South
China Sea and the United States
Washington argues that the United Nations
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) permits nations to exercise “high seas freedoms,” which
include, inter alia, peaceful military operations, in the Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) of coastal states. China disagrees. It claims that these are not
peaceful activities. This disagreement has resulted in two serious incidents:
the 2001 mid-air collision between a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft (EP-3) and
an intercepting Chinese
navy fighter, and the 2009 episode in which
Chinese fishermen and paramilitary ships harassed USNS Impeccable. More recently, a dangerously close intercept
of a U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft created another diplomatic dustup.
For the United States, the South China Sea is an
important area of the Asia-Pacific region for three reasons: 1) it is part of a
major transit route for maritime commercial traffic to and from East Asia and
for the United States Navy; 2) disputes over the ownership of its many small
islands, reefs, atolls, and rocks among China and several nearby Southeast
Asian states (including one United States ally, the Philippines) are generating
tensions that could result in conflict and instability; and 3) Beijing could
eventually use its growing influence in the area to create a sphere of
influence detrimental to United States interests.
In contrast, many in China see the United States
as using the disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea and elsewhere as
a means of justifying more concerted efforts to contain and undermine all Chinese
influence in the Asia-Pacific, and to encourage other states to provoke China
and militarize the issue.
The Obama administration’s policy
placed significant emphasis on diplomatic and collaborative efforts—from
increasing criticisms of Chinese actions in the region, to mobilizing legal
dispute mechanisms over these disputes, to calling for the Southeast Asian
“claimants” to work with one another and the United States to increase
diplomatic leverage.
On
balance, though, the policy focused more on the diplomatic side with
considerable caution on increasing military involvement or actions, especially
toward China.
In
this sense, the Obama approach did not appear to be responsive to domestic
calls, both from Congress—across party lines—and many in the policy community,
for a more vigorous stand on these disputes. Instead, the administration seemed
to be following an approach consistent with its more measured and accommodative
course to foreign policy.
The
Trump administration’s approach so far has pursued a more mixed response on the
South China Sea issue. Initially, the administration seemed to signal a more
robust response to China in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the present
political environment provides the necessary conditions for domestic
politics to affect the future direction of policy toward the South China Sea.
To counter the possibility of China’s successful
use of geoeconomic stratagem, the US is using the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) as outlined by the Obama administration and withdrawn by the Trump administration
in a first phase, although there is current consideration of whether the agreement
should be amended.
The TPP can be characterized as a preferable
excluding agreement, a regional arrangement, in which a large world power such
as the United States, should contribute more to the development of investments
and global trade, than blocking the initiatives in progress of other regional
powers, such as the ASEAN.
The
South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future
America’s Security Role in the South China
Sea
American Domestic Politics, Public
Opinion, and the South China Sea Disputes
United States’ Policy Strategy in South China Sea
Jorge Emilio Núñez
Twitter:
@London1701
21st September 2018
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