Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 14) [Post 174]

 

Oman and the United Arab Emirates

The UAE-Oman relationship has been marked by tremendous changes and rapid developments. During the past three decades, unresolved boundary disputes have not hindered the two countries’ quest for greater economic cooperation, which eventually led to a better relationship. 

The 1999 UAE-Oman border pact distinguished itself in one specific aspect: the two countries enhanced their socioeconomic relations exponentially. The accord opened the door for cooperation in the fields of trade, tourism, investment and other areas.49 The UAE investment in Oman reached very high levels, with almost $5 billion invested in the last three decades.

A boundary agreement reportedly signed and ratified with UAE in 2003 for entire border, including Oman's Musandam Peninsula and Al Madhah exclave, but details of the alignment have not been made public (i.e. contents of the agreement and detailed maps showing the alignment have not been published).

Historical Background

In the second half of the 1940s, two major political changes took place in the Arab Gulf region. 

The first was the transfer of Britain’s Political Residency headquarters from Bushire on the Persian side of the Gulf to Bahrain on the Arab side. This transfer resulted in the severing of London’s longstanding connection with Persia, marking the renewed importance of the Arab Gulf emirates. 

The second was the transfer on April 1, 1949, of responsibility for the Political Residency from the government of India to the Foreign Office in London. This marked a new British attitude towards the lower Gulf.

Until the 1930s, because of specific agreements with several rulers, the British refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of what were called the Trucial Sheikhdoms, so long as the peace at sea was kept.

British attitudes towards the Sultanate of Oman, on the other hand, were sharply different. Omani “independence” had been ensured after Britain and France undertook to respect a sovereign Sultanate in 1892.

Equally important, the British perceived their relationship with the sultan as a useful counterbalance to their various “relationships” elsewhere in the region. Indeed, London persuaded successive sultans to greet nascent emirates with less than full support, if not outright hostility. In part as a result of this legacy, and in part because of its own imperial history, Omani perceptions of the emirates before 1971, and the UAE after, have resulted in incident-prone ties.

Between 1952 and 1999, the UAE-Oman relationship went through four distinct phases: 1952-71, tense relations dominated by the Buraimi crisis; 1971-79, political thaw; 1979-99, more relaxed political and economic exchanges; post-May 1999, a far more optimistic outlook, provided various actors abandoned past suspicions.

The UAE and Oman: Opportunities and Challenges

Link to the complete document

CIA’s World Factbook

Link to the complete document

Oman and UAE: Comparisson Chart

Link to the complete document

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Qatar and Saudi Arabia

Thursday 10th December 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

"The Responsibility Not to Veto and the Syrian Conflict" by Dr Yasmine Nahlawi [video]

 

"The Responsibility Not to Veto and the Syrian Conflict"

by Dr Yasmine Nahlawi

PhD Newcastle University

Juris North Monthly Discussion

Wednesday 09th December 2020.

Wednesday 09th December 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 13) [Post 173]

 

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

A territory of 2,200 square miles (5,700 square km) along the gulf was shared by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as a neutral zone until a political boundary was agreed on in 1969. 

Each of the two countries now administers half of the territory (called the Neutral, or Partitioned, Zone), but they continue to share equally the revenues from oil production in the entire area. Although the boundary with Saudi Arabia is defined, the border with Iraq remains in dispute.

Historical Background

In the northern part of the country, Saudi Arabia contested territory with Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait and these border disputes were not resolved until 1965, 1981, and 2000 respectively. 

In 1922, even before the creation of the new state, Ibn Saud, the leader of the territory of Najd (the bulk of what makes up Saudi Arabia today), issued a claim against the British along the borders of what is now Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan after the British took over territory in that area formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire.

As with the zone between Iraq and Najd, the Kuwait-Najd zone was also about 2,500 square miles of desert. It was decided that “until through the good offices of the government of Great Britain a further agreement is made between Najd and Kuwait,” both states would have equal access to the neutral zone, including any future resources found there, particularly oil. 

After oil was discovered in the neutral zone in 1938, both states granted concessions to foreign oil companies, but it was not until the late 1950s that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait started bilateral negotiations on sovereignty rights to the zone, as well as maritime rights in the offshore area (about 40 miles). 

In late 1960, the two states came to an agreement to equally divide the neutral zone and a committee of boundary experts pursued delimitation for a number of years. 

