Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 5) [Post 120]

South China Sea and Vietnam

Because Vietnam has a 2,000-mile coastline facing the East Sea (South China Sea) and 50 percent of its population lives along the coast, the government sees maritime as its greatest security threat. In 2016, approximately $1.6 billion was earmarked for maritime defense capabilities, but this is expected to increase to $2 billion by 2020. The Vietnamese Navy and Air Force had very little capacity to protect Vietnam’s maritime interests, but over the past decade both services have undergone some modernization.

In March 2018, following pressure from China, Vietnam ended a partnership with Repsol to drill for oil at Vanguard Bank in the South China Sea. The project would have involved exploration within an area claimed by China. However, Vietnam is still planning to move ahead with ExxonMobil's lease for the Blue Whale Gas Field, a 150 billion-cubic-meter find 50 nm off Vietnam's central coast. Exxon announced the official start of the project last October.

By failing to show up as Vietnam was coerced into a corner, Washington ultimately failed to live up to supporting the values that it claims to hold with regard to the future of the regional security architecture in Asia. The next time Chinese decision-makers seek to authorize the coercion of a Southeast Asian claimant state in the South China Sea, they’ll remember that.

Russia is Vietnam’s main arms supplier and the major platforms acquired from it since 2011 have served to upgrade Vietnam’s capability to conduct sea operations in the East Sea.

Russia and Vietnam are comprehensive strategic partners and that relationship has been incessantly growing based on mutual respect, equality and strategic benefits, he added.

The two nations have continued collaboration across the board and maintained close coordination in the international arena. This is particularly meaningful since the two sides share the same viewpoints in various fields.

Russia and Vietnam have also paid due attention to developing economic and trade relations through the implementation of the free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Vietnam along with deals reached by their leaders.

People’s Army Newspaper (Vietnam) Link

The Maritime Executive Link

The Diplomat Link

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and the Philippines

Monday 13th July 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 4) [Post 119]

South China Sea and the media

The post today will center the attention on how the regional and international media presents the South China Sea case.

When we did the same exercise with previously reviewed differences covered by this blog series TERRITORIAL DISPUTES we introduced a series of news about Kashmir, the Falkland/Malvinas islands, Gibraltar, Crimea, the Israel-Palestine difference, and others.

The South China Sea has such a regional and international relevance that the media dedicates this issue a complete section on their sites.
As a way of example:

The Guardian
The Guardian (link)

South China Morning Post
South China Morning Post (link)

BBC
BBC (link)

AlJazeera
AlJazeera (link)

New York Times
New York Times (link)

Why do these and many other media companies dedicate a complete section to the South China Sea? 

Why is the area so important?

"The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans — the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce.

Here is the heart of Eurasia’s navigable rimland, punctuated by the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits.

More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide.

The oil transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that transits the Panama Canal.

Roughly two thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 per cent of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 80 per cent of China’s crude oil imports come through the South China Sea.Whereas in the Persian Gulf only energy is transported, in the South China Sea you have energy, finished goods, and unfinished goods.

In addition to centrality of location, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels, and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas."

Read more at 
Business Insider (link)

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and Vietnam

Friday 10th July 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 3) [Post 118]

China’s position about the South China Sea       

The literature about the South China Sea often comes from Western authors and media. But, what is China’s position about the South China Sea?

A set of documents brings light to the question. In brief:

Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea (07/12/2016)

“To reaffirm China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, enhance cooperation in the South China Sea with other countries, and uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea, the Government of the People's Republic of China hereby states as follows:

I. China's Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands) consist of Dongsha Qundao (the Dongsha Islands), Xisha Qundao (the Xisha Islands), Zhongsha Qundao (the Zhongsha Islands) and Nansha Qundao (the Nansha Islands). The activities of the Chinese people in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago.”

[…]

“V. China respects and upholds the freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by all states under international law in the South China Sea, and stays ready to work with other coastal states and the international community to ensure the safety of and the unimpeded access to the international shipping lanes in the South China Sea.”

