A
TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, in simple terms, is a disagreement about “who owns a
territory.” Yet, a TERRITORIAL DISPUTE is not that simple. In international
relations, this means in principle there is a disagreement between at least two
parties in relation to whom the sovereign is over a piece of land. The Israel-Palestine
difference includes Israel, Palestine, the region and, to an extent,
many other people around the world. The previous posts introduced a brief
historical chronology, mentioned some key domestic and international reasons
behind this case, and included references to other regional and international
agents that have played (and in some cases, still do) a central role.
With
the previous cases covered by this series (Kashmir, the Falkland/Malvinas
islands, Gibraltar and the Israel-Palestine difference) we explored an ideal
solution called EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY in what has to do with
population, territory, government and law.
Before
going into any negotiations
we had to determine who may be a legitimate party. Like many other TERRTORIAL
DISPUTES, this issue maintain the conflict over Crimea in a status quo. The claiming parties do not
recognise reciprocally complete legitimacy to go into any negotiations about
the disputed territory. Therein, the last posts introduced the concept of
“colourable claim” and explored three different grounds: historical
entitlement, legal basis and moral standing. For one reason or another, Crimea,
Russia and Ukraine have grounds to introduce a claim (this is different from
saying they have the right to be sovereign over the territory). It only means Crimea,
Russia and Ukraine ought to be part in any negotiation concerning the
sovereignty (de jure and de facto) over Crimea.
The
reader may ask why Russian and Ukrainian representatives do not agree on a
common ground to start negotiations and settle peacefully and permanently the conflict over Crimea.
To give an answer I quote Huth once again below. The quotation
clearly illustrates that international and regional issues at stake are many
times dependent on domestic agendas (and viceversa). Briefly,
the difference still exists because there is no real will to solve it.
Huth
explains the dynamics:
“[…]
very often political leaders are not willing to take risks and undertake
diplomatic initiatives that will break a long-standing stalemate in
negotiations. Furthermore, leaders themselves are socialized into viewing the
target as an adversary and, as a result, they are not predisposed to view
concessions as a legitimate option. Furthermore, […] a history of military
conflict with the target can be used by the military to justify larger budgets
[…]. The combined effect, then, is that the idea of offering concessions and
proposing a unilateral initiative to break the stalemate is a policy option
quite difficult to get on the policy agenda of political leaders within the
challenger. Few voices are advocating such policies within the challenger, and
the prevailing climate of opinion (both mass and elite) is opposed to such a
change in policy.”
“[…] leaders were typically constrained by
domestic political forces to be very cautious in moving toward a compromise
settlement, since popular and elite opinion, and often the military, was
opposed to such a policy. [...] In most situations the leader’s position of
domestic power and authority was better served by continuing confrontation […]”
Huth, Paul K. 2001. Standing Your
Ground. Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. The University of
Michigan Press.
There is another option: to
think about how to solve this dispute. This series TERRITORIAL DISPUTES intends
to offer a platform for discussion.
With all this in mind, I
introduced the overall idea I call EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY. I develop
this approach in full in Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. “Sovereignty
Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue.”
London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. In short, all parties
share sovereignty in equal ideal terms. To get to that, these parties go into
negotiations themselves (not UN or any other party alien to the conflict).
The next post will very briefly
apply the EGALITARIAN SHARED SOVEREIGNTY to Crimea and see how cooperation between Russia and
Ukraine can result in a peaceful and permanent settlement materialised by joint
institutions.
Jorge
Emilio Núñez
13th
June 2018
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