In July 1965 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait signed a Partition Agreement in which the neutral zone was equally divided, extending out to six miles of each annexed section with regard to maritime rights. Demarcation formally occurred in December 1968, with the land boundary dispute resolved, but the maritime dispute unresolved.

The maritime boundary dispute not only included water rights, but also sovereignty over two islands, Qaru and umm al-Maradim, located respectively about 23 and 16 miles away from the former neutral zone. 

Neither state took any actions with regard to their maritime boundary or rights to the islands until in January 2000 when Iran began to drill in an offshore gas feld that was claimed by both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 

This mutual threat motivated Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to sign an agreement in July 2000 to delimit their maritime boundaries, giving Kuwait sovereignty of the two disputed islands, with natural gas reserves in the area to be shared equally by the two states.

The Partition Zone

ONSHORE: Wafra Joint Operations (WJO)

The Onshore Operations covers an area of approximately 5000 square kilometers located in the Partitioned Zone between State of Kuwait and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The natural resources contained therein are equally shared by both countries. The area is currently operated jointly by Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC, representing State of Kuwait) and Saudi Arabian Chevron (SAC, representing Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).

 
The operations are managed by Wafra Joint Operations (WJO). WJO assets are staffed and funded equally by KGOC and SAC to explore, develop and produce oil and gas out of several fields and reservoirs in the area. The first discovery in this area was made in 1954 by drilling and completing the first well in the Wafra Field. Six major fields have been discovered in the area to date; Wafra, South Fuwaris, South Umm-Gudair, Humma, Arq and North Wafra.

OFFSHORE: Khafji Joint Operations (KJO)

The offshore Operations covers an area of approximately 7000 square kilometers is in the Partitioned Zone between State of Kuwait and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The natural resources contained therein are equally shared by both countries. The area is currently operated jointly by Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC representing State of Kuwait) and Aramco Gulf Oil Company, (AGOC, "representing Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).

 
The operations are managed by Khafji Joint Operations (KJO). KJO assets are staffed and funded equally by KGOC and AGOC to explore, develop and produce oil and gas out of several fields and reservoirs in the area.

The well was drilled in 1960 by AOC (Arabian Oil Company), known as K-001 (Khafji Field Well #1) in the Khafji Field. Four major fields have been discovered in the area to date; Khafji, Hout, Dorra and Lulu. 

Resolution of Border Disputes in the Arabian/Persian Peninsula

Link to the complete document

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: Neutral Zone

Link to the complete document

The Partition Zone

Link to the complete document

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Oman and the United Arab Emirates

Wednesday 09th December 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 12) [Post 172]

 

Iraq and Kuwait

The two countries have had a difficult relationship since the 1950s. Iraq was under a British mandate and received its independence in 1932 while Kuwait enjoyed British protective status until independence in 1961. 

In that year, which was three years after the collapse of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy, Kuwait’s newly acquired independence was threatened by Iraqi strongman Abd al-Karim Qasim, who claimed its territory as part of Iraq. 

These threats prompted British troops to redeploy in Kuwait temporarily to protect the country’s sovereignty and British interests there. The United Arab Republic, comprised of Egypt and Syria, also sent troops to protect Kuwait at the behest of the Arab League and to replace British troops. Faced with these actions, Qasim eventually backed down from his threats of annexation.

Kuwaiti leaders have been wary of Iraqi designs on their oil-rich territory since that time. However, because it saw Iran as the greater threat, Kuwait aided Iraq during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War by providing Baghdad with billions of dollars’ worth of loans. 

After the conflict ended, Kuwait and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) asked Iraq to pay them back, which led to renewed tensions with Baghdad.

In 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of overproducing to depress oil prices as well as diagonally drilling for oil into Iraqi territory. This caused a crisis in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations as well as in the broader Arab world. 

Despite mediation attempts by Egypt and others, Saddam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait that summer and to incorporate it into Iraq, calling Kuwait Iraq’s “19th province”, and imposing a brutal occupation on the country. 

This invasion then prompted the United States to send troops—initially a protective force—to Saudi Arabia while it helped to assemble a large coalition of countries, Arab and non-Arab, to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait by force in early 1991 and impose a tight sanctions regime on Iraq.

Definition of the boundary

The boundary between what is now Iraq and Kuwait has been defined in four instruments during the course of the twentieth century.

(i) Anglo-Turlcish Convention, 1913

The first formal definition of Kuwait’s northern and western boundaries was contained in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 29 July 1913 (14), by which the British and Ottoman Government reached agreement on their respective spheres of influence in the Arabian Gulf. 

