also have the obligation to welcome them as its
citizens in its territory, these people would have the right to opt to be
nationals of both States (that is to say, they have the right to relocate).
In
regard to the particular issue of human rights, reciprocal control amongst the
two parties (egalitarian consensus principle) could secure an improvement in
the present situation (a point discussed in more detail when dealing with
government in this series and this particular TERRITORIAL DISPUTE). In
particular, employment opportunities generated within the boundaries of the
disputed territories because of the exploitation of natural resources, could be
the result of a joint enterprise, details of which will be discussed when
considering territory.
NOTE:
based on Chapter 7, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and
International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New
York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Jorge Emilio Nunez
Twitter: @London1701
15th May 2018
Jorge Emilio Nunez
Twitter: @London1701
15th May 2018
No comments:
Post a Comment