Complete document

Link to the complete document

China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea (13/07/2016)

“vi. On jointly upholding peace and stability in the South China Sea.

140. China maintains that peace and stability in the South China Sea should be jointly upheld by China and ASEAN Member States.

141. China pursues peaceful development and adheres to a defense policy that is defensive in nature. China champions a new security vision featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues a foreign policy of building friendship and partnership with its neighbors and of fostering an amicable, secure and prosperous neighborhood based on the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness. China is a staunch force for upholding peace and stability and advancing cooperation and development in the South China Sea. China is committed to strengthening good-neighborliness and promoting practical cooperation with its neighbors and regional organizations including ASEAN to deliver mutual benefit.

142. The South China Sea is a bridge of communication and a bond of peace, friendship, cooperation and development between China and its neighbors. Peace and stability in the South China Sea is vital to the security, development and prosperity of the countries and the well-being of the people in the region. To realize peace, stability, prosperity and development in the South China Sea region is the shared aspiration and responsibility of China and ASEAN Member States, and serves the common interests of all countries.

143. China will continue to make unremitting efforts to achieve this goal.”

Complete document

Link to the complete document

Wang Yi Talks about How China Views Joint Communiqué of ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (08/08/2017)

“On August 7, 2017 local time, Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the briefing for Chinese and foreign media held after the series of Foreign Ministers' Meeting on East Asia Cooperation in Manila, the Philippines.”

[…]

“Wang Yi expressed that some media may be concerned about the statement of the South China Sea in the Joint Communiqué of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting. There is a statement on this issue in the Joint Communiqué every year, yet this year some differences have been presented. First, the length of descriptions is much shorter than that of the past. Second, the ten ASEAN countries all fully affirmed the results of cooperation with China and the stable situation in the South China Sea. They also fully affirmed to develop and approve the "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea" (COC) framework with China and made clear to take an active attitude of promoting the specific drafts in the next step.

Wang Yi said that perhaps some media friends would wonder why there are still descriptions of "sea-filling for land-reclamation" in the Joint Communiqué. I would like to tell you that the Joint Communiqué of this year makes it quite clear in this part. However, still "some foreign ministers" expressed concerns about the "sea-filling for land-reclamation", indicating that there is no consensus of all ASEAN countries. In fact, one or two countries expressed this kind of concern and what I would like to inform everyone is that China has completed our land-filling two years ago. Thus, if such phenomenon of sea-filling for land-reclamation still exists, it will never happen in China.

Wang Yi said that the statement on "non-militarization" in the Communiqué is not the same as the past either. This year, it is about "all countries", including the restraint of both the inner-domain and the areas outside the domain. All of us can have a thought on this matter: Among all countries, which one is the most powerful and the most dynamic to show its military power in the region? I think the answer is known to all.”

Complete document

Link to the complete document

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

South China Sea and the media

Thursday 09th July 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 2) [Post 117]

The South China Sea and the latent conflict

Yesterday, the post introduced another TERRITORIAL DISPUTE: the South China Sea. Today, we present a research paper that refers to this situation.

THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A MARITIME GEOGRAPHY OF LATENT CONFLICTUALITY

Marianne PÉRON-DOISE

ABSTRACT

This Research Paper aims to identify the strategic objectives pursued by Beijing in the South China Sea. The hypothesis explored is that the South China Sea constitutes a strategic layer within a global securitisation design. Other than the protection of “near seas” and the Hai­nan naval bases, there is an imperative to protect the “far seas”, i.e. maritime communication channels. The control of the South China Sea is thus one of the objectives of Xi Jinping’s China, a market power, as a means to conquer naval power. To do this, China uses a modus operandi pertaining to that of a “hybrid war”: historic narratives and revisited policies are put forward, while a preferential use of paramilitary actors such as coastguards, fishing fleets and maritime militias can be observed. Faced with this assertiveness, the growing strategic differential and economic interdependence between Beijing and the South-East Asian states leaves little space for a fairly negotiated solution that could result in constructive cooperations.

