By applying equality strictly, the agents would all receive equal
benefits and contribute equally towards the burdens. How would Borduria fulfil
its duty to defend Khemed? How would Khemedians defend themselves? The same
could be said about natural resources because although Khemedians, Syldavians
and Bordurians would receive the same share in terms of ownership, Khemedians and
Bordurians would not have the means to exploit them. Several other implications
could be drawn but the point is clear. It is both unreasonable and unfair to
expect three parties with different comparative situations in many different
areas to contribute in an equal manner or to receive an equal return.
Nevertheless, to apply the difference principle in the same form may have
similar consequences. Syldavia is the least advantaged in terms of natural
resources, so they will receive a larger share. Khemed is less advantaged than
Syldavia in terms of defence, so the latter will provide the means to defend
the third territory. But Borduria is the least advantaged in terms of wealth,
the natural resources in its territory are not part of the agreement so they
are not under discussion, and they do not have any means to defend the third
territory (Bordurians cannot even defend themselves). Would they have to
receive a larger share of the benefits resultant from the exploitation of
natural resources in Khemed with means provided by Syldavia? Indeed, this seems
unacceptable.
To recapitulate, there are two sovereign States Syldavia and Borduria claiming sovereignty over Khemed, a third populated insular territory. The three populations through their representatives agreed on sharing sovereignty over Khemed. They understand that they are dealing with many issues—i.e. activities or goods, and these many issues imply both benefits and burdens. So, to ask all of them to contribute equally and receive an equal return is not the solution. Neither is it for the better off in any given activity to contribute more and the least advantaged in any other activity to receive a larger benefit. They may either lead to domination or to continuous assistance. And because they do also know that they will maintain the agreement under the three pre-requisites, they keep their reciprocal non-interference and consider themselves reciprocally equals. In addition to this, they know it is a targeted agreement only referring to the third territory—i.e. this is not an agreement based on humanitarian reasons, domestic or global justice.
Thereby, the
representatives of Khemed, Syldavia and Borduria have decided:
Khemedians,
Syldavians and Bordurians have all the same right to participate in every aspect
of the sovereignty over Khemed. That is to say, they all have the opportunity
to present and amend proposals in relation to every aspect of the sovereignty
over Khemed (egalitarian consensus principle). Khemed shares in equal portions
natural resources with Syldavians and Bordurians. Syldavia shares in equal
portions the means for their exploitation with Khemed and Borduria. And
Borduria, because of their geographical location, will grant special privileges
for both Khemedian and Syldavian enterprises only related to the exploitation
of natural resources in Khemed (or any other activity but it must be related to
Khemed).
Indeed, either Khemed or Borduria may have issues in exploiting at the same level of efficiency as Syldavia their shares of natural resources. Hence, Syldavia must make sure that both the other agents reach the same level of exploitation or divide the benefits resultant amongst the three parties equally in the meantime—i.e. it is a targeted shared model.
The principle
can be seen in a larger picture across the board with different activities. At
first, the smaller and the larger the contribution, the smaller and the larger
the return respectively. But as the agreement aims to avoid domination (secure
non-interference) and has a target, it is to be expected a more evenly shared
contribution-return relationship amongst the parties will emerge in the long
term. That is to say in the example, at first Khemed would be defended by
Syldavia, and the latter would as well contribute to the exploitation of the
natural resources in the island (principle of efficiency). In principle,
Syldavians would receive a larger share of the resultant benefits—i.e. the
larger the contribution, the larger the return since Syldavia is contributing
towards both defence and exploitation of natural resources in a larger manner
than the other two agents (input-to-output ratio principle). This covers the
burdens-benefits part.
But, because
of the targeted agreement, Syldavia must make sure both Khemed and Borduria
reach relatively the same level for the defence of the third territory and the
exploitation of natural resources (equilibrium proviso). It is then when the
contributions amongst the three will be more even as well as the returns.
Meanwhile, and
in order to lessen the gap between contributions and benefits, Bordurians could
use the difference they have in their favour—i.e. geographically proximity
means a more accessible bilateral commerce with Khemed, faster and possibly
more effective response in case of international threat or attack, etc., things
that Syldavia cannot offer.
Moreover, as
the first pre-requisite prohibits interferences of any kind, and the second
pre-requisite specifically protects non-political liberties, different
religious beliefs between Khemedians and Bordurians could not be used for the
advantage or disadvantage of any of the populations. That is because they are in a certain order of priority. In other
words, the principle and the pre-requisites are lexically ordered. Therein, no
transgression of: a) the non-interference or non-domination principle; b) the
basic non-political liberties; and c) the principles recognised by the law of
peoples, is allowed under any excuse or reason even if that means not
fulfilling the ‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ principle.
NOTE: Post based on Chapter 6, Núñez, Jorge Emilio. 2017. Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Jorge Emilio
Núñez
9th
February 2018
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