Saturday, 29 April 2017

Book Presentation. Bucharest. April 2017 [video]


Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics

A Distributive Justice Issue


© 2017 – Routledge

 

Many conflicts throughout the world can be characterised as sovereignty conflicts in which two States claim exclusive sovereign rights for different reasons over the same piece of land. It is increasingly clear that the available remedies have been less than successful in many of these cases, and that a peaceful and definitive solution is needed. This book proposes a fair and just way of dealing with certain sovereignty conflicts. Drawing on the work of John Rawls this book considers how distributive justice theories can be in tune with the concept of sovereignty and explores the possibility of a solution for sovereignty conflicts based on Rawlsian methodology. Jorge E. Núñez explores a solution of egalitarian shared sovereignty, evaluating what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would, best realise shared sovereignty, and how it might be applied to territory, population, government and law.

Jorge E. Núñez is Senior Lecturer at Manchester Law School, UK and Visiting Professor at Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales, UNLP, Argentina
 
Amazon

Friday, 21 April 2017

IVR 2017: Special Workshop OBJECTIVITY AND LAW [Call for Papers]



Special Workshop OBJECTIVITY AND LAW 


Organizers 
Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora | Jorge Emilío Núñez | Gonzalo Villa Rosas 
XXVIII World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR) 

NEW VENUE FOR 2017 IVR CONGRESS: LISBON

 16 – 21 July 2017 


Presentation 
What is the relation between rule of law and legal reasoning? Which are the necessary conditions required by the rule of law for an adequate legal reasoning? Are judicial decisions fallible? Are there right answers to legal questions? Can legal reasoning be objective when it must answer moral questions? Are there legal facts? What kind of facts are legal facts? Do legal facts suppose moral facts? Are legal facts independent from moral facts? Are there moral facts? What kind of facts are moral facts? Can moral and legal facts be identical to, reducible to, or constituted by natural facts? What are the epistemic conditions which are required for obtaining suitable legal decisions and right moral answers? These and related questions will be addressed by our speakers from metaethical and legal philosophical perspectives. A compilation book of the papers presented at the Worshop will be published in a Journal. 
Notes: Open to additional interested participants. The abstracts and brief academic biography should be submitted by no later than Friday 28th October 2016. 
Language: The abstracts must be written in English or Spanish, and it should be under 400 words. The sessions will be held in English. 
Contact: objectivityandlaw.ws2017@gmail.com 


OrganizersJorge Luis Fabra Zamora (Co-Chair) 
Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora, Ph.D Candidate, Philosophy, McMaster University and External Research, FUCTO School of Law. My research legal philosophy, international law and philosophy of private law. 
Jorge Emilío Núñez (Co-Chair) 
Jorge Emilio Núñez, PhD in Law (Manchester-UK). Senior Lecturer in Law (Manchester-UK). Profesor de Derecho (UNLP-Argentina). Areas of research: jurisprudence, legal theory, political theory, international relations. Various international publications and events worldwide as key speaker. 
Gonzalo Villa Rosas (Co-Chair) 
Gonzalo Villa Rosas, Ph.D. Candidate in Law and Philosophy, Christian-Albrechts Universität (Germany); LL.M. Summa Cum Laude, Christian-Albrechts Universität (Germany); Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) with distinction from the Universidad Externado de Colombia (Colombia); M.e.Ph. Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Colombia). Areas of research: legal theory, argumentation theory, and meta-ethics. 

IVR 2017: Special Workshop "THE CONCEPT OF LAW" [Call for Papers]



Special Workshop THE CONCEPT OF LAW: ELEMENTS AND NATURE 
[Call for Papers]


Organizers 
Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora | Jorge Emilío Núñez | Gonzalo Villa Rosas 
XXVIII World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR) 

NEW VENUE FOR 2017 IVR CONGRESS: LISBON

16 – 21 July 2017 


Presentation 
Law has been defined in many forms and characterised by using essential, non-essential, necessary, sufficient, and even desirable conditions. Following Stammler’s classification of the four themes in law, that is ontology, axiology, formal logic and transcendental logic, the workshop aims to explore the law, its ontology and its nature. What are the essential conditions defining law? Do “essential” and “necessary” refer to the same conditions? Following recent works by Yankah and Schauer there seems to be renewed interest in elements that post-Hartian Anglo-American legal philosophy had long ago discarded: are the Hartian criticisms to Kelsenian and post-Kelsenian hard positivism still valid? Is coercion an essential element of law? Is legitimacy an essential element of law? Which are the relations between coercion and legitimacy of law? Which are the conditions for legitimacy of law? Is objectivity a condition for law and its legitimacy? These and related questions will be addressed by our speakers. A compilation book of the papers presented at the Worshop will be published in a Journal. 