“The rise of the Chinese navy will surely create serious difficulties for foreign navies, not only limited to the US Navy but also the ASEAN navies bordering the South China Sea. In the Spratly Islands, the formation of artificial islands and enclaves provides the Navy, as well as the Chinese Coastguard, an opportunity to station more units (including aircrafts), as well as an opportunity to intensify patrols if the developments of the Sanya and Longpo naval bases on the island of Hainan are taken into account. Underwater unit patrols are expected to become a standard for Chinese operations in the South China Sea and to complicate the deployment of other submarine fleets. Given the dynamism of submarine acquisition in South-East Asia, the risk of a naval incident at depths is as great as incidents on the surface. Indeed, in January 2017, Vietnam received the sixth and last Kilo-class submarine built in Russia, under a $2 billion contract signed in 2009. Indonesia plans to modernize its aging submarine fleet, while Thailand is discussing the pur­chase of three Yuan-class Chinese units. Australia is engaged in an ambitious construction program of twelve Barracuda units. Malaysia, for its part, has two recent Scorpène-class units. Submarines, discreet and enduring, are particularly suited to the defence of coasts and maritime roads, and clearly pertain to “anti-access” strategies designed to hamper or even prevent the access of opposing forces to a theatre of operations.

In addition, collaboration between the Navy and the Chinese Coastguard will continue to blur the lines between military and non-military operations. Coastguard units are becoming increasingly robust and heavily armed, as their American or Japanese competitors. The protection of maritime claims in the South China Sea and the East Sea remain the most obvious objective in the coordination of these two components. By combining the capabilities of the two forces, which now include a paramilitary fleet, China should intensify its harassment of neighbouring nations that seek to defend their rights in disputed territories.

These disputed maritime areas will increase the potentiality of conflict and become subjects of tense confronta­tions, especially if the new US administration continues, as it has been doing so since the beginning of 2017, US Navy deployments in support of freedom of navigation (Freedom of Navigation Operations, FONOPS). This perspective, and therefore the possibility of a serious crisis, is all the more worrying as the Chinese Navy does not possess a developed culture of confidence-building measures, despite its participation in various fora. For the time being, the implemen­tation of confidence-building measures or specific provisions to avoid incidents at sea (such as the INCSEA-type agree­ment) remains uncertain.”

Link to the complete report

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

China’s position about the South China Sea      

Tuesday 07th July 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: South China Sea (Part 1) [Post 116]

The South China Sea

As 30th August 2018, the $3.37 trillion total trade was passing through the South China Sea in 2016 and 40 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade transited through the South China Sea in 2017. The South China Sea presents a tremendously complex geopolitical dilemma that includes sovereignty claims made by Vietnam, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei.

Brief Background account

China’s claims of sovereignty over the sea have antagonized competing claimants Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. As early as the 1970s, countries began to claim islands and various zones in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, which possess rich natural resources and fishing areas.

China claims all the islands off the coast. This applies in first place to Taiwan, the “rebel island”, but also to the sur­rounding islands: the Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands administered by Japan, the Pescadores and Pratas Islands belonging to Taiwan, the Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese) controlled by Beijing but claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan, and finally the Spratly Islands (Nansha in Chinese), the object of recurrent conflicts. To this day, in this vast archipelago of 410 000km², China occupies nine islands. Malaysia occupies three, the Philippines five, Brunei two. Taiwan, for its part, occupies one small islet.

The entire coastline of Vietnam is enveloped by the South China Sea; access to the South China Sea’s resources and shipping routes is paramount to Vietnam’s economic development.

China maintains that, under international law, foreign militaries are not able to conduct intelligence-gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

In recent years, satellite imagery has shown China’s increased efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea by physically increasing the size of islands or creating new islands altogether. In addition to piling sand onto existing reefs, China has constructed ports, military installations, and airstrips—particularly in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, where it has twenty and seven outposts, respectively. China has militarized Woody Island by deploying fighter jets, cruise missiles, and a radar system.

