China and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes

Introduction and Background

The South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes remain a critical geopolitical flashpoint in 2025, involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. These disputes, rooted in overlapping claims over islands, reefs, and maritime zones, encompass historical legacies, legal battles, and resource competition, affecting regional stability and global trade. My research, detailed in 20 posts from July to September 2020 (Territorial Disputes: South China Sea, Parts 1-20), predicted their persistence without radical rethinking, a forecast borne out by recent escalations. This analysis, informed by Sovereignty Conflicts (2017), Territorial Disputes (2020), and Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023), aims to provide a comprehensive overview, and aligned with my forthcoming Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025).

Latest Developments: Escalation and Energy Ambitions

As of April 2025, tensions in the SCS have intensified. On March 29, Reuters reported China’s military conducting “routine patrols” in response to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s reaffirmation of support for the Philippines, with Beijing accusing Manila of “illegal claims” and destabilizing the region. Aerial footage from March 24 (Newsweek) showed China installing floating barriers at Scarborough Shoal to block Philippine fishing boats, prompting Manila’s Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro to label China’s claims “the biggest fiction and lie” (AP News). On April 5, Eurasian Times revealed China’s construction of the world’s first permanent deep-sea research station, targeting gas hydrate reserves estimated at 80 billion tonnes of oil-equivalent energy—exceeding the Persian Gulf’s 50 billion tonnes—set to begin operations by 2030. This move underscores China’s energy ambitions, potentially reducing reliance on Middle Eastern oil.

Tensions spiked further with Vietnam’s expansion of Spratly Islands outposts, including an 8,000-foot airstrip at Barque Canada Reef (Newsweek, March 27), and joint U.S.-Philippine-Japan naval drills on March 28 (SCMP), drawing Beijing’s ire. My 2020 posts (Parts 1-5) traced this cycle to historical claims and colonial legacies, predicting escalation without equitable resource sharing, now evident in China’s energy gambit and regional pushback (South China Sea Part 6).

Historical Context: From Dynasties to Dashed Lines

China’s SCS claims trace back to the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), with intermittent maritime activity documented in ancient texts (South China Sea Part 2). The modern dispute crystallized post-World War II with the 1947 “nine-dash line,” encompassing 90% of the SCS, based on alleged historical fishing rights (South China Sea Part 3). Colonial powers—Spain, France, Britain—left ambiguous borders, exploited by Japan during WWII, setting a precedent for post-1945 contention (South China Sea Part 4). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) solidified this claim in 1949, clashing with newly independent Southeast Asian states (South China Sea Part 5).

The 2013 “ten-dash line” update intensified disputes, overlapping with exclusive economic zones (EEZs) under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (South China Sea Part 7). Parts 1-5 argued this historical narrative—lacking continuous control—fuels today’s legal and political battles, as seen in recent patrols and constructions.

Legal Context: Domestic, Regional, and International Impasses

The legal framework of the SCS disputes is multilayered, reflecting domestic, regional, and international dimensions:

Domestic: China’s 1992 Law on Territorial Sea asserts sovereignty over the SCS, rejecting UNCLOS norms (South China Sea Part 8). The 2021 Coast Guard Law authorizes force to defend these claims, escalating tensions (South China Sea Part 9), as seen in March 2025 patrols (Reuters).
Regional: ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on Conduct aimed for a Code of Conduct (CoC), but progress stalled by 2025, with China resisting binding terms (South China Sea Part 10). The Philippines’ 2016 arbitral win under UNCLOS—ruling China’s claims lack legal basis—was dismissed by Beijing, a non-signatory to the tribunal (South China Sea Part 11), highlighting enforcement gaps.
International: UNCLOS grants 200-nautical-mile EEZs, violated by China’s artificial islands (e.g., Mischief Reef) and patrols (South China Sea Part 12). The U.S. and allies uphold freedom of navigation (FONOPs), but lack enforcement power (South China Sea Part 13). Parts 16-20 argued legal frameworks crumble without enforcement—China’s rejection of the 2016 ruling and March 2025 actions affirm this.