As part of this agreement, the status of Kuwait was settled and its boundaries fixed. Kuwait was separated from the adjacent vïlayet or province of Basra of the Otto­ man Empire to the north and west, by two lines.

(ii) Exchange, of letters, 1923

After the defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, it was decided by the Principal Allied Powers that the Mesopotamian provinces of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra should form the self-governing State of Iraq, and that Great Britain should administer it under a League of Nations mandate until it was ready for independence. 

Owing to the strength of nationalist sentiment, a mandate agreement in the usual form, between the League and the mandatory, was not drawn up. Instead, Great Britain concluded a Treaty of Alliance in 1922 (16) with the King of Iraq, who had been installed as a constitutional monarch the previous year. 

Under this agreement, the British were to provide King Faisal with advice and assistance in the administration of the country, and had the right to give binding advice to him on ail important matters affecting the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty. It did not define the boun­daries of Iraq.

iii) Exchange of letters, 1932

The mandate for Iraq was terminated on 3 October 1932, Iraq having on the same day become an independent sovereign State and been admitted to membership of the League of Nations. 

Meanwhile, at the instigation and through the intermediary of the British, an agreement had been reached between Iraq and Kuwait to reaffirm the existing frontier between the two countries, by means of an exchange of letters in July and August 1932 bet­ ween the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al Sa’id, and the Ruler of Kuwait

(iv) Agreement of 1963

Kuwait attained full independence on 19 June 1961. Six days later, the Iraqi leader, General Kassem, claimed sovereignty over the whole of Kuwait. British and Saudi troops went to Kuwait’s defence, to be replaced shortly afterwards by an Arab League defence force. Following the overthrow of General Kassem in February 1963 and his replacement by President Aref, relations between Iraq and Kuwait improved; and, on 4 Oetober 1963, an agreement was entered into by which Iraq, amongst other things, ’recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the state of Kuwait.

Iraq – Kuwait Relations (Arab Center Washington DC)

Link to the complete document

Iraq – Kuwait Boundary (Legal Aspects)

Link to the complete document

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

Tuesday 08th December 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 11) [Post 171]

 

Iran and Kuwait

Kuwait is a small country with an area of 17,820 km2, located at the top of the Arabian/Persian Gulf. It is the passage to the northeast of the peninsula, and the link between the island and the plains Tigris and Euphrates and the Iranian plateu behind it, which makes it of commercial importance.

Kuwait is located among countries which are considered in the region as medium, competitive and influential. Its policy is characterized by neutrality and balance, with a mediating role between middle powers because it enjoys balanced relations among them.

Iran, which covers an area of 1,633,188 km2, located in Central Asia, with the Caspian Sea on the north, Afghanistan and Pakistan on the east, the Arabian/Persian Gulf on the south, the Gulf of Oman, and Iraq on the west. It is considered as a natural passage for international trade an overseas the most important regional water straits, the Strait of Hormuz.

Kuwait and Iran have a common maritime border, which led to some kind of communication between them, and make Kuwait one of the closest points of convergence between the Iranian plateu, and the Arabian/Persian peninsula.

Territorial Dispute

Key facts:

• The negotiation between the parties started in 1960s.
• Parties are in agreement to ignore all of the small islands.
• The existence of islands of Kharg and Failaka cannot be ignored due to their importance.
• Soroosh oil field is another special circumstance in the delimitation area.
• There are no differences between the parties concerning the method of delimitation.
• The main dispute is the selection of the base points to draw the median line.
• Iran supported the median line with given full effect to Kharg island.
• Kuwait insisted that Failaka island must be considered as part of the Kuwaiti coastline.
• In 1970 parties agreed that both Kharg and Failaka should be considered as being within the baseline of Iran and Kuwait. The final continental shelf delimitation has remained suspended in view of the Kuwait boundary dispute with Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
• The delimitation negotiation between parties is ongoing.

Iran, Kuwait and the GCC

Internal politics, the sectarian balance within its mixed Persian and Arab Shia population, and regional tensions have shaped Kuwait’s relations with Iran. Kuwait has distinguished itself by actively seeking to reduce regional sectarian tensions. In 2017, it promoted mediation with Iran and Qatar when relations with the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states were at a low. Kuwait, like Oman, has historically rejected the Saudi-led call for greater GCC integration, a position Iran has tried to capitalize on.

