A Distributive Justice Issue
Previously:
Introduction
Chapter Two
demonstrated that although sovereignty means supreme authority, that authority
always accepts limitations—i.e. sovereignty is not absolute. Consequently,
sovereignty is always—to an extent—shared. However, Chapter Three showed that
the way in which sovereignty may be shared is not always just, fair, or
offering the participant agents the same relative situation—e.g. if there is
unbalanced or unilateral sharing, when only one of the agents is actually
dictating how to proceed. So, it is necessary for the success of the
‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ model to demonstrate how these limitations
work, and also, that they do not imply involuntary interference with the
sovereignty of any of the participant agents. Therefore, before defining the model
of ‘egalitarian shared sovereignty’ in detail, a question must be answered: how
multiple agents can cooperate together, limit their freedom without negative
consequences either de jure or de facto, so that none of the agents
dictate to the other parties what to do or not to do. This problem arises
because sovereignty is mainly seen as a concept that implies a single agent,
limited in one way or another. However, this book assumes the existence of
multiple agents that will have an equal relative position in respect to the
third territory—i.e. a plurality of agents that have equal power, that are
simultaneously at the same level—legally speaking, that are sovereign at the
same time over the same territory and population.
In order to
demonstrate how two sovereign States can share their sovereignty—i.e. how far
sovereign States can cooperate together and limit their freedom without
sacrificing their sovereignty—it is convenient to see: a) firstly, what the
concept of ‘sovereignty’ means and implies by examining its subatomic or
fundamental elements; and b) secondly, how a concept with similar features
operates and accepts limitations without changing its nature. The former will
be achieved by using Wesley N. Hohfeld language for legal analysis. By
mastering a number of basic legal concepts it will be possible to analyse a
complex one such as ‘sovereignty’, avoid misunderstandings with regards to its
meaning and implications, and have a more clearly defined picture of how
limitations operate without changing its nature. The latter, by reference to
‘self-ownership’ as a concept. As in the case of sovereignty, self-ownership
establishes a particular relationship between an agent and something: supreme
authority. Unlike sovereignty, this supreme authority is present at the level
of the individual. In other words, self-ownership defines the supreme authority
an individual has over himself; sovereignty defines the supreme authority a
State has over a territory and people. Thus, at first glance both
self-ownership and sovereignty appear to be supreme, singular and hence not
shareable. More explicitly, self-ownership has the same kind of relation to an
individual that sovereignty has to a State: both self-ownership and sovereignty
are essential characteristics in defining a free individual and a free State,
respectively. Then, if limitations in the form of self- or external constraints
can be applied to self-ownership, limitations in the form of self- and external
obligations can be applied to sovereignty. In consequence, as self- or
externally imposed limitations in regard to self-ownership allow any individual
to cooperate with any other individual, so self- or externally imposed
obligations on sovereignty enable a State to cooperate with other States too
without diminishing its sovereignty.
More preview posts coming in 2017.
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