Political Context: Power Plays at Multiple Levels

The political dynamics are equally complex, spanning domestic, regional, and international arenas:

Domestic: Xi Jinping’s leadership since 2012 has tied SCS dominance to national rejuvenation, bolstering the Communist Party’s legitimacy amid economic slowdown (South China Sea Part 14). Public support, fueled by nationalist sentiment, sustains this stance (CNA, March 11), as seen in state media narratives.
Regional: China pressures ASEAN states—e.g., harassing Philippine vessels at Scarborough Shoal (AP News, February 18)—while offering economic incentives via the Belt and Road Initiative (South China Sea Part 15). Vietnam’s outpost expansion (Newsweek, March 27) and Malaysia’s maritime security push (The Star, February 26) signal defiance, reflecting regional pushback.
International: U.S.-led alliances (e.g., Quad, AUKUS) counter China, with joint drills in March 2025 (SCMP) and increased EU-Japan naval presence (Nikkei Asia, March 7). Trump’s 2025 tariffs on China (commonslibrary.parliament.uk, March 12) intertwine trade with geopolitics, yet Beijing’s energy station gambit (Eurasian Times, April 5) aims to shift reliance from Middle Eastern oil (South China Sea Part 17). Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) sees this as distributive injustice—resources favor China—while Territorial Disputes (2020) notes value clashes (security vs. maritime rights).

Cultural and Religious Dimensions: Identity and Influence

Culturally, the SCS ties to Han Chinese identity as a maritime frontier, reinforced by state narratives of historical dominance (South China Sea Part 18). Fishermen from Hainan and Guangdong embody this claim, clashing with Southeast Asian counterparts (South China Sea Part 19), as seen in recent Scarborough Shoal incidents. Religiously, while less prominent, Buddhist and Taoist reverence for the sea subtly underpins China’s moral stance, contrasting with Christian-majority Philippines’ resistance (South China Sea Part 20).

Regionally, Vietnam’s Confucian heritage and the Philippines’ colonial Catholic legacy shape their defiance, framing China as an outsider (South China Sea Part 18). Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023) views this as a multi-agent tangle—state, culture, faith—distorting resolution, evident in polarized X posts like “China’s lies” (BRPSierraMadre, March 15) vs. “historical rights” (yuceltanay53, April 8).

Geopolitical Dynamics: A Global Chessboard

The South China Sea is a critical artery for global trade, with an estimated $3.4 trillion worth of trade passing through it annually, accounting for one-fifth of global maritime trade (Britannica). For China, 60% of its energy imports and 40% of its total trade traverse these waters, making the SCS indispensable for its economic and strategic interests (East Asia Forum, March 12). The disputes thus have far-reaching geopolitical implications, affecting not only regional stability but also global energy markets and trade routes. The involvement of extra-regional powers like the United States, which conducts freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s claims, underscores the global nature of the conflict (Newsweek, March 31). Additionally, the strategic competition between China and the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region is significantly shaped by the SCS disputes, with alliances such as the Quad (U.S., Japan, Australia, India) and AUKUS (Australia, U.K., U.S.) playing key roles in countering China’s assertiveness (Firstpost, March 23).

Natural Resources: The Prize Beneath

The South China Sea is not only a strategic waterway but also a repository of vast natural resources. According to estimates, the sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Eurasian Times, April 5). Moreover, recent developments highlight the potential of methane hydrates, with China’s deep-sea research station targeting reserves estimated at 80 billion tonnes of oil-equivalent energy. These resources are crucial for the energy security of the claimant states and have significant economic implications. For instance, China’s reliance on energy imports makes control over these resources vital for its long-term energy strategy. Similarly, Vietnam and the Philippines are keen on exploiting their EEZs for oil and gas exploration, which directly conflicts with China’s claims, as seen in the barriers at Scarborough Shoal (Newsweek, March 25).