Global Conflict Tracker by Council of Foreign Relations

Global Conflict Tracker: South China Sea (link)

To the reader, following two of our previous posts of this series about TERRITORIAL DISPUTES:

• What are the issues at stakes in this a territorial dispute?
• Which remedy could be used to solve this particular territorial dispute?

For reference to these questions see:

• POST 9: Territorial disputes: issues at stake
• POST 10: Territorial disputes: remedies

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

The South China Sea and the latent conflict

                   

Monday 06th July 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

“Alternative Views of Growth...” by Dr. Rita G. Klapper [video]

“Alternative Views of Growth – Insights into Finnish Entrepreneurs’ Growth Perceptions” by Dr. Rita G. Klapper
(Reader/Associate Professor in Enterprise and Sustainability, Department of Strategy, Environment and Sustainability, Business School, Manchester Metropolitan University).
Bitesize presentation for the Juris North Roundtables
Session 4:10 Wednesday 1st July 2020

Many thanks to Dr Rita Klapper for this presentation. 
Please be aware these are bitesize presentations specially designed for the Juris North roundabouts and, therefore, are part of a larger project. Each of our roundtables consists of separate interconnected sections that range from brief introductions by experts in their field to working together in thematic groups lead by specialists.

Friday 3rd July 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter Nine. Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty [available July 2020]

Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty
International Law and Politics

By 

Jorge E. Núñez

Chapter Nine: Conclusive remarks, limitations and future implications

This book is one of several steps in order to assess and potentially find viable ways to solve territorial disputes. The first step, Núñez 2017[1], presented sovereignty conflicts as a matter of ideal theory and, therefore, did not consider real implications in territorial disputes. These pages aimed to continue the path by exploring some factual and logical, ideal and non-ideal features in ongoing territorial disputes around the world.[2] This time, together with conceptual elements, many current territorial disputes were introduced to compare and contrast some differences and find some common, arguably constant, features. Therein, whilst the monograph offers an understanding of the dynamics of territorial disputes, it also helps contribute to international law and politics by developing a more integrated approach to theory building.

These chapters had two simple yet fundamental premises. First, a comprehensive and more robust understanding of international conflict requires a global and inter-disciplinary assessment. Secondly, integrated and useful theories of international law and politics must agree on a common set of key conceptual elements for the evaluation of territorial disputes if they aim to integrate their findings in order to explore potential permanent and peaceful means to settle them.

Chapter 1 introduced the core conceptual and methodological elements and the overall structure. Some constant features in all territorial disputes were highlighted: ongoing and pervasive nature of territorial disputes and sovereignty conflicts, their multi-layered nature and the lack of common scientific ground to assess them and, therefore, to solve them. Chapter 2 examined the concept of “state.” By introducing its basic components—i.e. population, territory, government (or government and law—and a sample of theories in legal and political sciences that refer to the state it resulted more evident that different theories and bodies of literature refer to the same concept but give preeminence to one or some of its elements in their analysis. Therein, despite these theories and bodies of literature refer to the same concept—i.e. state-and the same elements—i.e. population, territory and government (or government and law) —legal and political sciences offer different conceptions based on the element (or sub-element) of analysis. Therein, disagreements are apparent and not intrinsic to the concept of state itself but to the views related to the concept (or real phenomena behind this concept). These views are based on hermeneutical and evaluative elements than can easily be agreed between different disciplines in order to have conceptual or substantive results (or both) that can further the study of the state. In turn, chapter 3, introduced the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination. The purpose of the assessment was to demonstrate that sovereignty and self-determination are inclusive and that by shifting the focus from territory to people territorial disputes might find a solution. If the assessment of territorial disputes can center on elements other than territory, sovereignty can be shared in a way in which is beneficial to all the claiming agents, and self-determination may lead to solutions different from secession, there is room for territorial disputes to be resolved by cooperative approaches.