NOTES: Open to additional interested participants. The abstracts should be sent to the contact email by 10th May, 2017. Please send your manuscripts by 4th June, 2017. 
Language: The abstracts must be written in English or Spanish, and it should be under 400 words. The sessions will be held in English. 
Contact: conceptoflaw.ws2017@gmail.com 


OrganizersJorge Luis Fabra Zamora (Co-Chair) 
Jorge Luis Fabra Zamora, Ph.D Candidate, Philosophy, McMaster University and External Research, FUCTO School of Law. Areas of research: legal philosophy, international law and philosophy of private law. 
Jorge Emilío Núñez (Co-Chair) 
Jorge Emilio Núñez, PhD in Law (Manchester-UK). Senior Lecturer in Law (Manchester-UK). Profesor de Derecho (UNLP-Argentina). Areas of research: jurisprudence, legal theory, political theory, international relations. Various international publications and events worldwide as key speaker. 
Gonzalo Villa Rosas (Co-Chair) 
Gonzalo Villa Rosas, Ph.D. Candidate in Law and Philosophy, Christian-Albrechts Universität (Germany); LL.M. Summa Cum Laude, Christian-Albrechts Universität (Germany); Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) with distinction from the Universidad Externado de Colombia (Colombia); M.e.Ph. Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Colombia). Areas of research: legal theory, argumentation theory, and meta-ethics. 


How could the egalitarian shared sovereignty work in practice? “have you incorporated a gender analysis into your thinking? If not why not?”



Chapter Six (Núñez 2017) shows that egalitarian shared sovereignty is a fair way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts and that it is unreasonable to reject it as a way of solving them. That is because the fairness of the outcomes of the original position was secured by the conditions under which the choice was made. It is crucial time to evaluate if the general principles of the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be extended to workable institutions that realise these principles. That is the aim of Chapter Seven (Núñez 2017), to work out what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would best, realise the egalitarian shared sovereignty.

Two clarifications have to be made prior the application of the principles reviewed in Chapter Six. First, in order to apply these principles three actual sovereignty conflicts are used in Chapter Seven—namely, Kashmir, Falkland/Malvinas Islands and Gibraltar. There are many reasons to proceed in this way, in particular because it is actually possible to see how these principles work in real states of affairs rather than in an only theoretical environment. However, as the selected conflicts have all the elements essential to the model which is the object of this monograph, the conclusions will be fully applicable to similar disputes.
Second, the principles reviewed in Chapter Six have to be applied in a sovereignty conflict; more specifically, they have to be applied to a populated third territory and all that it involves. However, what does exactly the third territory involve? In order to answer this question, there are some points that must be discussed beforehand: first, to define the constitutive elements of the third territory; and second, to select which of those elements will be analysed through the proposed principle. The reason to proceed this way is mainly pragmatic. To do an exhaustive analysis of every component of the third territory would be out of the scope of a monograph of this nature. However, to demonstrate how the selected principles work is essential in order to prove the usefulness of this project.
[…]

Although population, territory and government can be seen as essential elements in order to establish a societal political organisation—sovereign or not—they presuppose others that give flesh to them: currency, market, defence, language, religion, etc. What are the elements or sub-elements to which the agreed principles are going to be applied? To answer this question, different criteria can be followed. Some of these elements are necessary in order for the third territory to exist, some others sufficient and most of them only desirable. Some of them can be divided; some cannot. From this account it can be maintained that the elements that constitute the third territory can be characterised and classified from different angles. However, there is a common feature to all of them and to sovereignty conflicts in general: controversy—i.e. the fact that every involved agent wants a larger share, even an exclusive one, over elements or sub-elements considered valuable. Even if some of these elements may be necessary, but not controversial—i.e. if the parties are not in dispute about what should be done about them—no negotiation is necessary. However, some others, if they are only desirable, may be matter of controversy. It is to these that the principles reached will be applied.


Therein, in answer to the question “have you incorporated a gender analysis into your thinking? If not why not?” The issue of gender is incorporated indirectly when Chapter Seven deals with population (Kashmir) and government and law (Gibraltar). Indeed, the model I propose in Núñez 2017 and its methodology can be applied to gender issues within a sovereignty conflict context. However, the model I propose in Núñez 2017 and its methodology would need to be applied in particular to a given case scenario and the issue of gender to have a more detailed outcome.