Crimea, territorial disputes and their dynamics
A
TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, in simple terms, is a disagreement about “who owns a
territory.” Yet, a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE is not that simple.
In international
relations, this means in principle there is a disagreement between at least two
parties in relation to whom the sovereign is over a piece of land.
The Israel-Palestine difference includes
Israel, Palestine, the region and, to an extent, many other people around the
world. The previous posts introduced a brief historical chronology, mentioned
some key domestic and international reasons behind this case, and included
references to other regional and international agents that have played (and in
some cases, still do) a central role.
With
the previous cases covered by this series (Kashmir, the Falkland/Malvinas
islands, Gibraltar and the Israel-Palestine difference) we explored an ideal
solution called EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY in what has to do with
population, territory, government and law.
Before
going into any negotiations, we had to determine who
may be a legitimate party. Like many other TERRTORIAL DISPUTES, this issue
maintains the conflict over Crimea in a status
quo. The claiming parties do not recognize reciprocally complete legitimacy
to go into any negotiations about the disputed territory.
The latest posts introduced the concept of “colorable claim” and
explored three different grounds: historical entitlement, legal basis and moral
standing. For one reason or another, Crimea, Russia and Ukraine have grounds to
introduce a claim (this is different from saying they have the right to be sovereign
over the territory). It only means Crimea, Russia and Ukraine ought to be part
in any negotiation concerning the sovereignty (de jure and de facto)
over Crimea.
The
reader may ask why Russian and Ukrainian representatives do not agree on a
common ground to start negotiations and settle peacefully and permanently the conflict over Crimea. To give an answer I quote
Huth once again below. The quotation clearly illustrates that international and
regional issues at stake are many times dependent on domestic agendas (and
viceversa). Briefly, the difference still exists
because there is no real will to solve it.
Huth
explains the dynamics:
“[…] very often political leaders are not
willing to take risks and undertake diplomatic initiatives that will break a
long-standing stalemate in negotiations. Furthermore, leaders themselves are
socialized into viewing the target as an adversary and, as a result, they are
not predisposed to view concessions as a legitimate option. Furthermore, […] a
history of military conflict with the target can be used by the military to
justify larger budgets […]. The combined effect, then, is that the idea of
offering concessions and proposing a unilateral initiative to break the
stalemate is a policy option quite difficult to get on the policy agenda of
political leaders within the challenger. Few voices are advocating such
policies within the challenger, and the prevailing climate of opinion (both
mass and elite) is opposed to such a change in policy.”
“[…]
leaders were typically constrained by domestic political forces to be very
cautious in moving toward a compromise settlement, since popular and elite
opinion, and often the military, was opposed to such a policy. [...] In most
situations the leader’s position of domestic power and authority was better
served by continuing confrontation […]”
Huth, Paul K. 2001. Standing Your Ground.
Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. The University of Michigan
Press.
There is another option: to think about
how to solve this dispute. This series TERRITORIAL DISPUTES intends to offer a
platform for discussion.
With all this in mind, I introduced the
overall idea I call EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY. I develop this approach in
full in Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. “Sovereignty Conflicts and
International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue.” London and New
York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. In short, all parties share
sovereignty in equal ideal terms. To get to that, these parties go into
negotiations themselves (not UN or any other party alien to the conflict).
NOTE:
This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial
Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge
2020).
Previous
published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the
author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, “Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and
Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue,” London and New York: Routledge, Taylor
and Francis Group, 2017.
NEXT
POST: Crimea and the egalitarian shared sovereignty: cooperation
between Russia and Ukraine
Wednesday 04th March 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701
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