Tuesday, 10 March 2020

Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 17) [Post 82]

 
 
Crimea, negotiations and a proviso
 
The previous post referred to the arrangements that Crimea, Russia and Ukraine could have in place in order to achieve a peaceful and permanent solution: the egalitarian shared sovereignty. However, the post finished with a remedy that still needed some guarantees to secure it cannot be used as a subterfuge for domination or imposition by the strongest party.
 
 
 
The egalitarian shared sovereignty includes a proviso
 
If we added a proviso in order to make sure that the party with greater ability and therefore greater initial participation rights would have the obligation to bring the other two parties towards equilibrium, the proposal becomes reasonable.
 
That is because it ensures the most efficient current distribution of rights and obligations but also ensures the party that currently benefits most has an obligation to bring the other two parties up to a position where they can contribute equally, that is, it has the burden to assist the other two parties to acquire the ability to contribute equally to that particular objective/area/activity of sovereignty over the third territory.
 
Therein, the party with the greater ability in whatever area would agree to this because there is no other way of having the cooperation of the other two, and the other two parties would agree because this arrangement requires they receive something immediately and will eventually gain the ability to have an equal share, and they would otherwise get nothing.
 
 
 
It is true that the obligation is potentially onerous:
  • what justifies the ascription of that obligation to the better off party? For example, if A is the stronger, and B and C are the weaker parties, is A obligated to raise the standards of B’s and C’s economies so that they can afford to invest in the exploitation of natural resources;
  • or is it enough that A gives B and C a specific sum equivalent only to what B and C need to exploit resources on terms equal with A?
  • If A gives that sum to B and C, are they obliged to spend it on exploitation, or can they spend it on something else and so forfeit any future claim to be assisted with the exploitation of natural resources?
  • Why cannot B and C simply issue leases to commercial companies to exploit the resources on their behalf; why do they have to rely on help from A?
  • What does the obligation imply in relation to unalterable inequalities, such as one state’s being geographically closer to the third territory than the other?
 
 
The way in which the parties fulfil the final agreement or how the parties use the outcomes of the exploitation of their shares have to do with either practical matters that depend on each real scenario or with decisions pertaining internal sovereignty and therefore are out of the scope of this article. Similarly, to think of every possible factual difference amongst the parties such as geographical proximity would be out of the scope of an academic writing of similar nature, in particular when this is only a theoretical exercise.
 
 
 
In what matters the justification for the obligation owed by the more advantaged claimant, two clarifications must be made.
 
  1. Firstly, I do not claim that any obligation is prima facie owed amongst the parties. I believe the most advantaged party would accept the agreement or better said, it would be unreasonable for this party to argue it is not fair to accept it. Whether the most advantaged party actually accepts the arrangement or not is a different matter.
  2. Secondly, it is reasonable to believe that if the three parties in the original position agree on: a) equal standing; b) making the nature and degree of participation dependent on efficiency; and therefore c) at first the party with more ‘input’ will receive more ‘output’; the more advantaged claimant—whoever that turns out to be—will accept to have an obligation to bring about equilibrium in the shares since, in the absence of that equilibrium, the more advantaged claimant would or could dominate the other claimants so there would be hardly a good reason for the other two parties to accept any other arrangement that somehow did not contain a degree of equilibrium.
 
That is because anything less than shares in equilibrium would potentially imply a smaller share in comparison to those of the other parties. Therein, the bigger the share, the riskier the case for any of the parties to have more control on a particular issue pertaining sovereignty or the sovereignty of the third territory as a whole.
This is directly linked to the idea of non-domination since the possible monopoly of power with regards to a particular issue pertaining sovereignty or the sovereignty of the third territory as a whole could degenerate into arbitrary power by the decisions being made mainly by the strongest party or in benefit only of the strongest party.
 
In consequence, the freedom of the least advantaged parties with regards the choices they could make with their shares and the originally agreed equal standing could potentially be reduced to the ‘rubber-stamping’ of the decisions made by the strongest claimant. Therein, it is reasonable to believe that the representatives of the parties would find the equilibrium proviso a fair solution to safeguard the interests of the three populations involved.
 
This way of approaching sovereignty conflicts like the ones discussed in this blog I call egalitarian shared sovereignty.
 
 
 
NOTE: This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
 
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.
 
 
 
NEXT POST: Crimea, negotiations and “similar” or “identical” shares of sovereignty
 
 
 
Tuesday 10th March 2020
 
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
 
Twitter: @London1701
 
 

Monday, 9 March 2020

Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 16) [Post 81]


Crimea and the “egalitarian shared sovereignty”

The question at issue now is to decide, by respecting these two pre-requisites, how to share sovereignty. Ergo, the issue is what would constitute a reasonable allocation of sovereignty over the third territory amongst sovereign States A and B and the third territory C as equal claimants—i.e. Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea, whose equality of claim is in no way affected by whatever other situation they already have; and that allocation has a target: the third territory (Crimea) and all that it implies in terms of rights and obligations.

By acknowledging the circumstances in sovereignty conflicts, that is, different agents and an ample concept such as sovereignty, and the way in which the original position has been set up, a revised principle may offer comparable advantages that may make it a reasonable option.