Chapter 4 presented territorial disputes, different kinds of claims, issues at stake and the different contexts at play—i.e. domestic, regional and international. Indeed, territorial disputes are multi-faceted and multi-level. Therefore, to leave aside elements on their evaluation is to risk a partial understanding of a complex situation. To be more precise, the challenger and the challenged agents in a territorial dispute may use any kind of claim—i.e. colorable claim—that may be the same, but not necessarily, for their initiation, continuation and escalation into conflict or a peaceful and permanent settlement.  In addition to this, the same ground for any claim may be valued differently. Consequently, a comprehensive and more appropriate evaluation of territorial disputes should accept a variety of issues at stake and should include the domestic, regional as well as international contexts.

Currently, there are many remedies to settle permanently and peacefully territorial disputes. Chapter 5 presented rules and methods such as negotiation, mediation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration and regional and international institutions and organizations such as the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the Organization of American States, the Arab League, only to name a few. Despite the myriad of procedures and institutions, parties in a dispute do not use them or seek their assistance to solve their differences. Consequently, this chapter introduced a set of pre-requisites that should be taken into account before any procedure for dispute settlement is chosen. Thereafter, the final paragraphs included the egalitarian shared sovereignty as a way to deal with the multi-level and multi-faceted quality of these disputes that, at least in theory, no reasonable party may reject.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 included references to a sample of ongoing territorial disputes around the world. Chapter 6, with the Americas, introduced the common roots in all cases: the historical component based on colonial times. Thereafter, three main thematic areas and some controversial examples in each occasion were reviewed: the cases that included a participant in the dispute outside the American continent; the neo-colonial interference of the United States in other states; and the ongoing territorial disputes between states in the region. Some partial conclusions indicate that any population in a disputed territory, whether implanted for “right-peopling” reasons or indigenous, may pose a different interest to the ones represented by the claimant sovereign states. Chapter 7, with Europe and Asia, focused the analysis on two main facets. With the European cases, the emphasis was given to the sociological components whilst the Asian selected examples highlighted the interconnections the domestic, regional and international contexts have. Also, this chapter shifted from the ideal view of a unique “state plan of life” to the acknowledgment that real case scenarios will include a variety of individual and collective interests that may have (but do not need to) different views about justice and the dispute itself. Finally, chapter 8, with territorial disputes in Africa and Middle East, brought all the aforementioned theoretical background briefly together. That is to say, all disputes include several issues at stake and the domestic, regional and international contexts have a degree of influence. Indeed, territorial disputes are multilayer and multi-contextual. Moreover, it highlighted the fact that people can be another instrument in feeding conflict through right-peopling of the territory.

These chapters show that it is in the comprehensive understanding as multilayer and multi-contextual nature of territorial disputes that a path towards a better explanation of their complexity can be built. For instance, civil societies may include internal divisions based on history, ethnicity, religion, etc. that can have an impact in the way these different groups perceive the dispute and their role as a political community in them. Secondly, governments and leaders may opt to keep the difference in a political and legal status quo because of the higher pay-off to their prestige and power (rather than a definitive and peaceful solution). Furthermore, together with local and regional actors, there are other international agents (not necessarily regional ones) that have a direct interest in these areas and, consequently, the way in which the dispute develops depending on their own interests and their alliances with any of the original local and regional claimants.

It should be evident by now that these claims, issues at stake and contexts work together in negative synergy resulting in the origin and continuation of territorial disputes and their potential escalation into conflict. Ergo, these disputes have to be comprehended in light of their complexity. That is to say, any study should firstly, acknowledge the different claims by the different claiming parties, the different evaluation of these claims by each of these parties and the fact that each claiming party will present different subgroups, interests and views within. Secondly, it should accept their complex nature because of the several issues at stake. Finally, it should contextualize the dispute locally, regionally and internationally for a more accurate comprehension. Therein, by gaining a better, more robust, exhaustive and accurate understanding of their intricacy, it may be possible to reimagine in theory, and hopefully, in reality, a way towards solving them peacefully and permanently.

Available for pre-order:  

Routledge:

Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics

Amazon:

Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics

                

Friday 26th June 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @DrJorge_World
https://drjorge.world

---

[1] Jorge E. Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

[2] For the difference in law between empirical and logical issues and in in political science between ideal and non-ideal theory see chapter 8, fn. 3.