Published Research and Open Data

The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) tracks China’s militarized islands (e.g., Subi Reef) and Vietnam’s expansions (Newsweek, March 27), providing empirical data on militarization. The UN’s February 19, 2025, statement condemned China’s helicopter incident near Scarborough Shoal (State.gov), but lacks enforcement, reflecting international limitations. X posts reflect polarization—“China’s lies” (BRPSierraMadre, March 15) vs. “historical rights” (yuceltanay53, April 8)—yet lack March-specific data. My 2020 posts (Parts 21-25, not posted) predicted civilian tolls from advanced warfare—fishermen’s losses in 2025 bear this out, as seen in Philippine reports (AP News, February 18).

UN and International Response: Stalled Efforts

The UN Security Council’s 2024 SCS resolutions were vetoed by China (Al Jazeera, February 21), echoing Parts 10-15’s critique of bias and weakness. ASEAN’s CoC talks falter (CNA, March 11), while U.S.-led drills (SCMP, March 30) signal deterrence over diplomacy. Sovereignty Conflicts (2017) decries this—fisheries disrupted—while Territorial Disputes (2020) notes power bargaining renders it impotent, as seen in stalled ASEAN-China negotiations.

Evidence vs. Manipulation

Parts 6-9 warned of narrative wars—2025 amplifies this. China claims precision in patrols (Reuters, March 29), yet Philippine losses mount (AP News, February 18). AMTI data ties actions to military aims, not proven targeting, despite Manila’s accusations (Territorial Disputes, 2020), highlighting the challenge of distinguishing intent.

New Paths: Beyond the Current Order

The SCS crisis exposes global order’s collapse—centralized bodies fail, as Parts 16-20 predicted. Cosmopolitanism and State Sovereignty (2023) urges multi-agent solutions; Territorial Disputes in the Americas (2025) refines this: regional frameworks over a paralyzed UN. ASEAN could mediate—its 2002 initiative offered peace for restraint, viable with Vietnam’s 2025 clout (Newsweek, March 27). Co-sovereignty—shared EEZ zones or joint resource management—could balance security and survival (Sovereignty Conflicts, 2017). This demands mindset shifts—China’s coalition resists (East Asia Forum), and ASEAN’s divisions rigidify lines. Temporary truces and pluralist coalitions (ASEAN, Quad) offer pragmatic pivots, as seen in recent drills (SCMP, March 30).

Conclusion

China’s SCS dispute in 2025—barriers at Scarborough, 80 billion tonnes of energy at stake, ASEAN’s defiance—mirrors my 2020 research: justice skews (fisheries lost), complexity entrenches (U.S.-China rift), and pluralism fractures (CoC stalled). Parts 1-5 rooted this historically, 6-15 exposed legal-political rot, 16-20 urged new lenses. Evidence ties tolls to military aims (AMTI), yet manipulation clouds truth (UN gaps). The current order fails—Sovereignty Conflicts demands equity, Territorial Disputes adaptability, Cosmopolitanism multi-agent hope. Regional guarantors and co-sovereignty chart exits, if rigid mindsets yield. My posts below—free online—trace this fault line; readers can join this reimagining.

Invitation to “The Borders We Share”

My series, The Borders We Share, launched March 4, 2025, probes these divides. My latest post (https://drjorge.world/2025/03/11/the-borders-we-share-khemeds-oil-crimeas-shadow-post-2/) ties Crimea’s 2014 shadow—2 million under Russia—to Ukraine’s fight, blending fiction (Khemed’s oil) and reality. I advocate co-sovereignty to heal—readers are invited to explore these shared edges, from Black Sea to Arctic, where 2025’s fate unfolds. Next week, Post #3: Sherlock’s Docks, Ireland’s Edge: Clues to Equal Ground (i.e. Imagine Sherlock Holmes untangling a dockside brawl over fish and fog—then picture Northern Ireland’s border after Brexit, a real-life riddle of fences and feelings).