Kuwait shared its neighbours’ anxieties when the Iranian revolution took place and feared its spread. In addition, during the initial period of the Iran–Iraq war, several terror attacks in Kuwait were traced to Iranian support for local Shia groups. In response, Kuwait supported Iraq, which resulted in Iran eventually retaliating by targeting Kuwaiti oil facilities and tankers in 1987. 

After the war, relations remained strained until Iran condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, opening the door to post- Gulf war diplomacy and increased economic and political interaction, which grew most during the Khatami presidency. Sectarian tensions also abated after the first Gulf war, mainly due to increased domestic support among Kuwaiti Shia who rallied around the Al Sabah ruling family and supported the war resistance efforts. In 2003, Iran and Kuwait signed a security cooperation treaty, which has been followed up by further MoUs designed to improve trade, cooperation and trust.

The United Kingdom, the Region and Kuwait

In 1899 the British concluded a treaty of protection with the ruler of Kuwait, along the lines of treaties they had already concluded in the early part of the nineteenth century with Bahrain and the Trucial States. By this agreement, the Shaikh of Kuwait pledged not to receive representatives of foreign powers, sell or lease land, or conduct foreign policy without the agreement of the British Government.

Shortly after, in 1904, the first Political Agent was appointed, a British member of the Government in India, who was responsible for giving advice to the Shaikh (the advice, particularly in foreign affairs, was effectively binding upon the ruler); his responsibility was to the Political Resident in the Gulf and through him the Government of India, rather than the India Office in London.

In 1913, the Shaikh of Kuwait promised Great Britain that he would not give an oil concession to anyone expect a person appointed by the British Government. So, by the outbreak of war in 1914, at which point the British recognised Kuwait’s complete independence from the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait was effectively a British protectorate, and the British had an exclusive oil agreement.

Iran and the GCC Hedging, Pragmatism and Opportunism

Link to the complete document  

The Present and Future of the Kuwaiti – Iranian Relations and their Influence on the Security of the Arabian Gulf

Link to the complete document

Continental Shelf Delimitation in the Persian Gulf

Link to the complete document

A Struggle for Supremacy? Great Britain, the United States and Kuwait

Link to the complete document

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Iraq and Kuwait

Monday 07th December 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 10) [Post 170]

 

Iran – Iraq: The Shatt al-Arab waterway

The Shatt al-Arab River forms the boundaries between Iran and Iraq before flowing into the Persian Gulf. Due to its strategic importance for both Iraq and Iran, for centuries both countries have defended their sovereignty rights over the river. The Shatt al-Arab dispute was an important cause which led to the outbreak of the 1980-1988 war between Iraq and Iran.

Conflict History

The delimitation of the Shatt al-Arab River has been a point of contention between the co-riparians for centuries. Tensions due to incompatible sovereignty claims over the river escalated in the 1960s and led to a full-scale war between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988. 

Recently, after centuries of dispute, bilateral strains have been normalised and the co-riparians have concluded an agreement on both the delimitation and the joint management of the Shatt al-Arab River.

Strategic importance of the Shatt al-Arab River for both Iran and Iraq

The Shatt al-Arab River is formed by the confluence of the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers in Iraq. The river constitutes the border between Iraq and Iran on the last 50 miles of the river and continues to flow down to the Persian Gulf. Being the only access point of Iraq to the Persian Gulf, the Shatt al-Arab River has a strategic importance for the country’s transportation and exports. 

Moreover, given the dry and humid climate in this part of the Middle East, the water from the river is crucial for agriculture. Although Iran has other accesses to the Gulf, a high quantity of crude oil produced in Iran is transported through the Shatt al-Arab River.

In addition to that, this river also symbolises a cultural line between Persians and Arabs. This boundary illustrates the many fault lines between Iran and Iraq: Shi’a vs. Sunni Government; heir of Persian Empire vs. heir of Ottoman Empire; Fundamentalist/Secular Government. 

The delimitation of the Shatt al-Arab River’s borders has been a point of contention between Ottomans and Persians for centuries and both empires have sought to control it. After the Second World War, and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the dispute shifted to an Iraq-Iran conflict.

Not only Iran – Iraq: The United Kingdom

The British government was involved in the issue ever since 1847, when the treaty of Erzerum of May 31, 1847 was negotiated and signed between representatives of Iran and Ottoman Empire as the main parties as well as the representatives of Russia and Great Britain.

Later, during demarcation of frontiers of these two countries, which was dragged on until 1913-14, the British played a crucial role. The dispute over the Waterway flowing between Iran and Iraq called "Shatt - al - Arab", was an issue involving Iran - Iraqi relations. After the First World War as a successor state, but as until 1932 the British government had a mandate over Iraq, it was the Anglo - Iranian diplomacy which served instead.

