Crimea and the Egalitarian Shared Sovereignty: Final
Words
To recapitulate, we have two
sovereign States Russia and Ukraine claiming sovereignty over Crimea, the third
populated territory in our model. The three populations through their
representatives agreed on sharing sovereignty over Crimea.
They understand that they
are dealing with many issues such as activities or goods, and these many issues
imply both benefits and burdens. So, to ask all of them to contribute equally
and receive an equal return is not the solution.
Neither is it for the better
off in any given activity to contribute more and the least advantaged in any
other activity to receive a larger benefit. They may either lead to domination
or to continuous assistance. Because they do also know that they will maintain
the agreement under the three pre-requisites, they keep their reciprocal
non-interference and consider themselves reciprocally equals. In addition to
this, they know it is a targeted agreement only referring to the third
territory: this is not an agreement based on humanitarian reasons, domestic or
global justice.
In order to make the
egalitarian shared sovereignty work by acknowledging the many differences
amongst the parties, we have to foresee the possibility that one party (or some
of them) may contribute more and the other parties considerably less, so it
would imply an unbalanced relationship that may indeed lead to a) domination or
neo-colonialism; or b) continuous assistance.
Thereby, egalitarian shared
sovereignty understood as a balancing principle amongst Crimea, Russia, and
Ukraine—bearing in mind their differences—implies:
Crimea, Russia, and Ukraine
have all the same right to participate in every aspect of the sovereignty over
Crimea. That is to say, they all have the opportunity to present and amend
proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty over Crimea
(egalitarian consensus principle).
Crimea shares in equal portions natural
resources with Russia and Ukraine. Russia shares in equal portions the means
for their exploration and exploitation with Crimea and Ukraine. And Ukraine,
because of their geographical location, will grant special privileges for both
Crimean and Russian enterprises only related to the exploitation of natural
resources in Crimea (or any other activity but it must be related to Crimea).
Indeed, either Crimea or
Ukraine may have issues in exploiting at the same level of efficiency as Russia
their shares of natural resources. Hence, Russia must make sure that both the
other agents reach the same level of exploitation or divide the benefits
resultant amongst the three parties equally in the meantime, that is it is a
targeted shared model.
The principle can be seen in
a larger picture across the board with different activities. At first, the smaller
and the larger the contribution, the smaller and the larger the return
respectively. But as the agreement aims to avoid domination (secure
non-interference) and has a target, it is to be expected a more evenly shared
contribution-return relationship amongst the parties will emerge in the long
term.
In the
example, at first Crimea would be defended by Russia, and the latter would as
well contribute to the exploitation of the natural resources in the peninsula
(principle of efficiency). In principle, Russian would receive a larger share
of the resultant benefits—the larger the contribution, the larger the return,
and let us remember that Russia is contributing towards both defence and
exploitation of natural resources in a larger manner than the other two agents
(input-to-output ratio principle). This covers the burdens-benefits part.
But, as we have a targeted
agreement, Russia must make sure both Crimea and Ukraine reach relatively the
same level for the defence of the third territory and the exploitation of
natural resources (equilibrium proviso). It is then when the contributions
amongst the three will be more even as well as the returns.
Meanwhile, and in order to
lessen the gap between contributions and benefits, Ukrainians could use the
difference they have in their favour: geographically proximity means a more
accessible bilateral commerce with Crimea, faster and possibly more effective
response in case of international threat or attack, etc., things that Russia
cannot offer.
Moreover, as the first and
second pre-requisite grants non-domination and non-political liberties,
different religious beliefs between could not be used for the advantage or
disadvantage of any of the populations. That is because they are in a certain
order of priority.
This principle is applicable
only to sovereignty over the third territory and to what concerns the third
territory (and all that this implies). Thus, the principle and the
pre-requisites are lexically ordered (Rawls 1999, pp. 53 in fine and 54 supra)
both mutually and in relation to the egalitarian shared sovereignty. In other
words, no transgression of: a) non-domination or non-interference; b) the basic
non-political liberties; and c) the principles recognised by the law of
peoples, is allowed under any excuse or reason even if that means not
fulfilling the egalitarian shared sovereignty.
The lexical order dictates
the priority amongst the pre-requisites and the principle if there is a
conflict in practice. Indeed, the pre-requisites and the ‘egalitarian shared
sovereignty’ are intended as a single conception and not to work individually.
However, reality may show instances in which to apply the principle could go
against one or both pre-requisites.
Therefore, the lexicographic
or lexical preference ordering applies. That is because the agents will have
multiple criteria motivating their choices. As they will have a ranking of
priorities, the choice amongst the different alternatives will follow the
highest criterion. Inversely, by respecting the egalitarian shared sovereignty
we know the agents will take into account both pre-requisites.
The main reason to proceed
this way is to secure a real ‘equal footing’. Indeed, as a result of the
lexical order basic rights will only be compared with other basic rights,
powers and prerogatives with other powers and prerogatives, and so on. Thereby,
arrangements that could imply trading basic non-political liberties for, for
example, the exploitation of natural resources, could be avoided. So, none of
the agents could use their relative better position at the expense of any of
the other parties.
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POST: Northern Ireland (available online from Monday 27th April 2020)
Friday 13th March 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