Firstly, we must remind us of the fact that the representatives of the three parties are behind the veil of ignorance as characterized before in this paper. Hence, they are deprived of knowledge in regard to which party they represent.
It is reasonable for them and likely to agree that each party has a right to participate in each aspect of sovereignty, regardless of their particular circumstances, i.e. their development or ability, because no one would want to be left out. In other words, they would agree that ideally, they would have ‘equal’ shares of sovereignty over the third territory, which means that the three claimants would have equal standing or status.
Therein, all three parties would have a right to participate and the decision-making process in each case would be subject to egalitarian consensus: all the three parties should be granted an equal input into the decision-making process. They all have the opportunity to present, and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty of the third territory.

A second point has to do with factual circumstances. The representatives would acknowledge that it would be hard to see how after lifting the veil of ignorance all the three parties had the same relative situations such as economic development, defense system, means for exploitation of natural resources, law, and so on.
It is reasonable to think that the representatives would agree that the degree of each party’s participation would vary according to each party’s ability to contribute. As per the previous paragraph, it is also reasonable to suppose that each party would as well have an interest in each aspect of sovereignty. Therefore, and bearing in mind these two circumstances—equal right to participate and different ability to contribute—it is reasonable to maintain that each party would have an interest in each aspect of sovereignty being handled in the most efficient manner.

A third point would be to determine the level of input and output of each party with regard to each objective/area/activity related to the sovereignty over the third territory. In principle, the representatives may think of distributing what benefits or rights each party would enjoy depending on the level of contribution that the party makes. Indeed, they acknowledge that some parties will be able to make a bigger or larger input than others. However, an immediate problem arises.

The representatives would realize that by making the output dependant on the level of each party’s input this could result in a subterfuge for domination. That is to say, the better off party contributing more towards one or more areas and therefore securing a larger stake while the other two parties were unable to make the same level of contribution that would be translated in an ad eternum share of benefits.
Tomorrow the post will refer to a proviso to avoid this kind of potential form of domination or imposition.

NOTE: This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: Crimea, negotiations and a proviso

Monday 9th March 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701

Friday, 6 March 2020

Territorial disputes: Crimea (Part 15) [Post 80]


Preliminary requirements for a fair distribution

To recapitulate, we introduced a brief history in relation to the dispute over Crimea, different views from academics, media, politicians and people at large in Crimea, Russia and Ukraine, legal implications, and other elements. 
The last posts introduced the “colorable claim” in order to show why the historical, legal or moral arguments may legitimize the right to claim sovereignty.

Assuming Crimea, Russia and Ukraine decide to move from the status quo and go into negotiations about the sovereignty over Crimea, and assuming the parties agree that none of them will resign to their claims, in what follows we are going to consider how the negotiations may produce a peaceful solution beneficial to all.

Sovereignty implies many aspects of many different levels. Not only is this translated in benefits but also burdens. The solution reached must be one that, apart from being intuitively appealing in the negotiations under the status quo, can be applied when the status quo is lifted in such a way that the three populations want to respect the agreement reached.
Then, the solution must be somehow beneficial to the three agents, must recognise to an extent their claims and the result is not detrimental to any of the agents.

Thereby, and in order to succeed in choosing a principle to be applied for the allocation of sovereignty we must bear in mind some circumstances:

  • The claiming parties will be in very different situations in many areas.
  • The least advantaged party may be but does not need to be the population in Crimea.
  • Sovereignty conflicts and sovereignty itself are complex: they imply both benefits and burdens in many different areas.


In order to address the issue of complexity we must first make clear how the parties will not use any agreement reached for their benefit only, that is, the agreement must not be a subterfuge for any form of domination from one or more claiming parties in relation to the other(s). This is particularly important in territorial disputes like the one over Crimea in which there is a party considerably “stronger” than the other two.

Therefore, it is plausible to think the representatives will have a cautious view about the outcome. So, it is reasonable that the representatives in the negotiations may want some safeguards in order to secure their respective populations against any form of domination once the status quo is lifted.
Bearing in mind the previous discussions, it is reasonable for the representatives in the original position to agree on three basic points in order to share sovereignty before deciding how to do it (Núñez 2017):

  • First, it is prohibited to interfere with the internal or external affairs of any of the other agents.
  • Secondly, each agent will respect the liberties of the three populations; so no agreement reached can be interpreted in a way that curtails the basic non-political liberties of any of these populations. This point means that none of the agents is allowed to interfere in any way with the basic non-political liberties of the inhabitants of any of the other parties. 
  • Thirdly, the agents will conduct their mutual relations in light of the principles recognised by the law of peoples.


With these three pre-requisites agreed in the negotiations, once the status quo is lifted the negotiators secure that the agreement is not a subterfuge for domination of any kind, that the individuals of each population safeguard their basic non-political liberties, and that the three agents are free and autonomous from each other—i.e. in the case of Crimea that does not mean independence, hence the use of the word “autonomous.”

NOTE: This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).
Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, “Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue,” London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST: Crimea and the egalitarian shared sovereignty

Friday 06th March 2020
Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter: @London1701