During the negotiations between Iran and Ottoman Empire in 1845-47, British and Russian representatives, as two rival powers pursuing their own interests, participated in the negotiations, and as a party to the dispute tried to influence the outcome, that is to say, the British supported the Ottoman’s arguments and the Russian supported the Iranian side. Later on, by submitting a partial comment on the treaty provisions in favour of the Ottoman Empire, the treaty itself became a source of dispute between the two parties.

Iraq-Iran: from Water Dispute to War

Link to the complete document

A Historical Review of British Role in Iran-Iraqi Dispute on the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway

Link to the complete document

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Iran and Kuwait

Friday 04th December 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world

Territorial disputes: The Persian Gulf (Part 9) [Post 169]

 

The Persian Gulf: Iran, UAE and the “Three Islands”

The previous post introduced Iran in the context of the Persian Gulf and TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. Today, the blog series introduce the difference in relation to “three islands.”

The islands – with Abu Musa and Lesser Tunb located 38 and 22 nautical miles from the Iranian coast respectively and, by way of comparison, both are nearly 32 nautical miles from Ras Al-Khaimah – have been forcibly occupied by Iran since 1971. 

Publicly, neither party to the dispute shows the slightest willingness to compromise on the sovereignty issue. The islands themselves, apart from some oil deposits (both on land and in their territorial waters) and deposits of red oxide, have little value in terms of resources. 

All three of them are small, and Lesser Tunb is tiny, uninhabited and without potable water. Even Abu Musa, the most well-endowed of the three, has an area of no more than four square miles, a population of around 2,000 people in 2012, three small oil wells and diminishing deposits of red oxide.

The dispute seems to be in part the manifestation of much deeper regional rivalries: the islands are psychologically important to both Arabs and Iranians vying for regional influence and respect. They are powerful symbols of nationalism, status, prestige and regional authority.

Beyond the historic contestation and symbolism of the islands, their significance is strategic, as they lie close to the Strait of Hormuz through which passes 35 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil and thousands of tons of commercial shipping on a daily basis.

Bases for the Claims

Iran bases its claim to the islands on a chain of ownership through various ancient Persian empires dating back to the sixth century BCE. The political and commercial domination of Iran over the Persian Gulf in the Seleucial (312- 150 BC), Parthian (238 BC-224 AD), and Sassanid (224-641 AD) period points to the conclusion that in pre-Islamic times the [Tunbs] and Abu Musa most likely belonged to Iran. 

Arguably, despite its claim of dominating the Gulf continuously for over two thousand years, Iran has not yet come forward with any records of its own that display or document an earlier connection with the islands.

Scholars who support the UAE’s claim to the islands disagree with the idea that Persian empires continuously ruled the Persian Gulf, especially after the rise of Islam. the Gulf became a purely Arab "lake" with the Islamic conquests in the seventh century AD. 

Even in the periods following the decline of the early Islamic Caliphate, local powers, especially in Oman, maintained control and sovereignty over the region as a whole.

The historical records show that the Arab Qawasim tribes of Ras Al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Lingeh made use of the islands from the eighteenth century onwards. The British, as the dominant power in the region, supported the Qawasim claims to the islands largely because they were anxious to contain and limit the infuence of Persia in the Gulf. 

British support of the Qawasim tribes was later translated into their support of the emirate of Sharjah’s claims to Abu Musa, and the Ras Al-Khaimah emirate’s claims to the Tunbs. When these emirates were united into the UAE, the new state inherited these claims, all of which are contested by Iran.

Unfortunately, there is a problem with both the Iranian and Arab versions of history: there is no surviving documentation from pre-colonial times about sovereignty over these three particular islands.

The Three Islands

Link to the complete document

Iran. A Country Study

Link to the complete document

Disputes Islands Between UAE and Iran

Link to the complete document

NOTE:  

This post is based on Jorge Emilio Núñez, Territorial Disputes and State Sovereignty. International Law and Politics (Routledge 2020).

Previous published research monograph about territorial disputes and sovereignty by the author, Jorge Emilio Núñez, Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics: A Distributive Justice Issue London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2017.

NEXT POST:

Iran – Iraq: The Shatt al-Arab waterway

Thursday 03rd December 2020

Dr Jorge Emilio Núñez

Twitter: @DrJorge_World

https://drjorge.world